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Aijstract
This study is an attempt to construct o social profile of 
the Juoiciary of the superior courts uurin^ the period 1820-1 9 6 8.
The analyses cover a vio: raepe of characteristics iacluuiap 
parental occupation, schooling, class op degree, ape of call to 
toæ luu' ^aa ape at appolnt^/^ent to tue -each. These indices are 
used to deter..line how far opportunities for recruitment to the 
dench lave seen circumscribed by social origin, to assess the 
importance of academic pualificaticns and vocational skills in 
the achievement of professional success and to describe the 
pattern of the typical judicial career. The division of the 
total population of judges into four cohorts, based on the date 
of their initial appointment to the superior courts, allows 
throughout for historical comparison, demonstrating the major 
^oints of change and alsu underlining the continuities in tne 
composition of the Bench during the period studied. The 
relationship between the law and politics provides a central 
point of discussion, focusing on an examination of the changing 
influence of political considerations in judicial appointments 
and a review of the main supports for judicial independence in 
contemporary England. This is set against a comparative survey 
of methods of judicial selection, drawing particularly on 
American and French experience. A separate chapter is devoted 
to an examination of the Lord Chancellorship, of the changing 
nature anu duties of that office anu of the social origins of 
its occupants. The study includes a description of the changing 
power and prestige of the Bench and the varied reactions that the 
judges have historically aroused in the performance of their 
functions. It ends with an attempt to show how the accumulated 
experiences of the judiciary, especially within the legal profession 
operate to set them apart from the society they judge.
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Introduction
The medieval clothes, dog latin and monastic ritual
of the Inns hear witness to the ancient origins of the Bar; 
but if today too much of the past seems to cling to the 
profession, the explanation lies less in this uncritical 
adherence to historic trappings than in a failure to escape 
from the fetters of nineteenth century professionalisation.
The formulation in the last quarter of the century of a 
detailed professional code with rules of entry and conduct, 
while it provided a guarantee for client and public, at the same 
time successfully promoted the self interest of the Bar. At 
the centre of this development was the Bar Council, organised 
in the first place in reaction to proposals of the Judges’ Rules 
Committee which threatened the financial interests of the junior 
Bar; by the 1920’s it had consolidated the major restrictive 
practices of the profession and set itself up as guardian of its 
members morals and purses.
The development of a cohesive and rigid professional 
organisation was accompanied by the crystallisation of its 
ideology. Professionalisation, wrote Morris Finer
" took place in the matrix of an individualistic
society in which the lawyer’s client were the landowners, 
the farmer, the trustee of the marriage settlement, 
the employer and the company promoter. It was a society 
in which two categories of right - property and freedom 
of contract - were paramount. The lawyer served to 
protect these rights, and his profession took its tone and 
outlook from the wealthy and middle classes who were 
principally concerned with them.”(2)
(1). Now Mr. Justice Finer.
(2). Morris Finer, Q.C., ’’The legal profession”, in M. Zander ed; 
What’s Wrong with the Law? Published by the BBG(1970) p.44.
Victorian middle-ciass ideas of social justice were absorbed 
by the profession and carried forward into the twentieth 
century, together with a judicial system which, after some 
six hundred years of haphazard growth, had been completely 
recast by the reformist zeal of the nineteenth century. Almost 
another century passed before the essentially Victorian 
foundations of the court structure were again subjected to 
, rational analysis and reform.
It is surprising therefore that of all periods in legal 
history the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been 
the most inadequately chronicled; that an era when considerable 
headway was being made in civil law reform and the expansion of
special legislation and in which the form and content of the
contemporary legal system was fundamentally cast should have
aroused so little interest. In Alan Harding’s Social History of 
( 1 )English Law'  ^ a work of well over 400 pages, only 17 are devoted 
to the structure of the legal profession and the courts in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
In 1967 Brian Abel-Smith and Robert Stevens prefaced their 
own attempt to correct the deficiency with these words:
"While many legal historians had written about the 
history of courts, lawyers and the law up to the end of 
the eighteenth century, surprisingly little, we found, 
had been written about the histories of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Moreover the interest of many 
legal historians did not extend beyond the development 
of substantive law; tnat is the doctrines of the law rather 
than the social and political background of the legal system 
In turn the social and political historians who had 
written about the previous two hundred years had not found 
the legal profession or legal administration worthy of 
serious study.(2) The developing social sciences had so 
far failed to take an interest in matters legal; while 
all too often works on the legal system seemed to jump 
from the Middle Ages to the 1960's with only a casual
(1). Penguin, (1966)
(2 ), This contrasts with the general historians of the medieval 
period who have usually given legal institutions a central 
position in their commentaries.
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glance at the legislation of the 1870's. While there 
were studies of solicitors and official histories 
of the Inns of Courts, surprisingly little had been 
written about barristers, judges, legal education, 
legal aid or the evolutun and work of the courts during 
the last two centuries."(l)
Up to the 1960's only two pieces of empirical evidence on
the social origins of the legal profession had emerged; and in 
both cases these data were largely incidental to the author's 
main purpose. Sir Francis Galton, in his Hereditary Genius 
published in the latter part of the nineteenth century, was 
concerned with the eminent antecedents of the superior judiciary 
only in so far as they substantiated his thesis of inherited 
ability.(2 ) Similarly, Morris Ginsberg's analysis of admissions 
to Lincolns Inn, contained in Studies in Sociology, formed just
a part of the material used by him to study variations in social
( s)m o b i l i t y . Harold Laski, inspired by the American legal 
realists, made frequent critical observations on the judges' 
handling of cases involving class issues: "....the fact that the 
lawyer is usually a member of the property-owning class," he
commented, "tends to make him ....  sympathetic towards the
general outlook of that c l a s s . But, because he was writing 
at a time when many lawyer-politicians were attaining an infamous 
prominence, Laski's attention was focused principally on the 
direct relationship between the Bench and politics, producing 
a detailed analysis of the political antecedents of the Bench, 
and evaluations of the judicial appointments system and the office 
of Lord Chancellor.
(1). B.Abel-Smith and H. Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts, Heinemann 
(1967)pp v-vi.
2). Watts, 2nd ed. (I89 2).
,3). Methuen, (1932). .
,4). H.J. Laski, -^ he ‘^tate in Theory and Practice. ^hwin
----------------------- — -------   (1935) p. 179.
(5). H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics.Allen& Unwin,bthed.(1967)
" " 9 Reflections on the Constitution.Manchester
University Press, (1951).
' 9 Studies in Law and Politics. Allen & Unwin (1932)
Since the mid-fifties there has been growing sociological
( 1 )interest in this country in the study of elites and professions, 
social groups that are both clearly defined and well documented; 
but apart from some fairly superficial observations on the social 
backgrounds of the contemporary Bench in the superior courts, 
the judiciary, unlike the cabinet, the higher civil service, the 
bishops, the senior military and leaders of industry, have not 
before been subjected to comprehensive sociological analysis. 
Similarly, the Bar, though included in general works on the 
p r o f e s s i o n s , h a s  not been singled out for more detailed 
consideration. The lack of such a study has inevitably placed 
some limitation on my ovm work; for comparison between the judges 
and the Bar as a whole, I have had to rely mainly on impressions 
gained from general literary material. Forecasts of the future
(1). B. Abel-Smith, A History of the Nursing Profession.
Heinemann, (l§60).
G.H. Copeman, Leaders of British Industry, Gee, (1955)
R.K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain:From 1870 
to the Present Day. Routledge & Kegan Paul, (1955).
W.L. Guttsman, The British Political Ente .NacGibbon & Nee,
(1963).
B.A. IvicParlane, The Chartered Engineer, Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis,
London (l96l),
D.H.J. Morgan, "The Social and educational background of 
Anglican bishops - continuities and change". B.J.S.(1969)
pp.295-310.
C.B. Otley, Social Background of Senior Officers of the 
British Army 1870-1959 Unpub. Thesis, Hull University (1962)
A. Tropp, The Teachers, Heinemann (1957)
(2). A.M. Carr-Saunders & P.A. Wilson, The Professions. Cass,(l964) 
R. Lewis & A.E.U. Maude, Professional People. Phennix House,
X1952)
G.L. Millerson, The Qualifying Associations. Routledge
& Kegan Paul (1964)
V/.J. Reader, Professional Men. (The Rise of the Professional 
Glasses in Nineteenth Century England]Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
(1966).
8composition of the judiciary based on the present composition 
of the Bar and the solicitors branch of the profession have 
been even more conjectural though I have been assisted to some
extent by an unpublished study of the contemporary legal
( 1 )profession carried out in 1966.^
In so far as it provides a case study for describing methods 
of recruitment to the pinnacles of a key profession, for 
illuminating the social distribution of power and status, and 
for assessing the relative contributions of such factors as 
education, social origins and political activity to the 
achievement of professional success, this analysis emulates the 
earlier works on elites. At another level a study of the 
judiciary, of those who are seen to dispense, and often to 
epitomise, ’justice’, makes a contribution to the sociology of 
lav/, a discipline which in England, still lacks a sound factual 
basis.
The rejection of the mechanistic interpretation of the 
judicial role by the American legal realists in the thirties and 
their promulgation of the doctrine that judicial decisions are at 
least partially attributable to the social experiences and values 
of the judges, though valuable in itself, was not immediately 
accompanied by any systematic study of the background characteris­
tics of the judiciary. For many years the sole contribution was 
Cortez Ewing’s descriptive analysis of the career patterns and
political affiliations of the Justices of the Supreme Court
( p 1
appointed during the period 1789-1937. But the publication i 
1939 of John Schmidhauser’s influential ’Collective Portrait’ of
(1). H.R. Harris, The legal Profession in England and Wales. 
Unpub, Thesis. Reading University. (1966)
(2). The Judges of the Supreme Court, 1789-1937 Minneapolos, 
University of Minnesota (1938)
( 1 )the Supreme Court Justices,' 'marked the beginning of
more rigorous research into tide social attributes of American
judges and provided the groundwork for more sophisticated
(2)analyses of judicial decision-making, '
In this study of the social experiences of the senior 
English judges, essentially a study of a group, I have not 
attempted to relate specific background characteristics to 
individual judicial behaviour. I have simply indicated throughout 
what, as a result of the common experiences of the judges 
appears as the dominant ideology and temperament of the Bench 
as a whole, emphasising its persistently homogeneous and isolated 
character. In my assumption that the background experiences 
of the judiciary are principally directed towards consensus and 
unanimity, I have adopted a Suandpoint wholly opposite to that 
of the major American studies of judicial behaviour, whose main 
hypothesis is that background factors are a major cause of 
division or variance among the judges. The difference in the two 
approaches is partly methodological; studies which seek to relate 
background factors to actual decision patterns in multi-judge 
courts by measuring the degree to which a particular characteristic 
is correlated with a particular type of decision contain an element 
of bias, since they must exclude from analysis the majority of 
cases, which are decided unanimously.
The difference also derives from the dàstinetively
constitutional role of the American Supreme Court, - the most 
common subject of such studies, - which has no parallel in the 
English judicial system. The political content of that court's
(1). Midwest Journal of Political Science Vol,3 No. 1 (1959)
Judges'DecislonsW
and 'Ethnic Affiliations and Judicial Properties'24 J. of
Politics 92^1962)
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work makes it an obvious target for the identification and 
analysis of individual idealogical standpoints. Further, though 
the origins and experiences of the higher-level American judges 
are sufficiently uniform to allow of the identification of a 
'collective personality', they do possess more potentially 
divisive characteristics, in terms, for example, of their 
ethnic and regional backgrounds, most important, they lack that 
rigidly defined career structure which plays such a very 
significant part in the 'socialisation' of the English judge.
The ytudy
The structure of the superior courts.
Centuries of piece-meal growth had produced by 1820 
a judicial system that was an uneasy amalgam of past expedients,
an unco-ordinated medley of courts whose jurisdiction was ill-
r -i )
defined  ^ ' and often in conflict. The courts of common law 
and equity, the court of Admiralty, and the ecclesiastical courts 
all administered separate bodies of law, with separate procedures 
and separate vocabularies of technical terms; it was not uncommon 
for proceedings on one issue to be conducted in two courts 
simultaneously. The greatest confusion arose between the systems 
of common law and equity which, according to HoIdsworth, were 
"not merely rival but even directly contradictory".lie recalls
(1). "In Knight & Marquis of Waterford (1844) 11 Cl. and Fin. 653, 
fourteen years of litigation merely resulted in the discovery
by the House of ^ords that the plaintiff had mistaken his 
remedy." Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law. 
Methuen, Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed. X4966)~Vol.I pl634l
(2). Though 1AM. Jackson regards the tv/o systems as having been 
complementary rather than conflicting. "By the early nineteenth 
century", he writes, "a working partnership was well 
established." (The Machinery of Justice in England.C.U.P.
6th ed. 1972 , p.7:T--------- -----
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Palgrave* s statement in 1834 that,
"It must appear a singular anomaly to a foreigner, 
when he is informed that our English tribunals are 
marshalled into opposite and even hostile ranks; 
guided by maxims so discrepant, that the title which 
enables the suitor to obtain a decree without the 
slightest doubt or hesitation if he files a bill in 
equity, ensures a judgement against him should he 
appear a plaintiff in a declaration at common law.
And exercising their respective jurisdictions by means 
of form and pleadings, which have as little similarity 
as if they existed among nations whose laws and customs 
were wholly strange to each other."(l)
The three Common Law courts. Queen’s Bench, Common Pleas and 
Exchequer, each had a chief andmisne judges and were united only 
by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, in which appeals from the judges 
of any of them were heard by judges of the other two. Equity 
was administered by the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls 
and the Vice-Chancellors. During the nineteenth century, other 
superior courts were set up. In I85I an equity court of appeal 
was introduced, manned by two Bopds Justices sitting with the 
^brd Chancellor; and 1857 two special courts were established, 
the Court of Probate and the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes, the latter presided over by the Lord Chancellor, the Chief 
Justices and the senior puisne judges plus a judge ordinary 
of the court, who was also the judge of the Probate Court and 
the old Admiralty Court.
It was not until 1873 that any serious programme of re-organi­
sation and rationalisation was undertaken in thesuperior courts.
The first Judicature Act, passed in that year and implemented in 
1875, provided for the consolidation of all the existing superior 
courts to form one Eupreme Court of Judicature, combining a 
High Court of first instance and a single Court of Appeal; subject 
to certain rules, it was provided that common law and equity
(1). Holdsworth op. cit. p.635.
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Figure I
The structure of the superior courts of law
Superior courts in the nineteenth century prior to the
Judicature Act 1873
1 The High Court of Chancery
2 Court of Queen's Bench
3 Court of Common Pleas at 
v/e strains ter
4 Court of Exchequer
5 High Court of Admiralty
6 Court of Probate
7 Court for Divorce and
Matrimonial Causes
8 Assize Courts
9 Exchequer Chamber (common 
law appeals)
10 Lords Justices In Chancery 
(Chancery appeals)
11 Appellate jurisdiction of 
Privy Council in Lunacy and 
from the High Court of
Admiralty
12 Other Appellate 
Jurisdiction
S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  J U D I C A T U R E  
Judicature Acts 1873-5
T H E H I E H C 0 U R T 
(Justices of the High Court)
T H E  C O U R T  O F  A P E i E A I  
(Lords Justices of Appeal)
Chancery Division 
Queen's Bench Division 
Common Pleas Division 
Excheauer Division
After 1881 
Queen's Bench 
Division
Probate Divorce and 
Admiralty Division
Assizes
(1)
H 0 U S E 0 F L 0 R D S. Final Court of Appeal for Great
Britain and (now Northern) Ireland. (Lords of Appeal in Ordinary.) 
Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876.
Source: R.M. Jackson - The Machinery of Justice in England,C.U.P. 
6th ed. (1972) p.9.
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(1). This Division ceased to exist on 1 October, 1971, 
and was in effect replaced by the Family Division.
The change was accompanied by a certain amount of 
redistribution of business among the three divisions: 
Admiralty jurisdiction was transferred to the Queen’s 
Bench division and contentious probate work to the 
Chancery Division, while the new division took over 
miscellaneous family jurisdictions previously exercised 
by the other two courts, such as adoption, guardianship 
and matrimonial property disputes.
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should be administered concurrently in every court by every
judge, and that, where there v/as any conflict the rules of
equity should prevail. The existing judges of the courts of
common law, the court of Chancery, the Probate and Divorce court,
and the court of Admiralty were constituted judges of the High
Court. It was divided at first, into five divisions, tnree of
them representing the old common law courts. The only reason
for this was to avoid putting either of the Chief Justices or
the Chief Baron out of office. In the event, both Sir Alexander
Cockburn, Chief Justice of the Queen’s Bench and Chief Baron
Kelly died in 1880; the following year the Common Pleas Division
and the Exchequer Division were abolished by Order in Council
and their jurisdiction transferred to the Queen’s Bench Division.
Lord Coleridge, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas became
the Lord Chief Justice of England. The office of Vice-Chancellor
( 1 )was discontinued,' ' and the Master of the Rolls became president 
of the new Court of Appeal, which was modelled on the earlier Court 
of Appeal in Chancery.
The decisions of the Court of Appeal were intended to be 
final and the appeal jurisdiction of the House of Lords was 
abolished by the Judicature Act; but in 1876 the new Conservative 
government, urged on by the peers, passed the Appellate Jurisdiction 
Act, restoring a final appeal to the Lords, though providing 
for the appointment of two Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, paid 
professional judges with life peerages who would also be appointed 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as vacancies
(1). Revived by the Administration of Justice Act, 1970 C. 3 1,s.5 .
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( i )occurred. The Supreme Court, however, retained its now
misleading title.
Almost a century later on January 1, 1972, the Courts Act
1971 came into operation. The Act gives effect with some
modifications to the proposals for a major restructuring of the
higher courts of England and Wales made by the ^oyal Commission
( 2.)on Assizes and Quarter Sessions.^  ^ The Supreme Court now 
consists of the Court of Appeal , the High Court and a new Crown 
Court, which inherits the criminal jurisdiction of the abolished 
courts of quarter session and assize. The High Court Judges 
continue uo exercise the jurisdiction of the High Court in civil 
cases and sit in the Crown Court for the trial of more serious 
offences. The Act also provides for the appointment of a 
permanent bench of Circuit judges to deal with criminal cases 
in the Crown Court and civil cases in the county courts; for this 
purpose some thirty new full-time appointments are being made.
(1). The sequence of events leading up to the passing of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, 1873-5, and the Appellate 
Jurisdiction Act I8 7 6 , are documented in R. Stevens,
’The Final Appeal ; Reform of the House of Lords and 
Privy Council, 1867-76.' 80 LgR 5473 (1964)
The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords continues 
to be the subject of controversial debate
Cl. Drewry, ’One appeal too many ?’ B.J.S.Vol XIX No.4 (1968)
L. Blom-Cooper and G. Drewry, ’The House of fords:
Reflections on the social utility of final appeal courts.'
Mod. Law Rev. May, 1969
L. Blom-Cooper,Q.C. and G. Drewry, Final Appeal: A Gtudy of the 
House of Lords in its Judicial Capacity, Oxford, Clarendon,
' * I M l 1.  m I . — w —«   I -Mill III....   II II I ' I I I . P  I .  » V  » .  -t ■ ^  . . .  , ^
(1972)
(2). Cmnd i+153 (1969)
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in addition to those Circuit judges recruited from the existing
county court benches smd the full-time judges exercising criminal
jurisdiction at the ^entrai Criminal Court and elsewhere.
Part-time Recorders will also assist in the work of the Crown
Courts. In accordance with the Beeching Report’s emphasis on
the need for flexibility, the Act allows for a considerable
degree of judicial mobility between jurisdictions; thus, a judge
of the Court of Appeal may in theory at least be requested to sit
in the Crown Court or in a county court, or a High Court case may
( 1 )be allocated to a Circuit judge.' ' A more flexible approach is 
also encouraged by the provision that the High Court and the Crown 
Court may sit anywhere in England and Hales.
The Judges
For the purpose of this research a list of appointments to
the superior courts was obtained initially from a Chronicle
of English Judges, Chancellors, Attorneys General, and Solicitors
( o)
General, compiled by R.C. Mitchell.' ' This was later checked 
against and supplemented by the Law Lists and Whittakers Almanacks, 
In 1 8 2 0, at the beginning of the period covered by this study.
Mi judges sat in the superior courts; during the next 148 years, 
up to the end of 1968, 563 more appointments were made. But the 
total number involved in this analysis is only 3 8 6, since almost 
a third of the appointments were promotions or transfers within 
the judiciary. For the purposes of historical comparison, the 
judges have been divided into four cohorts, based on the date of
(1). By the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, 
High Court Judges may sit in the ^ourt of Appeal and the Lords 
Justice in the High Court.
(2 ). Nev/ York, v/.P. Mitchell Printing Co. (1937)'
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TaC'le 1.
Statutory Increases in tne ^azimum Numbers
of the Judiciary of the Superior Courts
Court House of Lords 
High ,0%]^ of Appellate'
Legislation h.n.D. Chancery P.N.A. Anneal Committee
Judicature Act 1673 5
Appellate Jurisdiction 4
Act 1876
Appellate Jurisdiction
Act 1913 6
Judicature Act 1925 17 6 2
Appellate Jurisdiction 7
Act 1929
Supreme Court of 19
Judicature
(Amendment) Act 1935
Supreme Court of 4
Judicature 
(Amendment) Act 1937
Supreme Court of 8
Judicature
(Amendment) Act 1938
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Legislation High Court ^al
ICXUJ3€^  ^jCuT _Z/3]?CUS
Appellate 
Committee
jeiT 
32Judicature (Amendment) 
net 1914!.
(win. 17 w.B. 5 Gil. 3 P.Û.Â.)
Appellate jurisdiction 
Act 1947
Patents A Designs 
Act 1949
high Court and County 
Court Judges ^ct 1950
Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act 1956
Administration of 
Justice (Judges and 
Pensions) Act I9 6O
Criminal Justice 
Administration Act 19Ô2
Administration of 
Justice Act 1968
Maximum Number of Judges 
Order 1 9 70**
39
42
48
53
70
75
11
13
14
11
- Since 1944 the Lord Chancellor has been able to make 
adjustments in the number of judges appointed to each division 
of the high Courts according to changes in the volume of 
litigation.
Under S.1(2) of the preceding Act.
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( 1 )their initial appointment to the superior courts.' ' The 
periods of appointment have been chosen to give cohorts of 
roughly equal size. The most recent cohort, composed mainly 
of members of the contemporary Bench, is the smallest.
Period of appointment. Number of judges appointed• 
1820 - 75 106
1876 - 1920 103
1921 - 1950 91
195M - 1968 86
TOTAL 386
The thirty-one men who held the office of Lord Chancellor 
between 1820-1968 are considered separately; they are included 
in the study, first because the Lord Chancellor is a judge of 
the superior courts, though the political and administrative 
functions of the office have gradually come to predominate over
( z)the judicial role,' ' and second, because it is the Lord 
Chancellor who forms the link between the political and legal 
worlds and is ultimately responsible for all appointments to the 
superior Bench.
Data were collected about each judge and Lord Chancellor 
according to the following breakdown,
1. (a) Date of birth.
(b) Birth order.
(c) Date of marriage.
(d) Number of children.
(e) Date of death.
(1). The fourteen judges who were in office in 1820 though
appointed before that date have been included in the first 
cohort.
(2). Though the present Lord Chancellor , Lord Hailsham, is very
active judicially.(See below p.188) Former Lord Chancellors 
usually participate more frequently in the judicial v/ork of the 
House of Lords,
20
2. (a) Date of appointment to the Bench.
(b) Record of legal career,
(c) Date of retirement.
3. Father's name, title and occupation.
4. (a) School.
(b) University.
(c) Academic record - class and subject of degrees.
5. Political activities,
6. Other experience.
Most of the information was readily available,^ ' nearly
all the judges having entries in the Dictionary of National 
Biography or who's V/ho. Data which could be verified from other 
sources indicated that in general these standard works of 
reference could be accepted as accurate. The other main sources 
consulted were Burke's Peerage and Landed Gentry, the registers 
of the Inns of Court and the records of the universities of 
Oxford, Cambridge and London. Additional material was gleaned 
from various works on the legal profession and from individual 
biographies.
The validity of this type of study depends ultimately on 
the adequacy and accuracy of the biographical data; I v/as 
therefore fortunate in being able to attain a high degree of 
completeness using a variety of reliable sources. In only three 
instances was I unable to trace any information ; for the rest the 
completeness of the data varied at the individual points of 
inquiry. Thus in most cases information on the principal career 
stages, - age at call to the Bar, at taking silk and appointment
(1). See Appendix A,
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to the Bench, - was exhaustive; the lacunae were negligible.
On social class and education the proportion of required material 
successfully obtained was lower though satisfactory, with an 
overall average of some 85%. The proportion of data lacking 
was highest on class of degree, averaging 25.1%, ranging from 
42.6% in the earliest cohort to l6.0% in the most recent; 
on the other hand the subject read at university showed a very 
high and fairly constant degree of completeness, averaging 
just under 92%. With regard to higher education in general, 
however, the stated averages do not properly represent the 
sufficiency of the data, lack of information on this point 
simply indicating in the majority of cases a lack of such 
experience. Specific response rates for all topics and more 
detailed comments are given in their appropriate places in the 
tables and text.
The study is divided into four main sections. Part One 
sets out to examine the socio-economic composition of the English 
Bench over the past century and a half and to determine how far 
opportunities for entry into the group have been circumscribed 
by social origin. Two indices have been employed; the first and 
most directly relevant, father’s occupation, is used both as the 
basis of a social class analysis and for a straight-forward 
examination of the intergenerational movement between 
occupational groups. The influence of heredity is considered 
in terms of professional self-recruitment and a comparison made 
with other groups. Particular attention has been paid to the 
role of patronage in the nineteenth century and the extent to which 
its influence on success and advancement within the legal
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profession was weakened by the demand for competent lawyers. 
Secondly, in so far as type of education received is both a 
reflection and determinant of social class, particularly 
in the private sector, the educational histories of the judges 
have obvious socio-economic implications. But the examination 
of their educational background goes further; because of the 
homogeneity of the pattern that emerges from the analysis of the 
schooling and further education of the judiciary, I have been 
able to draw some tentative conclusions about the intellectual 
character of the Bench as a /hole, both by an assessment of 
the adequacy and content of the teaching to which they were 
exposed and by an examination of their individual academic 
achievements. As part of the study of social background, I have 
also sketched out a demographic profile of the judiciary; analysis 
of judicial fertility, nuptiality and mortality are compared with 
similar data for the peerage and for the general population 
and , ome useful, if prede table, results have been otained. This 
section has, however, because of inherent limitations in the 
basic data and its predominantly statistical nature, been included 
as an appendix rather than in the main body of the thesis.
Part Two of the study looks at the typical judicial 
career; the sequence, from call to the Bar through Queen's 
Counsel and minor judicial appointments and ultimately to the Bench 
of the superior stage is analysed on an age and time-scale basis; 
the resulting patterns demonstrate a high degree of overall 
consistency throughout the period studied. Movement of tlbe judges 
within the superior courts is examined, principally in terms of 
'promotions' from the High Court to the Court of Appeal; this is 
followed by an analysis of the termination of the judicial career, 
centring on the question of a fixed retirement age. The section
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ends with an historical review of judicial rem&heration.
In the third part, ’Politics and the Judiciary’, I have 
considered the changing importance of the House of Commons 
as a stepping stone to the Bench, and in particular the question 
of the Law Officers’ supposed right of preferment to high 
judicial office. The 1920’s emerge as a watershed and events 
of these years tend to dominate this section. The manoeuverings 
of certain politicians and lawyers, the continued vitiation 
of judicial appointments oy political considerations and the 
overt expression of partisan views by sitting judges both 
on and off the Bench scandalised both profession and public 
and provided ammunition for critics of capitalist society like 
Harold Laski; but the period marked a turning point and from 
then on we observe a pronounced strengthening of judicial 
impartiality and independence. Systematic analysis of relations 
between the judicial and political spheres has been confined 
to England;I have, however, used existing information on the 
experiences of America and Prance in a comparative survey which 
considers how far political abuses are likely given any particular 
method of judicial selection. A separate chapter is devoted to an 
examination of the Lord Chancellorship, of the changing nature and 
duties of that office and of the social and educational origins 
of the men who have held it since the turn of the nineteenth 
century.
The last section departs from the empirical base of the 
earlier part of the study. The first half traces historical shifts 
in the status and power of the Bench and the varied reactions 
from hyperbolic eulogy to bitter criticism that the judges have
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aroused in the performance of their functions. And in 
the final chapter I have considered the phenomenon of 
judicial isolation and attempted to show how the accumulation 
of their experiences, especially within the legal profession, 
operate to set them apart from the society they judge.
25
PART I THE SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL
BACKGROUNDS OF THE JUDICIARY.
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Chapter I
The Social Origins of the Superior Court Judiciary.
It is said that one practising barrister in reply to the
question "What manner of men are the judges?" remarked,
"Largely what you would expect; gifted and talented 
members of the upper classes. England has its normal 
quota of success stories from rags to riches, its 
millionaires who started as office boys, its tycoons 
who sold newspapers on street corners. But no one 
other than a gentlement in the class sense of the word 
has ever graced the high court bench. Working class 
origins are not recommended for anyone with judicial 
ambitions."(1)
An analysis of the social composition of the Bench over 
recent years (i.e. the 86 judges appointed in the period 
1951-68) supports this view. The largest group ofjudges, almost 
half, were those classified as upper-middle class, most of them 
sons of members of the senior professions or middle-range entre­
preneurs. Some 10% were sons of peers or landed gentry, and 
another 15% had fathers who were knights or were themselves 
members of an elite group. The lower-middle class accounted 
for just 9% of the judges; and only one, whose father was a 
colliery official, could conceivably be described as working- 
class. The pattern of social recruitment to the judiciary has 
a distinctly upper-class flavour.
That it has become fashionable, since the fifties, to point 
with some relish to the narrow social backgrounds of the judges 
is, in part, a reflection of the developing interest in the 
sociology of law, an acknowledgment, albeit a superficial one, 
of the subjective element in the judicial process. This attitude 
derives also from a contemporary preoccupation with the composition 
and interaction of all elite groups; a preoccupation which has, 
in terms of English society, displayed itself both in a number of
(l). B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts. 
Heinemann (1967) p.299.
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( 1 )comprehensive socio-historical studies of single groups,^
and in less scientific criticism of the ’establishment*
( 2)as a whole. ^ ^
In 1956 the Economist wrote, "A study of the reference 
books confirms that nearly all bishops are the children of 
those who would not have been too greatly fluttered by the 
coming of a bishop to tea."^^^ To-day, most elite groups, 
higher civil servants, top businessmen and judges, - would 
qualify for similar comment; all are characteristically 
upper-middle class and display a high degree of self-recruitment.
What is peculiar to the judiciary, however, is the 
relative consistency of its pattern of recruitment; since the 
early nineteenth century there has been little change in the 
social composition of the Bench. Though there appears to have 
been some decline in the representation of the traditional elite 
on the Bench, the variation is not significant. Yet studies of 
other elites have demonstrated a definite widening in their social 
base, have shown that a century ago they were much more firmly 
rooted in the upper echelons of society, drawing very strongly on 
the landed and titled classes; membership of the government, 
the executive agencies, the military and the church, was then 
wholly dependant on an extensive system of patronage, which rested 
on the possession of landed property. Thus, according to 
Guttsman, of all Cabinet Personnel appointed between 1868-86,
55% (27) were members of the a r i s t o c r a c y ; a n d  this is a very
(1) P.K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain t From 1870 to 
the Present DaylRoutledge & Kegan Paul, (1955)
W.L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite. MacGibbon & Kee,
(1 9 6 3)
C.B. Otley, Social Background of Senior Officers of the British 
Army 1870-1959. Unpub. Phd,thesis. Hull University.(1962).
D.H.J. Morgan, The Social and educational background of Anglican 
bishops - continuities and change. B.J.S. (1969) pp.295-510.
2) Hugh Thomas ed. , The Establishment. Anthony Blond (1959)
3) The Economist. (Oct.20, 1956)
,4) Guttsman. op.cit. Table 11 p.79«
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Table II
Social class origins of the (1).iud.Kes'- ■'
Period of
appointment 1820-75 1876-1920 1921-50 1951-68
Total
1820-19C
Social class 
I. Traditional 17.9% 16.14.% 15.4% 10.5% 15.3%
landed (19) (17) (14) (9) (59)
upper class.
II Professional 8.5% 14.6% 14.3% 14.0% 12.7%
commercial (9) C15) (13) (12) (49)
and adminis­
trative 
upper class.
in Upper middle 40.6% 5 0.5% 47.3% 5 2.3% 47.4%
class. (43) (5 2) (43) (45) (183)
IV Lower middle 11.3% 9 .7% 8.8% 8.1% 9.6%
class. (12) (10) (8) (7) (37)
V. Working 2.8% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3%
class. (3) (1) (1) (1) (6)
Not known. 18.9% 7.8% 13.2% 14.0% 13.5%
Total.
(20) (8) (12) (12) (5 2)
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(106) (103) ( 91) (86) (386)
(1), See Appendix B for a discussion of the methodology of the 
class analysis.
29
exclusive group, for (uittsman defines the aristocratic 
population rigidly, including only those who were descended from 
a holder of a hereditary title in the grandparent generation 
and hence excluding the sons of the newly ennobled and those 
who had received hereditary titles themselves. In contrast, of 
the 106 judges appointed between 1820-75 only 19 (17.9%) were 
landed or titled; only I4., on Guttsman* s definition, were 
aristocrats. In addition, there were, if anything, during the 
middle years of the nineteenth century rather more members of the 
lower social strata on the Bench; some 14% of the judges were of 
either lower middle class or working class origins. This means, 
in effect, that at least until the final quarter of the nineteenth 
century, the judiciary were an elite characterised by an 
unusual degree of social nobility.
Law was recognised in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries as one of the principal avenues of social betterment
for "the lower middle class, the sons or proteges of small gentry,
( 1 )yeoman or burghers".^  ^ "A legal career", writes Halevy,
"was open to the ambitions and talents of the poorest, and it led
i 2^to the very highest positions in society".^ ' Similarly 
Trevelyan has stated that "the number of English County families 
founded by lawyers is even greater than those derived from the 
cloth t r a d e " . T h e  early Victorian view of A. Poison 
supports these retrospective assessments of social mobility 
within the legal profession. "The only road to the highest 
stations in this country", he wrote, "is that of the law".
He refers also to a list given by Sir Edward Coke of "near two 
hundred great and noble families which had even in his time risen
by the law". Lord Thurlow, the lawyer son of a clergyman, who
(1). Pilot Papers.II. No.4. (Dec.1947) p.8 5.
(2). E. Halevy, A History of the English People in I8I5.Fisher
Unwin (1924)P.19•
(3). G.M. Trevelyan, English Social History. Longman, Green,2nd ed.
(1946) p. 12S;
(4). A. Poison, Law and Lawyers. Longman Green,(1840)Vol.I.p.V.
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rose to be dome Lord Chancellor, was once abused by the Duke of
Grafton for his * plebeian extraction, and his recent admission
into the peerage*; Thurlow, unabashed, replied, "I am amazed at
his Grace*s speech. The noble duke cannot look before him, behind
him and on either side of him, without seeing some noble peer
who owes his seat in this House to his successful exertions in the
( i )profession to which I belong."^ ^
It may be that there was more upper class representation
amongst the Bar than on the Bench; sons of the ruling classes
frequently held largely nominal posts, while those lower down
the social scale had greater motivation to work and stcLve
after the pinnacles of their profession. The wealthy man, to
Poison's mind, was more likely to tread "the primrose path of
(o')
dalliance", than "the steep and thorny way to heaven".^ ^
The hard road of the law was therefore left mostly "to the feet 
of the poor and the steps of the needy, to younger sons or men 
of small o r i g i n " . P r i v a t e  means could even be a hindrance to 
individual professional success. "There are very few", wrote 
Addison about the Inns of Court, "that make themselves considerable 
proficients in the studies of the place who know they shall 
arrive at great estates without them".
This ignores, of course, the importance to professional 
success of all forms of patronage - political, financial and 
personal. During the nineteenth century progress in the church, 
for example,was alnost wholly dependent on the avaiübility of
(1). J.H. Burton, Political and Social Economy. Edin.Chambers.
(i849) pp.152-5. '
(2). Poison, op.cit. p.4-0
(5). Sir Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the accession 
of George III. Macmillan, 2nd. ed. {1908) p.42.
(4). ibid.
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benefactors and the exercise of influence. So Trollope wrote,
"And this was what you call a cure of souls.
(A) man had absolutely had his living bought for 
him by his uncle, - just as he might have bought 
him a farm. He couldn’t have bought him the 
command of a regiment or a small judgeship. In 
those matters you require capacity. It is only 
when you deal with the Church that you throw 
to the winds all ideas of fitness".(1)
To a practising barrister patronage was less important ; 
though political and legal connections could be a great help, 
and perhaps ultimately crucial to judicial appointment,
"no one was likely to entrust his interests, his property, 
perhaps his liberty or his life, to anyone who was recommended
( 2)on grounds of friendship alone".'  ^ Ability and hard work were,
therefore, essential to success at the Bar and men were seldom
raised to the Bench who had not distinguished themselves at the
Bar. Even in appointments to the very highest judicial offices,
(the Chief Justices, Chief Barons, Lords of Appeal, Masters of
the Rolls and Presidents of the Family Division) where political
( 3)interests often played a crucial role,'^'social background does 
not appear to have been a major consideration; an analysis . 
of the social class origins of the i06 men who have held these 
offices gives results very similar to those obtained for the 
whole superior judiciary. (Table III).
"The Bar", as W.J. Reader observes, "offered an opportunity 
to those who had little to rely on but their wits and energy,
and some eminent lawyers ---- came from comparatively humble
origins, or at any rate from origins where neither money nor 
interest was p l e n t i f u l " . B u t  this point must be given a
(1). A. Trollope, The American Senator. O.U.P.. (1951) p.290.
(2). W.J. Reader, Professional Men (The Rise of the Professional 
Classes in Nineteenth Century England). Weidenfeld &
Nic olson. (1966) p.22.
(3 ). See Chapter 7.
(4). W.J. Reader, ibid.
32
Table III
Social class origins of the senior .judges (1)
Period of Total
appointment 1820-1920 1921-68 1820-1968
Social class
I. 15.5% 14.6% 15.1%
(9) (7) (16)
II. 8.6% 12.5% 10.4%
(5) (6) (11)
III. 46.6% 50.0% 48.1%
(27) (24) (51)
ly. 10.3% 8.3% 9.4%
(6) (4) (10)
V. 6.9% 3.8%
(4) (4)
Not known 12.1% 14.6% 13.2%
(7) (7) (14)
Total 100% 100% 100%
(58) (48) (106)
(1). i.e. the Chief Justices, Chief Barons, Lords of Appeal, 
Masters of the Rolls and Presidents of the Family 
Division.
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proper perspective, the references to the 'poor and lowly social 
origins' of some lawyers, made by writers such as Halevy and 
Namier have been used principally to emphasise a comparison 
with the closed and firmly upper-class character of other elite 
occupations and are clearly not to be confused with the poor of 
Rowntree and Booth, or , indeed, with any ordinary manual wage- 
earner. For tough the pattern of judicial recruitment was 
characterised early on by a recognition of individual merit, 
access to the elite continued to be heavily circumscribed, if not 
by any form of overt social discrimination then certainly by the 
financial restrictions on entry to the profession.
That an aspirant to the nineteenth century Bar was 
expected to have received a gentleman* s training and to 
demonstrate some proficiency in the classics was alone sufficient 
to exclude the majority, whose family resources had not extended 
to a public school or similar education; and the adoption 
of competitive professional examinations in the second half of the 
century, while strengthening the meritocratic qualities of the 
profession, also incrdased the educational expenses involved. 
Further, according to an estimate of the Complete Book of 
Trades (1842), an intending barrister needed capital of somewhere 
between £1,000 and £1,500; this amount, if carefully managed, was 
deemed sufficient to cover the cost of professional fees and 
deposits and to insure against the pecuniary difficulties
( 1 )invariably encountered during the early years at the Bar.^ *
By the end of the century the basic sum required to become a 
barrister had risen to about two and a half thousand pounds.
TlT. The Complete Book of Trades (or the Parents^ Guide and
Youths Instructor) - by several hands. (1842) p.486.
(2). W.W.R. Ball, The Students* Guide to the Bar. Macmillan,
7th ed. (1904) p.61
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These financial prerequisites created a bias in the social
composition of the profession. An analysis by Morris Ginsberg
of the social origins (in terms of father's occupation) of those
( 1 )
admitted to Lincolns Inn between 1886 and 1927,' ^showed that it 
was only towards the very end of that period that there were any 
signs of the working class beginning to penetrate the legal 
profession. The proportions were very small; Class III, sons of 
skilled wage-earners, accounted for only 1 of the 190 admissions 
between 1919 and 1922, and only 2 out of the 119 admitted in the 
period 1 9 2 3 - 2 7 . For those of low socio-economic status the 
greatest obstacle to the attainment of a judicial appointment 
has clearly been the initial impracticability of entering the 
legal profession rather than inequality of opportunity within the 
profession.
It has been easier in the post-war period with the increasing 
accessibility of the grammar schools and the provision of 
maintenance grants for higher education for working-class 
children to obtain the type of education required by the 
professions; yet the existence of the public schools and middle- 
class domination of the educational opportunities offered by the 
State have ensured the maintenance of a strong class differential 
in educational, and hence occupational, chances. The legal 
profession continues to impose its own financial deterrent; in 
1968, Abel-Smith and Stevens placed the minimum cost of being 
called to the Bar at over £170, with cramming fees and other 
special costs the sum involved might approach £400.^^^
(1). Except for the years 1894-1903 and 1912-18.. Foreign and 
colonial students were not included in the analysis.
(2). M. Ginsberg, Studies in Sociology. Methuen,(1932) p.170.
(3). B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, In Search of Justice. Allen Lane,
CÎ95F)pp.100-01.
35
The pupillage year might account for another £800 - £1,000.
On the other hand the financial uncertainties of early practice 
have been mitigated by the introduction of Legal Aid.
In the absence of firm data on the social origins of the
present Bar, it is impossible to predict with any accuracy, the
composition of future Benches. The experience of other elite
groups provides no useful guide. Thus both Kelsall and the Pulton 
( ^ )Report' ' indicate that the recruitment area of the higher civil 
service has been extended during the past thirty years; but 
comparison between the civil service elite and the judiciary is 
limited, the former including more junior ranks and hence 
forming a much larger group. More important, entry to the civil 
service does not involve a candidate in heavy costs and the 
pattern of future reward is more certain.
One study of the contemporary legal profession does indicate
that the social composition of the judiciary is unlikely to change
for some time, unless the whole system of appointments is radically
( o)
revised and barristers deprived of their judicial monopoly.' '
If judges are to be chosen from all sections of society, the 
selection pool itself must be expanded; the most obvious short­
term innovation would be to open the Bench of the higher courts 
to s o l i c i t o r s . P r o f .  Chapman is an advocate of this course.
(1). Kelsall. op.cit..
Pulton Report Vol.3* (1) - Social Survey of the Civil Services
(2). H.R. Harris, The Legal Profession in England
and Wales. Unpub. Ph.D. thesis. Reading University (1966)
(3). See below pp.JO?
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"In general", he writes, " the ordinary career 
of a solicitor in private practice or local govern­
ment fits him far better for judicial office than 
the normal career of a barrister. Solicitors 
come from a far wider social, educational and 
political background, and are consequently less 
liable to suffer from those social and political 
blind spots which mark a good proportion of the 
present higher judiciary".(1)
Yet it is possible that those solicitors appointed to the 
Bench, especially to the superior courts, might not be so 
"socially average* nor have such a breadth of experience as 
Prof. Chapman suggests; there is probably no difference in 
the social backgrounds of leading barristers and solicitors. 
Initially at least the judiciary might well be drawn from much 
the same social group as it has been for the past one hundred 
and fifty years. The selection of judges has now a distinctly 
personal flavour, based on reputation within a relatively small 
and intimate group; it is difficult to envisage such a system 
operating on a country-wide scale with a population of some 
21,000 practising solicitors. Without additional radical changes 
in the method of judicial appointment, in professional training, 
and in the educational system as a whole, another 'self-recruiting* 
elite might soon emerge.
(l). B. Chapman, British Government Ob served, p.53.
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Occupational groups and self-recruitment.
Though father's occupation has already been employed in 
this study as the determinant of social class, a separate 
examination of the specific occupational groups into which 
the judges' fathers fall, gives an added dimension and a 
greater substance to the portrayal of their social background; 
it has also the advantage of being less open either to subjective 
errors of judgement or to methodological criticism.
The results of such an analysis, given in Table IV, show
the largest proportion of judges, some 40%, to have had parents
who were members of the liberal professions, 'divinity, physic
and the law'; but the latter, as one might expect, is predominant,
family tradition acting as a major determinant of entry into any
profession. Thus prof. R.K. Kelsall, in a study of professional
recruitment, showed that there was a strong tendency for the
children of lawyers, doctors, clergymen and teachers to enter
their father's occupation.
"The available evidence all suggests that the 
recruitment to the four professions considered 
was relatively much greater from families 
already engaged in these occupations than from 
other families". (l)
On the legal profession in particular he wrote,
"In the second half of the nineteenth century, less 
than a third of the Cambridge sons of barristers 
and lawyers chose a legal career; the other three 
professions taken together were more popular 
with the Church or teaching as the commonest after 
the law itself. By 1937 and 1938, however, nearly 
half of the graduate sons of fathers in the legal 
profession were following the Law; and a further 
16 percent were engaged in one of the other three 
professions". (2)
(1). R.K. Kelsall, "Self-recruitment in Four Professions".
D.V.Glass ed. Social Mobility in Britain.Routledge(1954)u.317.
(2). ibid. p.313.
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Table IV
Occupations of the judges' fathers
Period of appointment 
1820-75 1876-1920 1921-50 1951-68 18201968
Occupational Group. Percentage of fathers in each group
Law 18.9%
(20)
22.3%
(23)
35.2%
(32)
24.4%
(21)
24.9%
(96)
Church 15.2%
(16)
5.5%
(5)
7.0%
(6)
10.4%
(40)
Medecine
^'(8)
5.8%
(6)
2.2%
(2)
8.1%
(7)
6.0%
(23)
Politics
^■(6)
7.8%
(8) ^*S)
1.7%
(1) ^(18)
Teaching 
(all grades) ^'(3) ^'(2)
2.3%
(2)
2.3%
(9)
Armed Forces
“■g)  ^■ (2)
1.1%
(1) ^'(5)
4.4%
(17)
Engineering and 
Architecture
— - 2.2%
(2) ^'(5)
Finance (1) 7.7%
(7)
14.0%
(12)
7.0%
(27)
Entrepreneurial(2) 19.8%
(21)
27.2%
(28)
17.6%
(16)
16.3%
(14)
20.5%
(79)
Administration (3) 2.9%) 3.5%
(3) ^(15)
Landowning (4) 17.9%
(19) ^^(1&
11.0%
(10)
8.1%
(7)
13.5%
(52)
The Arts (5) 0.9%
(1)
2.9%
(3)
2.2%
(2)
1.2%
(1)
1.8%
(7)
Miscellaneous
^■(4)
- 3.3%
(3)
5.8%
(5) ’(!?)
Not known 17.9%
(19)
8.7%
(9)
15.4%
(14)
12.8%
(11)
13.7%
(53)
Total occupations 130 121 104 98 453
Total of judges'
fathers (6)
106
(100%)
103
(100%)
91
(00%)
86
(100%)
386
(100%)
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(1). Including banking, accounting, stockbroking and insurance.
(2), Merchants, directors, etc. - includes all occupations, 
not otherwise listed, directed to profit-making.
(3). Including all engaged in civil, colonial or diplomatic
service or in public administration.
(4 ). Those listed in Burke's Landed Gentry and members of the 
hereditary peerage and baronetage.
(5 ). Includes artists, musicians and journalists.
(6 ). The number of occupations exceeds the number of fathers,
since some of them held more than one position; in
particular many of the landowners were also in paid 
employment and many of those who were for some time 
Members of Parliament also had other occupations, 
especially the law.
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Table V,
Belf-rscruitïïient in the Judiciary 
Period during,which Judge first appointed
Total
Occupation of father 1820-75 1876-1920 1921-50 1951-68 1820-1968
Superior court judge k
Lo rd G ha ncellor
Holder of other 
judicial office, 
u.c. or serjeant
Other Barristers
Solicitor
Total of all fathers in
the legal profession 20
Total judges appointed 
during each period 106
7
23
103
10
32
91
Percentage of 
self-recruitment
3
4
21
86
3
22
18
33
96
386
18.9^0 22.3^0 35.2>^  24.4}ô 24.87>
*
( One father in each of these periods was a member of both 
branches of the profession).
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Morris Ginsberg in his analysis based on the parentage
of those admitted to Lincolns Inn between 1886 and 1927
found that during that time the sons of the existing legal
profession represented a consistently high proportion of
the prospective barristers, exceeded only at times by those
of 'gentlemanly' stock and during the period 1909-13 by the
( 1 \
combined forces of 'Other Professions'.'  ^ The average percentage
of fathers in the legal profession, for the whole period was
about 23%. A study of the contemporary legal profession by
H.R. Harris, although not directly comparable, suggests that this
I o)
figure has remained fairly stable.  ^ Using a sample of 445 
barristers and 555 solicitors, Harris found that 20% of all.the 
respondents^^) were sons of lawyers - 6% sons of barristers and 
14% sona of solicitors. Of the barristers only, 11% of those 
responding were sons of barristers and 10% sons of solicitors.
An analysis of the legal pedigree of the superior court 
judiciary indicates that, if anything, there has been a greater 
degree of self-recruitment, among the elite than among 
ordinary lawyers; further, the proportion of lawyers' sons 
appointed to the judiciary has been significantly higher during 
the last fifty years than in the previous century. However, 
a comparison of the judiciary with two other elite groups, 
bishops and army officers, shows that their degree of self­
recruitment has not been abnormally high. At only one time,
(1), Ginsberg, op.cit.p.171.
(2). Harris, op.cit.pp.77-8.
(3). The overall response was 58%.
(4). SeIf-recruitment is taken to mean the appointment to the 
Bench of sons of lawyers in general rather than sons of 
judges. The latter will be termed Judicial self-recruitment.
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about 1940, do they appear to have achieved a rate of self­
recruitment at all comparable to either of the other elites.
The church, in particular, has tended to draw its leaders 
from amongst those whose fathers were themselves clergymen in 
the Church of England, especially during the last fifty years.
Judicial self-recruitment was first described by Sir
Francis Galton in his book 'Hereditary Genius'. Studying the
judiciary for the period 1660-1865, he found that out of 286
judges more than one in every nine had been either father, son
or brother to a judge and that other "high legal relationships"
( 1 )had been even more numerous. To state the amount of family
association within the judiciary in this collective fashion 
is, however, a little misleading, since each relationship is 
counted twice. The actual number of judges' sons appointed 
to the Bench during this period was only 15, giving a 5% degree 
of self-recruitment, a figure approaching my own estimate for the 
years 1820-1968, that is 6% or 7.5% if Lord Chancellors are 
included.
The past century and a half has seen three great legal 
dynasties in the superior courts, - the Coleridges, the Homers 
and the Bussells; each of these families has supplied three 
generations of judges to the Bench. The Coleridge dynasty began 
in 1835 with the appointment of John Taylor Coleridge to the 
Queens Bench; in 1873 he was joined by his son John Duke Coleridge 
who was made Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and later became 
the first Lord Chief Justice ; after an interval of some thirteen 
years. Lord Coleridge was followed by his son, Bernard Coleridge,
(1). Sir Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius. Watts,2nd ed.(I892)p.62
(2). In June, 1970 Lord Hailsham (Quintin Hogg)
became Lord Chancellor, the first time that the son of a Lord 
Chancellor had been appointed to that office.
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who was appointed to the High Court in 1907, the first peer 
of the realm to attain that distinction. The Homers and the 
Russels have similar histories in the Chancery and Appeal 
courts and the two families, joined by marriage, have a family 
tree that might well be the envy of any aspiring barrister.
Trade, 'society* and the legal profession.
A considerable number of those who made their way to the
Bench, particularly in the period 1876-1920, came of commercial
stock, a few, sons of small shopkeepers, others, like
Mr. Justice Fry, members of well-known entrepreneurial families;
most though belonged to the diverse and expanding merchant class,
a section of the community not easily placed in social terms.
At the individual level social ranking obviously varied according
to such factors as size of enterprise and type of merchandise,
but during the nineteenth century the position of the whole
mercantile class appears uncertain. In former times, trade had
frequently provided a livelihood for younger sons of the
aristocracy and formed the backbone of many landed estates
but by the nineteenth century commerce had acquired a social taint
and traditional society, albeit hypocritically, held those
associated with it in contempt. In Trollope's words,
"Merchants as such are not the first among us; though 
it perhaps be open, barely open, to a merchant to 
become one of them. Buying and selling is good and 
necessary; it is very necessary and may, possibly 
be very good; but it cannot be the noblest work of 
man; and let us hope that it may not in our time be 
esteemed the noblest work of an Englishman."(l)
(l). A.. Trollope, Dr. Thorne. O.U.P.,, (1963) p. 12.
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Thackeray's characters were rather more vehement.
"The selling of goods by retail is a shameful and
infamous practise, meriting the contempt and scorn
of all real gentlemen."  "I've been accustomed
to live with gentlemen, and men of the world and 
fashion, Emmy, not with a parcel of turtle-fed
tradesmen."(1)
G.P. Judd offers an explanation for this widespread 
attitude :
"A snobbish antagonism to trade reached its peak only 
in the Victorian period, when the landed interest, 
on the defensive with its economic pre-eminence lost 
and the cult of land worship dying, gave a last 
determined counterblast to the rising industrial 
order". (2)
To sons of the ambiguously-placed merchant classes, prosperous 
but frowned upon by the traditional upper and middle classes, 
the law, a socially prestigious occupation with a professional 
success rate dependant on ability and industry, and largely 
unhampered by social considerations or family connections, 
offered golden opportunities. Early patrons of the rising 
public schools, heavy educational expenses and a lack of 
immediate rewards presented no problem for prosperous businessmen; 
the commercial classes, moreover, needed lawyers.
For the rest, the judges appear to have been drawn in 
fairly random fashion from the higher non-manual occupations; 
minor variations, such as the increase in the number of judges 
with 'financial' fathers appear to have no obvious explanation 
or significance. It remains, however, to consider the judges 
of titled and landowning origin; this social sector may be 
variously termed class, occupational group or elite. I have, 
for this and reasons which will emerge in the following argument, 
chosen to examine this particular group in detail separately from 
the two previous analyses.B!1). W.M. Thackeray, Vanity Fair. Chaps 5. & 20.2). G.P. Judd#IV, Members of Parliament 1754-1832. New Haven,
Yale University Press,(1955) P*55.
(3). The landowning group included in the occupational analysis 
differs from the traditional landed upper class only in that 
It omits life peers.
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The Judges and the traditional elite.
Though the territorial aristocracy of the nineteenth 
century still held matters of state, worship and war firmly 
in their grasp, within judicial precincts their immediate 
influence was, we have observed, less keenly felt, the rigours 
of the legal professions excluding all but a handful of that 
privileged class from the Bench. To-day their numbers are even 
fewer; only 9 of the 86 judges appointed between 1951-68 were 
from the landed upper class, though in fact the decline in their 
proportion of appointments, from almost 19% for the major part 
of the nineteenth century to 10,5% in recent years, is not 
statistically significant.
It is important to remember, however, when examining 
retrospectively the landed connections of any special group, 
that over the past century it has become increasingly difficult 
to delineate a traditional, landowning class. In the latter part 
of the nineteenth century the economic predominance of commercial 
interest fostered by industrialisation made the derivation of an 
additional income from either industry or commerce an almost 
essential prerequisite of landownership. The landed interest, 
blest with a strong instinct for self-preservation and adaptable 
in the face of a lost cause, were therefore content to confine 
their distaste for trade to the level of social discrimination, 
at the same time investing their otherwise diminishing resources 
in the prosperous mercantile enterprises of their 'inferiors'.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century an informed and 
perceptive commentary on London society appeared; its author.
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supposedly 'A Foreign Resident*, wrote,
"No doubt caste prejudices have still tremendous 
force; it is nearly impossible to overpass the 
barriers set up by centuries of separation.
Nevertheless the shrewed observer may notice 
changes, silently and not easily appreciable, at 
work. He sees that the so-called, but 
impoverished. Brahmin does not dispise the methods 
by which the pariahs have won wealth. It is a 
curious but significant fact that peer and parvenu 
frequently invert their roles nowadays. A duke 
becomes the partner of the general provider. My 
Lord Londonderry sells coal openly in the London 
streets; peers join with perruquiers in carrying 
on hair-dressing in the Burlington Arcade; the 
brother of the Queen's son-in-law sells tea, and 
another of the family is a broker who deals in 
stocks and shares". (l)
Even social barriers were occasionally lowered to allow
of intermarriage between the landed and the most successful and
acceptable entrepreneurial families, the fbrmer benefiting
financially, the latter gaining entree to society.
"Marriages ----  that might, according to old narrow­
minded traditions, seem ill-assorted, prove undeniably 
happy; in the prevailing dearth of good alliances, 
blue-blooded parents are glad enough to accept 
plebeian offers that promise substantial settlements. 
This is especially true of such as come from beyond the 
Atlantic. No very searching inquiry is made into the 
origin of the fortunes that American heiresses bring 
their well-born English swains. There is no stain in 
trade antecedents provided they are geographically 
remote".(2)
From the 1880's onwards, falling rents, due to the 
increasingly uncompetitive position of British agriculture, 
made serious inroads on the security of agricultural land^^^ 
a security which was judged by many property holders to be 
finally undermined in 1909 by the Liberal Government's taxes on 
land values; a decade later the results of the war were felt
f(1). Society in London, by A Foreign Resident. Chatto & Windus
(18- ) pp,l6l-2.
(2). ibid. p.162.
(3). Though a large number of the territorial aristocracy, - the 
urban landlords and those whose tenants produced milk for 
urban markets - were not affected by the great depression.
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in the imposition of even higher levies. Fearing further
'attacks* many of the traditional ruling class divested
themselves of their territorial assets. The "steady, inexorable
spread of landlessness among the former great families", is
demonstrated in the changing qualifications for inclusion in
( ^ )Burke's Landed Gentry.' ' Until the 1914 war it was necessary 
to possess some 2 ,0 0 0 acres; since then the stipulated quantity 
of land has gradually diminished and more and more landless have 
been included.
The gradual loss of their most distinctive characteristic,
landownership, substantially changed the nature of the whole
traditional elite. But in relation to judicial ancestry in
particular, a more significant phenomenom has been the
steady growth of the titled classes by the creation of new titles
and the institution of life peerages; both have in effect
diluted the elite's traditional element. A closer examination
of those judges whose origins lay in the highest social class
reveals that some 30% of them were the sons of either 'new*
or life peers, thus, somewhat paradoxically, intensifying the
notion that the acquisition of judicial status has owed more
to achievement than to any ascribed rights of lineage. It must
be admitted, however, that at least until the end of the
nineteenth century , peerages were rarely extended to any but
(2)those of impeccable social and economic origin.^ '
(1) . L.G. Pine, Ramshackledom; A Critical Appraisal of the
Establishment. Seeker & WarburgX*(T952) p.65.
(2). According to Bromhead, even Ramsay MacDonald in the 
twenties and thirties, when distributing peerages to 
political supporters, "showed a certain preferance for 
men whose social background would make them inconspicuous 
in an aristocratic assembly’.'
P.A. Bromhead, The House of Lords and Contemporary Politics. 
Eoutledge,' (1958) p.26.
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Table VII
Social ranking among the judges from Social Class I
Period of 
appointment 1820-75 1876-1920 1921-50 1951-68
Total
1820-1968
Sons of:-
Hereditary 
peers or 
baronets 4 3 1 1 9
Newly
created peers 
or baronets 3 3 3 1 10
Life peers — 1 3 2 8
Landed gentry 12 10 6 5 33
Total 
Class I. 19 17 14^^) 9 5 9(1)
(1). Mr. Justice MacNaughten*s father was created a Lord of 
Appeal in 1887 and also in 1911 became 4th Baronet of 
Dundarave, Antrim.
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During the eighteenth century, writes Guttsman in his study
of the British political elite, "the hulk of the new peerages
went either to men who already hald Scottish or Irish titles,
(
or to members of the landed gentry." ' ' This practise continued 
throughout the first fifty years of the Victorian age; "all but
10 per cent of the newly created peers were" he says, "of
2) If
..(3)
aristocratic or gentry 'backgrounds."Ennoblement rarely
conferred what did not already exist.
But many of that * exceptional* 10 per cent must have been 
drawn from the law; thus in I856 Lord Campbell in a speech on the 
Wensleydale Peerage, a test case for the introduction of life 
peerages for lawyers, spoke of the proposal as "an injustice to 
the middling and humbler ranks of society, to whom a prospect has 
hitherto been held out of mixing with the ancient nobility through 
the profession of law" ' And indeed, of the ten fathers in 
this study who were newly created peers or baronets, 9 were 
themselves judges, - three of them, the Lords Srskine, (1806) 
Chelmsford (I85 8) and Finlay (1916), Lords Chancellors, and the 
remainder, judges of the superior courts. Chief Justice Denman 
(1832), Chief Baron Pollock (1844)> Lord Chief Justice Coleridge 
(1873), Lord Wrenbury (1915) and Mr. Justice Phillimore, bart. 
(1881).
For the most part, these were sons of the professional 
middle class, though undoubtedly, either by their own efforts 
or inheritance, financially well-endowed. For in the nineteenth 
century, possession of property, preferably land, was a crucial 
restricting factor in the granting of titles; it was
Guttsman. op.cit. 
ibid, p . 117
(3). W.L. Guttsman, The English Ruling Class. Weidenfeld &
Nicolson,(1969) p.9.
(4). ibid. p.7 5. (quoting from Hansards Parliamentary Debates.
3rd series, vol.40. cols.355-4-
. Campbell spoke from the heart; he was the son of a Scottish 
. Date of acquiring title. Minister.
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inconceivable that hereditary honours should be bestowed on 
anyone with insufficient means to "sustain the dignity", that 
is, to maintain the visible status of their position and, 
further, to guarantee financial independence for their descen- 
dants.^ / On this point, aristocratic propriety would not 
easily bend even, as the case of Lord Wensleydale testifies, 
in the interests of a strong judiciary .
In 1856 it was proposed that a peerage should be granted 
to James Parke, a former Baron of the Exchequer; unfortunately 
Parke's judicial qualification seemed to outweigh his material 
resources. On the advice of Lord Chancellor Cranworth he was 
therefore created a peer, Baron Wensleydale, but only 'for and 
during the term of his natural life'; the majority of the 
Lords, interpreting this as an attack on the hereditary basis 
of the peerage, accepted the power of the crown to confer such a 
title but effectively nullified it by withholding from the new 
peer the privilege of sitting and voting in Parliament. Ultimately 
after much argument a full hereditary peerage was granted, fears 
about the new Baron's inability to provide for the future being 
dissipated by his advancing years, and lack of male heirs, all 
three of his sons having died in infancy.
The need for expert lawyers to carry out the appeal work
of the House of Lords without the burdens of a hereditary title
was finally met twenty years later with the passingof the
1876 Appellate Jurisdiction Act which instituted the office
of Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. At first the full privileges
of the House were only extended to acting Lords of Appeal, but
in 1887 it was enacted that a retired Law Lord might continue
(i). In the early twentieth century and particularly after the war 
the association between the possession of wealth and elevation 
to the peerage acquired a more dubious nature. Lloyd George is 
reputed to have earned over three million pounds for the 
Liberal Party by the sale of peerages.
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to sit and vote as a member of the House of Lords during his
lifetime . Until 1958 only the Lords of Appeal were eligible
for life peerages; this explains why, out of the eight fathers
of judges who were life peers, only one - Lord Fisher, the
( 1 )former Archbishop of Canterbury - was not himself an eminent 
judge.
Paradoxically, the parentage of these "legal* life peers 
was if anything of rather higher social standing than that of 
the judges’ fathers who were newly created peers. Nevertheless 
the main conclusion to emerge from this analysis is that a 
sizeable proportion of what may generally be termed the 
traditional social elite proves here to be a legal elite, 
representative of the overall pattern of occupational self­
recruitment rather than of a general class bias in professional 
recruitment or achievement.
In summary, the contemporary Bench of the superior courts 
proves, as an elite group, to be typical in its pattern of social 
recruitment. Historical analysis reveals, however that in the 
past the legal profession has been exceptional in its emphasis 
on ability as a determinant of success and hence in its relative 
rejection of overt patronage and class bias; the absence, 
historically, of the traditional landed class as a dominant 
sector of the Bench is particularly striking. A distinct
(l). Father of Mr. Justice Fisher. Queens Bench Division 1968-70,
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upper-middle class pattern has nonetheless emerged 
in the membership of the Bench, limits to social mobility 
via the profession being set by educational and financial, 
and thus social restrictions on entry into the profession. 
Occupational self-recruitment, as in other professions and 
elite groups, is also an important feature of both entry 
to the Bar and appointment to the Bench.
55
Chapter 2.
The Judiciary and the Public Schools.
An analysis of the type of education received by the 
judiciary provides, as an alternative to fathers’ occupation, 
an index with which to construct a social profile of the group, 
defines the general limits of the members’ intellectual resources 
and gives some indication of the type of values likely to 
dominate the superior courts. As expected, the educational 
histories of the judges conform in general to the characteristic 
elite pattern of public school and Oxbridge.
Public schools are here defined as those schools which were 
at any time members of the Head Masters’ Conference, as recorded 
in the Public Schools Year Book,'  ^ and the original reports of 
the conference. This definition , employed in most similar 
studies, has proved the most convenient and comprehensive; but 
in view of the importance of the independent schools in the lives 
of the judiciary and the often confused picture of education 
which emerges flom the nineteenth century, it is worth reviewing 
briefly their development, and illuminating some deficiencies 
of the definition.
The ’public school’, subject of interminable treatese, 
furious polemic, nostalgic adulation and sundry Royal Commissions, 
has not, as a concept, been distinguished by any great 
consistency in its use. Thus, E.C. Mack, in the introduction
(i). Though the ’public schools’, as a particular group within 
the general system of independent education were, of course 
in existence, long before the establishment of the Head 
Masters’ Conference, i.e. 1870.
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to his authoratitive work on the schools writes:
"In the eighteenth century some writers limited 
it to mean only Eton and Winchester, excluding 
even Charterhouse and Westminster. In the early 
nineteenth century, Rugby and Shrewsbury and even 
Harrow, were often ommitted and day schools 
like St. Pauls and Merchant Taylors and the semi- 
charitable Christ’s Hospital included. As late 
as l86i, though Cheltenham and Marlborough had 
long been great upper-class schools, the Public 
School Commision could designate as the Public 
Schools the seven old boarding-schools and the 
two day schools mentioned above. To-day,(1) with 
every school that has the slightest pretension of 
serving the upper classes calling itself a Public 
School, there is complete confusion. The Headmasters’ 
Conference has been reduced to limiting the term 
to those schools that have governing bodies. On 
this tenuous basis, it excluded Sheffield School 
from the Conference in 1927, (the Labour Party, having 
gained control of Sheffield, dispensed with the 
school’s governor^".(2)
Most authorities on the history of the education 
system believe that the origins of the public schools are to 
be found in the free grammar schools, that is, those schools 
which offered free tuition to all or some of the scholars.
These schools were also distinguished by their non-local 
character. The ordinary endowed grammar schools, restricted 
their intake of ’peregrin!’ (foreigners or strangers) and were, 
therefore, predominantly day schools, occasionally with a 
small boarding attachment. The policy of the public schools 
was to take a greater number of pupils from outside their 
immediate environs and thus they developed into boarding 
institutions. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, 
the differentiation between the great public schools and the 
remainder of the grammar schools became more marked.
(1). circa 1940.
(2). B.C. Mack, Public Schools and British Opinion.1780-1860 
Methuen, (1941) p.xiii fn.
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"Winchester, because of the scale of it’s foundation, 
and Eton, because of its royal patron, (l)had always 
been pre-eminent amongst the English schools. Other 
schools, on account of their size or antiquity, or 
because of the social status of many of their pupils, 
began to occupy a more prominent position. They were 
frequently referred to as ’the great schools’ but the 
term ’public school’ had not yet attained its modern 
significance."(2)
With the growth in the importance and popularity of these 
schools, came an Inevitable increase in the numbers of fee- 
payers, relative to foundation s c h o l a r s . D u r i n g  the 
eighteenth century the distinction between the two types of 
grammar school was finally settled and the public schools 
established themselves as institutions for the education of 
the wealthier classes, though some of the landed classes still 
preferred to employ private tutors. By the close of the century 
Eton still retained seventy scholars, but these were, writes 
Mack, "lost in a school of four or five hundred young bloods 
from the ruling classes".
If we take as our earliest definition of a public school, 
a non-local, endowed, boarding school serving almost entirely 
the upper classes, then until about 1840, only seven schools may 
be so termed, that is, Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Shrewsbury, 
Winchester, Westminster and Charterhouse. If the ’boarding* 
criterion is waived, then St, Pauls and Merchant Taylors may 
also be included - in short, all the schools which were later to 
be the subject of the Clarendon Commission. The paMcular social
(1). Henry VI.
(2). S.J. Curtis, History of Education in Great Britain.
Univ. Tutorial Press,(1948) p.52.
(3). The scholars received only tuition free. Boarding and entrance 
fees and ’extras’ were paid by all pupils.
(4). Mack, op. cit., p.399.
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composition of each of these major public schools and their 
relative popularity at different periods has varied considerably. 
While eighteenth century Eton was the school of the Tory 
aristocracy, its rival Harrow, received the patronage of the liVhigs. 
Winchester, until the 1790*s ,was much less favoured by the ruling 
classes. But all seven of the great boarding schools had become, 
by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the preserve of the 
upper classes, the old aristocracy and landed gentry, the new 
capitalists of the industrial revolution, eager to adopt the 
gentry’s style of life, and some of the more prosperous and 
well-connected members of the professional classes. The day 
schools, St. Pauls and Merchant Taylors, dependant on local 
demand had a larger intake from the lower middle classes, but 
nevertheless enjoyed great prestige and were throughout the 
century accorded similar status by being included with the other 
seven whenever these were referred to.
Inevitably success had its imitators in the form of the large
(1)
number of proprietory schools which sprung up during the middle 
years of the nineteenth century, to meet the needs of the rising 
professional classes, amongst them University College School (1833), 
The City of London School (I837), Marlborough College (1843), and 
Haileybury College (I86 2); some, like Marlborough, later became
(1). These schools were^like business enterprises, 
financed by an issue of shares.
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endowed. These schools, both day and boarding institutions,
were modelled on the existing public schools and owed much to
(1 )the inspiration of Drs. Arnold and Thring.' * But, though
the influence of such men was important in establishing the
particular intellectual and moral climate of the schools, their
path was defined and their success ensured by a set of conditions
peculiar to that time. R.H. Tawney describes four factors as
decisive to the development of the schools.
"They were", he writes, "the Industrial Revolution, 
with its flood of new wealth; the deficiencies, both in 
number and quality of existing day-schools; the 
modernisation of communications; and the careers opened 
by the expansion of the empire, the reform of the civil 
service and the growth of the professions. The first 
greatly increased the demand for high secondary education. 
The second and the third put a premium on boarding- 
schools and made recourse to them practicable. The fourth 
ensured that the aptitudes cultivated by them would find 
little difficulty when school-days were over, in securing 
suitable employment". (2) Tawney continues, "it is not 
an accident that the boarding-school boom followed 
closely on a railway boom, that three times as many public 
schools were founded in the thirty years between 1841 and 
1871 as in the whole country before 1841 ...."(3)
The new schools, like their predecessors quickly became 
the exclusive province of the rich, excluding the majority by the 
costliness of the services they provided; scholarships were 
available but werd mostly won by boys whose parents could afford 
an equally expensive preparatory education. With a few exceptions, 
public school boys were drawn from a small and privileged social 
group. By the mid-nineteenth century, "the scattered handful of
(1). T.W. Barnford casts some doubts on the extent of,Arnold’s influence: "--- the usual assumption that Arnold’s reputation
brought about a revolution must be treated with reserve."
Early Victorian headmasters, he says, were not easily 
converted to new ideas. "As with all men of stature, others 
have created a legend around him" (T.W. Bamford, The Rise of 
the Public Schools. Nelson, (1967) PP.51-3. See also 
T.W. Bamford - Thomas Arnold, (i960).)
(2). R.H. Tawney, The Radical Tradition. Allen & Unwin,1964, p.53.
(3). ibid. p.5 4.
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semi-charitable institutions which represented the F-ablic 
School system in the sixteenth century, had become a vast 
network of upper class schools". ' Attendance at one became 
a pre-requisite for entry into the higher walks of life.
Classification of schools.
Having due regard for the complexities of the schools 
system, the following classification was ultimately considered 
to be the most accurate and practicable for this study.
1. The Clarendon schools.
2. Other Public schools - independent schools at any time in 
membership of the Headmasters Conference.(2)
3. Direct grant schools at any time in membership of the H.M.C.(3)
4. Independent and direct-grant schools not in membership of the
H.M.C., including those old endowed grammar schools which either 
closed down or were taken over by a Local Authority.
5. All secondary schools wholly maintained by Education
Authorities in England and Wales or Scotland.
(Scottish Grant-aided Voluntary Schools have been classified 
a s ’direct-grant *).
6. Private schools - independent schools under private ownership.
7. Foreign schools - including schools in Ireland.
8. Private tuition.
(1). Mack, op. cit. p. 399.
(2). The Headmasters Conference includes at present: - 133 
independently financed schools, 66 direct-grant grammars 
and 15 ordinary grammar schools.
(3). There are 179 direct-grant grammar schools in all. These 
are financed partly by fees and funds, partly by the 
Department of Education; they are obliged to take not 
less than a quarter and not more than a half of their 
pupils from the state system.
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Table VIII
Schools attended by the judges.
Period of Total
appointment 1820-75 1876-1920 1921-50 1951-68 1820-1968
Type of school Percentage of .iudKes attending each type of
1.Clarendon 34.0%
(36)
35.0%
(36)
45.1%
(41)
32.6%
(28)
36.5^ 
(l4l )
2.Other 
Public 8.5%
(9)
19.4%
(20)
26.4%
(24)
39.5%
(34)
22.5%
(87)
3.Direct- 
grant 2.8%
(3)
8.7%
( 9)
11.0%
(10)
8.1%
( 7)
7.0%
(27)
4.Other Inde- 
pendent 8.7%
( 9) ^P3)
1.2%
( 1) ^(30)
5.Maintained - - 6.6%
(6)
10.5%
( 9)
3.9%
(15)
6.Private
^ 1 %
6.8%
( 7)
— -
^(15)
7.Foreign 2.6%
( 3) ^(®6)
4.4%
( 4) ^P2) ^(S)
8.Private 
Tuition 9.h%
(10)
6.8%
( 7) V i )
- 4.7%
(18)
Not known^^) 27. k %  
(29)
16.5%,
(17) ^ 1 % ^^(59)
Total
Judges 100%
(106)
100%
(103)
100%
(91)
100%
(86)
100%
(386)
(1). Some judges, particularly in the earlier periods, attended 
more than one type of school. Hence the figure ’total 
judges’ is smaller than the column totals.
(2). Quite a large number of the nineteenth century judges have 
left no record of any formal schooling; undoubtedly most 
of these either attended small local private schools or 
were privately tutored. Of the few twentieth century 
judges whose early educational experiences are omitted 
from their biographies in standard works of reference, it 
seems reasonable to assume that most of the schools 
attended were of a non-independent status.
fi2
Table IX
Schools attended by two or more judges
School Number oi
attending
Eton 35
Winchester 29
Rugby 17
Westminster 17
Harrow 15
Charterhouse 10
St. Pauls 8
Haileybury 7
Merchant Taylors 6
Shrewsbury 6
Manchester Grammar 5
Bedford k
Downside k
Fettes k
Marlborough k
Mill Hill k
University College k
Beaumont 3
City of London 3
Clifton 3
Greshams 3
Highgate 3
Kings College 3
Lancing 3
Oundle 3
Royal Academical Institute, Belfast 3
Tonbridge 3
Uppingham 3
Aberdeen Grammar 2
Bury Grammar 2
Dulwich 2
Edinburgh Academy 2
King Edward’s, Birmingham 2
Liverpool College 2
220 cont/..
(1). In a few cases (approx. 6%) the judge received only part of 
his secondary education at one of these schools.
Table IX (continued)
School
Liverpool Institute
Reading
Ruthin
St. Francis Xavier College
Stonyhurst
Wellington
Wigan Grammar
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Number of judges 
attending school
220
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
234
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Table IX (continued)
Schools attended by ^wo or more judges
Period of School Number of judges
appointment attending school
1820 -  75
1876 - 1920
1921_ - 50
Eton 14
Winchester 6
Harrow 5
St. Pauls 5
Westminster 4
Charterhouse 3
Reading 2
Eton 11
Rugby 7
Westminster 7
Harrow 5
Merchant Taylors 3
Winchester 3
Aberdeen Grammar 2
Liverpool College 2
Manchester Grammar 2
Mill Hill 2
Winchester 12
Rugby 7
Charterhouse 5
Eton 5
Haileybury 3
Harrow 3
Shrewsbury 3
Westminster 3
Bury Grammar 2
Clifton 2
Marlborough 2
Merchant Taylors 2
Wellington 2
Wigan Grammar 2
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Table IX (continued)
Period of
appointment
1951 - 68
School
Winchester
Eton
Greshams
Shrewsbury
Westminster
Charterhouse
City of London
Downside
Dulwich
Pettes
Haileybury
Harrow
Marlborough
Oundle
Rugby
St. Pauls
Uppingham
Number of
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Over the century and a half covered hy this study,
the number of judges attending the Clarendon schools
has remained fairly constant but there has been a stiking
increase in the percentage of judges recruited from all public
schools, from some 42% for those appointed during the middle
years of the nineteenth century to ever 70% for those appointed
since 1920. Other studies of elite groups have shown a similar
growth pattern in public-school representation; Kelsall’s
investigation of the Higher Civil Service is probably the only 
( 1 )exception.' ’ In 1942 the Fleming Committee were told that 
out of 850 bishops, deans, judges, stipendiary magistrates, Indian 
civil servants, governors of Dominions and directors of banks and 
railway companies, 76 per cent came from public schools, and 
of these almost half came from twelve major public schools.
Table IX provides an additional measure of the impact of 
these institutions which, attended by only 5% of the current 
school population, have a quite disproportionate influence in 
public life. All but 8 of the 37 schools attended by more than 
one member of the judiciary since 1820 are well-known public 
schools; of the others, five - Manchester Grammar, Kings College, 
University College, King Edwards, Birmingham and the Royal Aca­
demical Institute, Belfast, - are famous direct-grant schools; 
only one, Wigan Grammar, is a state school,
A comparison over time indicates that the domination of all 
nine Clarendon schools has been fairly consistent, but that Eton
(1). R.K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain; From 1870 
to the Present Day. Routledge & Kegan Paul. (l955).
(2 ). Fleming Report, p.54
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and Winchester have clearly been the main educative influence 
on the judiciary. This conforms to the school background 
of other elite groups. "With two exceptions,"' ' writes 
T.H.J. Bishop, "national leadership groups can be divided 
into two types: those where Eton is far ahead of a field in 
which Winchester has a prominent place; and those where Eton 
and Winchester are among several leaders."' ' In the case 
of the judges, however, the Wykehamist influence is stronger 
than usual. Eton has over the whole period produced slightly 
more recruits for the Bench, although Winchester has predominated 
for the past fifty years; but Eton is, after all, one of the 
largest public schools, and Winchester one of the smallest.
In his study of Winchester. Bishop provides a table, devised 
by Mrs. B.N. Clapham, which makes allowance for this factor.
It does so by expressing each school’s contributions as multiples 
of the numbers it would contribute if all secondary schools made 
equal contributions in proportion to their size. The effect of 
making allowance for size is to show that Wykehamists have 
a much better chance of becoming judges than boys from other 
schools. Bishop comments, "Not surprisingly, the field in which 
Wykehamists probably register their greatest success is the 
law, a profession where brains and conservatism come strikingly 
together.
The relatively high representation of Wykehamists in the 
superior court lends some support to the argument^^^ that the 
judges are an intellectually distinguished group. Winchester
1). Trade union leaders and board members of state-owned industry.
2). T.H.J. Bishop, in collaboration with R. Wilkinson, Winchester 
and the Public School Elite: A statistical Analysis. Faber &
Faber,"XÏ9^TT1pp* 43-4-,
ibid. p.43. 
ibid, p.20.
3). Tested more rigorously in Chapter 3.
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has been one of the few public schools which throughout its 
history has held scholarship in continuous esteem, though its 
academic laurels were not really won until towards the end of 
the nineteenth century. Since then, the Wykehamist reputation 
has been well deserved; although 6 out of seven Winchester 
pupils are commoners selected financially rather than intellec­
tually, a study by K. Hutton of their intelligence quotients has
shown the scholarly stereotype type to have suffered little from 
( 1 )exaggeration.' ' Hutton concluded from the results of his 
analysis that exceedingly few scholars were not in the top of 
the population but, further, commoners were also shown to be an 
intellectually select group though not, of course, as select as 
the scholars. The Wykehamists tested were all born in the 
1930’s but Hutton contends that the distribution of intellegence 
which he found among these scholars and commoners would be true of 
all Wykehamists back to those born in the 1890*s.
Although they may be criticised on other counts, the ability 
of Winchester and the other public schools to provide ’a product 
which competes successfully in most markets’ is to-day rarely 
questioned. The eighteenth century public school presented a 
quite different picture, providing an education that was poor 
preparation for any office demanding a modicum of learning or 
integrity. The schools were, like Oxford and Cambridge, rigidly 
classicist. Until 1840 an endowed school could not, by law, 
introduce other subjects, such as modern languages or mathematics 
except as optional courses; the curriculum was restricted solely 
to the teaching of Latin and Greek and religious instruction. 
Science was contemptuously ignored. It was, writes Bamford,
(l).. K. Hutton, "Intelligence Quotients and Differential Fertility;
Some observations from Winchester College". Eugenics Review
Jan. 1933.
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"as though the English heredity did not exist. Newton 
had died over 130 years before, the Industrial Revolution 
was more than a century old and the heroic age of 
industry associated with Boulton, Watt and Murdoch 
was already more than fifty years in the past. England 
was rapidly being covered with railways and the great 
scientific and industrial spectacle of the Hyde Park 
Exhibition was a ten-year-old memory."(l)
The schools were unaffected; universally admired, the 
industrial and craft associations of the physical sciences 
rendered them wholly unsuitable as objects of study for the 
progeny of the landed upper-class. For them, at least three 
quarters, and sometimes as much as eighty per cent of the time 
in class was devoted to the classics and relevant areas of 
history and geography; this was the ideal programme for the 
development of a well-trained mind and character. Yet, B.C. Mack
writes, "Few boys profited..... even to the extent of acquiring
a smattering of classical learning; if they carried away anything 
as a result of their labours, it was a permanent aversion to any 
form of intellectual endeavour.
These weaknesses in the educational establishments which 
nurtured the future leaders of society reflected the comparative 
lack of interest in the intellect felt by most Englishmen; only 
at Winchester and Westminster was learning more respected.^
It was not until about the 1830’s that the upper and middle 
classes began to pay more attention to the intellectual side 
of education; though even Arnold, one of the educational pioneers, 
listed his aims as "first, religious and moral principle; second, 
gentlemanly conduct, (and only) thirdly, intellectual ability.
1). T.W. Bamford, The Rise of the Public Schools.Nelson,(196?)P.89
2). Mack, op. cit. p.28
3). And at the Scottish academies and the newer boarding 
establishments of the non-conformist denominations which 
aimed at a more vocational education to fit boys for a career 
in commerce, industry or the professions.
(4). Mack, op, cit. p.249
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But certainly it was not only the academic aspects of the schools 
that called for radical reform; the moral and social climate 
of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century public schools, 
with their strange amalgam of harsh authority and arrogant 
libertarianism, provided poor breeding grounds for the Bench.
The public school society v/hich Mack described so vividly was 
"like a society of primitive savages - a world of brutal 
compulsions and taboos, in which happiness and freedom could be 
won, if at all, only after much hardship and struggle. The 
average individual suffered cruelly. " ... "High handed tyranny 
and cruel bullying were almost universal occurences at all
( a )
schools."' ' ’Boy freedom’ provided a perfect environment for 
intimidation and sexual perversion. If any knowledge was gained 
it was "the mere knowledge of vice" Discipline was harsh; 
the birch and the strap were the principal instruments of order, 
character-formation and even intellectual training. Bamford 
points to a strong positive correlation between eminence and a 
strong right arm; "all the great headmasters were renowned 
floggers."^^)
The absence of scholarship and orderly discipline in the 
early nineteenth century schools was due largely to the 
solidarity of the boys; public school boys came from a narrow 
social stratum and possessed a powerful group unity, exemplified 
most strikingly in the series of actual rebellions that took 
place in all the public schools at the turn of the century. In; 
1793, Winchester had its ’Great Rebellion’, "when the boys armed 
with swords, bludgeons and stones, barricaded themselves in the 
school and hoisted the Red Cap of Liberty; it had another in 
1818 when the Riot Act was read and the ’rebels’, induced to
rrrriiaokro5. cit.pp.42-37T55:
(2). Bamford, op. cit. p.66.
72
leave their stronghold hy the promise of a fortnight's holiday,
( A \
were captured by troops."'  ^ Troops were also used at Rugby 
in 1797 when the boys blew off a door with a petard. But these 
were not the fore-runners of Lindsay Anderson; most of the 
school 'rebellions’ were conservative protests against innovations 
or the withdrawal of established rules and privileges, especially 
in relation to the use of leisure. It is therefore not altogether 
surprising that one of the leaders of the second Winchester 
uprising was William Page Wood, one of the Vice-Chancellors and 
later, as Lord Hatherley, Lord Chancellor.
It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century, 
and particularly after the Public Schools Act of 1869, that 
standards in the schools began to show some improvement, due 
largely to external pressures from parents and the rivalry of the 
newer proprietory schools. Academically, socially and morally, 
the schools acquired a new sense of responsibility and with 
increased organisation the grosser deficiencies of earlier years 
gradually disappeared. There were weaknesses; the curriculum was 
still restricted, and at least until the 1920’s, the education 
provided by the public schools, with their emphasis on "liberal", 
non-vocational training, the inculation of a corporate spirit, 
and the importance of sport and moral improvement, definitely 
encouraged the development of character to the disparagement of 
brains. This was the era par excellence of the stiff-upper-lip 
and the team spirit.
(l). W.L. Burn, The Age of Equipoise. Allen & Unwin, (l964)p#67.
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Inevitably the schools themselves were to produce some
i i )of their sharpest critics,' ' but this was far outweighed
by their worldly success as a direct and exclusive training 
ground for all public offices, turning out "manly, well-adjusted, 
honourable boys, moulded into unthinking conformity and inbred 
with a passionate idealistic loyalty towards authority.
And,what was particularly crucial for those destined for a legal 
career, a reverence for, even an obsession with, tradition.
It is hazardous, in describing the ’judicial background’, 
to attempt to assign a relative importance to each of the various 
formative factors in their lives; thus to stress in this case, 
the influence of the public schools on judicial behaviour.
It is impossible to be sure whether characteristics of the 
judiciary that may be attributed to the effects of a public 
school education, are not produced at root by the common culture 
of their home and class environs, or later in life, by their 
professional experience. Similarly the ’old-boy net* itself, 
the tendency for the judiciary and other elite groups to be 
overwhelmingly dominated by former public school boys may 
simply reflect the class composition of these institutions. 
Attendance at a public school, particularly one of the exclusive 
Clarendon schools, invariably implies membership of a family of 
some social standing and wealth; therefore, in terms of professio­
nal success, the public school may be important only in so far as 
it reinforces the existing social and economic advantages of those 
who go there, providing them with an additional and distinctive 
social badge.
TTyi "Thirty yearsago", writes John Vaizey, "their literate
products obviously loathed them - books from The Loom of Youth 
on savaged them and in 1934 (as Phillip Toynbee tells it)Esmond 
Romilly at the age of fifteen founded a magazine called Out of 
Bounds which was ’against Reaction, Militarism and Fascism in 
the Public Schools". (J. Vaizey - The Public Schools, in 
H. Thomas ed. The Establishment Anthony Blond,(1959) p.26.)
(2)Mack, op. cit. p. 292.
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Chapter 3.
Higher and Professional Education
The Judges and the Universities.
In 19 5 6, the Economist reported that the most noteworthy
fact about the educational background of the judiciary was the
( 11preponderance of university men on the Bench.'  ^ Many 
become barristers by being students as the Inns of Court but, 
it said, a university education is obviously a great help in 
getting to the top. Some factual evidence supporting this 
point is to be found in an unpublished thesis by H.H. Harris 
on the contemporary legal p r o f e s s i o n . 88% of all the 271
practising barristers studied by Harris were graduates. However, 
it is only the sub-sample of 88 barristers aged 45 and over 
which is relevant for the purposes of comparison with any of 
the judges; of these, only 75% were graduates. The number of 
university men in the most recent cohort of judges (i.e. those 
appointed to the bench during the period 1951-68) is significantly 
higher, 81 out of a total of 86 (about 95%). Although I have 
some reservations about the reliabilitycf the data drawn from 
Harris’ thesis, owing to the smallness of the sub-sample and 
the high rate of non-response, these comparative figures do 
provide some foundation for the hypothesis that a university 
education is important to the achievement of success within the 
legal profession. Obviously no conclusive statements can be 
made on this subject in the absence of more substantial data on 
the educational backgrounds of barristers in general.
(1). ’’Judges Summed Up’’, The Economist, (Dec.15, 1956)
(2). H.R. Harris, The Legal Profession in England and Wales. 
Unpub. Ph.D. thesis. Reading University,(1966) p.70.
(3). 61% of his original sample of 445 barristers.
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Table XI
Universities attended by the .judges
Period^of 182p_-IS 18Z£-1220 1921-50 1951-68 1820--Ii68
appointment TT790- (1846-90% (1891 - (i921-38) IT790-1938)
(period of 1845) 1920)
University
attendance)
University Percentage of nudges attending each university
Oxford 16.0%
(17)
35.0%
(36)
47.3%
(43)
48.8%
(42)
35.8%
(138)
Cambridge 37.7%
(40)
27.2%
(28)
27.5%
(25)
34.9%
(30)
31.9%
(123)
London
’• f a
16.5%
(17) ' • f a
8.1%
( 7)
8.0%
( 31)
Trinity,
Dublin
6.6%
( 7) ^■?°5)
1.1%
( 1)
1.2%
( 1) ' • f i w
Edinburgh - 4.9%
( 5)
2.2%
( 2)
2.3%
( 2) 9)
Glasgow
°’f°l)
1.9%
( 2)
1.1%
( 1) ^■f°2)  ^' ('" 6)
Liverpool — 4.4%
( 4)
1.2%
( 1) 5)
Manchester - 2.2%
( 2)
1.2%
( 1)
0.8%
( 3)
Aberdeen — 1.0%
( 1)
— — 0.3%
( 1)
Queens,
Belfast
— — 1.1%
( 1)
—
1)
Queens, 
Galway
- 1.0%
( 1)
—
1)
8T. Andrews
°’f°l)
— —
1)
Foreign
Universities; '^('°2)
1.9%
( 2)
4.4%
( 4)
2.3%
( 2)
2.6%
( 10)
Total judgesGii. 2% 
attending /,\ (68) 
university^ ^
87.4%
(90)
87.9%
(80)
94.2% 
(81)
82.6%
(319)
Judges not
attending
university
" • f a ^■fu) f  3) ^‘M 2 )
Judges with 
no record of 
university 
attendance
31. 1fo
(32)
8.7%
( 9)
8.8%
( 8) ^•f°5)
14.2%
( 55)
Total 100% 
judges (106)
100%
(103)
100%
(91)
100%
(86)
100%
(386)
(l). The total of judges attending university is, throughout, 
slightly smaller than the total of all universities 
attendances by judges because a few judges in each period 
attended more than one university, particularly those who 
went to a foreign university.
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Table g  demonstrates how the number of judges attending
university has increased since the beginning of the nineteenth
century, corresponding to an overall growth in the university
population, as the provisions for further education have improved
( a )
and the prestige and popularity of the new universities grown. '
But it was particularly the second half of the nineteenth century
which saw a real boom in university education, mainly in response 
to the rising demands by the professions for qualification by 
written examination. The new professional requirements, though 
still vitiated by considerations of wealth or patronage, and though 
far from stringent by contemporary standards, converted the sons 
of the leisure classes to a more formal style of education than 
they had previously enjoyed.
The most salient feature of the table is not the general
increase in ’graduate’ judges, but the consistently high number
of Oxbridge men recruited to the Bench, constituting for the
whole period some 80% of all those judges who attended university.
There has been some reversal in the relative fortunes of the two
universities; for most of the nineteenth century more Cambridge
men reached the superior courts, but since 1876, Oxonians have been
predominant. The only time when there was any significant difference
in the proportion of judges graduating from the two ancient
foundations, as compared to other universities, v/as for those
appointed to the ^ench during the period 1876-1920; of these 90
judges, whose student years may be roughly located in the period
1846-90, only 71% had been at Oxbridge. During this period an
unusually large number of the future judges attended the new
(2 )University of London' ' or rather its two constituent colleges.
(1), Until the nineteenth century the Grand Tour had, for the 
landed classes, often acted as a substitute for university.
(2). Founded I83 6.
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Kings and University. This is hardly surprising; the foundation 
of these colleges was essentially a response to the educational 
demands of the new middle class, many of whom were at that 
time excluded fr^m the ancient universities hy virtue of either 
their religion or their financial condition and who were in 
any case looking for the kind of scientific and professional 
education disdained by those institutions.
During the second period five Edinburgh graduates were 
also appointed to the superior courts. The explanation for this 
judicial invasion from north of the border lies in the provisions 
of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act I876 which allowed for the 
appointment of members of the Faculty of Advocates to the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. Indeed, all but 
one of the judges studied who were graduates of Edinburgh 
University, have been Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. The exception 
is one of the present judges of the Family Division, Mr. Justice 
Orr.
Though a few graduates of Liverpool and Manchester 
Universities have made their way to the Bench during the 
twentieth century, the educative influence of these city 
universities on the judiciary has dwindled in recent years. The 
number of judges from Trinity College, Dublin has inevitably 
diminished as a result of Irish independence.
Turning again to the dominant Oxbridge theme. Table XII 
shows that few of the colleges established before 1945^^^
(1). Of the 17 judges educated at London during this period 
at least 8 were not members of the Church of England; 6 
were non-conformist and two were Roman Catholic.
(2). By which time all the judges in the study had completed 
their university careers.
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Table XII (a)
NUMBER OP JUDQga ATT-iiKDIHG BACH CAMBRIDGE 
COLLEGE (1)
COLLEGE NUMBER OF
Trinity 58
Trinity Hall 13
Gonville & Caius 13
Kings 7
St. Johns 6
Pembroke 5
Emmanuel 4
Christs 3
Corpus Christi 3
Jesus 3
Downing 2
Peterhouse 2
Sidney Sussex 2
Clare 1
Magdalene 1
Queens 1
St. Catherines 0
Selwyn 0
TOTAL 124
(1). Colleges founded during the past decade 
have not been included.
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Table XII (b)
NUMBER OP JUbGEd ATTENDING EACH OXFORD 
COLLEGE (1)
COLLEGE
Balliol
New
Christ Church
University
Trinity
Corpus Christi
Magdalene
Exeter
Oriel
St. Johns
Wadham
Brasenose
Jesus
Queens
Lincoln
Merton
Worcester
Hertford
Kehle
Pembroke
St. Edmund Hall
College unknown
TOTAL
NUMBER OP JUDGES 
2k 
22 
20 
11
7
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
. 3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1
Ï39 (2)
(1). Colleges founded in the past decade 
are not included.
(2). One of the judges. Chief Baron Richards, 
was a student at both Jesus and Wadham 
colleges.
SI
have failed to produce at least one judge, hut the major 
contributors have been Trinity, Cambridge and the three 
Oxford Colleges, Balliol, New College and Christ Church.
These four colleges between them account for almost half 
the Oxbridge judges and have provided twice as many judges 
as all the other universities taken together. Balliol has
an enviable record of success in all spheres. "Life", said
Lord Samuel, "is one Balliol man after another".'  ^ But it is 
from Trinity College, Cambridge that the hi diest proportion of 
judges is recruited; though this is the largest Oxbridge college, 
its relative contribution is inexplicably disproportionate.
The key to the judicial success of some of the other 
colleges may lie in their close connections with the major 
public schools. Thus, until at least the middle of the 
nineteenth century there existed a restrictive scholarship 
system, linking in particular Winchester and New College,
Oxford (another Jykehamist foundation), Westminster and 
Cnrists College, Oxford, and Eton with Kings College, Cambridge. 
Scholarships were rarely won on intellectual merit alone; in 
most cases they were reserved by statute for men who came from 
particular schools, particular localities or particular families. 
Thus the two old boy nets of public schools and Oxford and 
Cambridge Colleges reinforce each other. Whatever the influence 
of any individual college, the overall ascendancy of Oxford and
(i)o A. Sampson, Anatomy of Britain To-day. 
Hodder 6 Stoughton, (1965) p.226.
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Cambridge has remained unchallenged, fulfilling Poison's maxim
that "no student comes to the bar more qualified for success,
than he whose general education has been completed at Oxford 
i  ^1or Cambridge",' '
It would be imprudent to draw any general conclusions from tlese
data without consideration for the changes which have taken
place since the eighteenth century in the previsions for higher
education. In these days of UCCA and multi-choice, it is
easy to forget that in previous centuries the range of seats
of He arning has been more limited. Until 1828 there were just
seven universities in the whole of the United Kingdom; only
two of these were in England; Scotland, with a smaller population
boasted four - Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and St. Andrews; the
seventh was Trinity, Dublin. The Oxbridge monopoly of higher
education prevailed throughout most of the nineteenth century;
only five other universities, Durham, London, Belfast, Manchester
( o)
and Wales, were added before the end of the century.' ' Half 
of the present 44 universities received their charter after 
1940, that is after all the judges in the study had entered upon 
their university careers. Attendance at Oxford and Cambridge 
may be used as an index of high social status but it should 
be emphasised that the distinction between Redbrick and Oxbridge
is a comparatively new phenomenon, a point which has not always
been made clear in other studies of elite groups.
There is some evidence that there are substantially fewer
Oxbridge men at the contemporary Bar than on the Bench^^^ but
(1). A. Poison, Law and Lawyers. Vol.I Longman, Orme, Browne,
Green & Longman, (l840) p.32.
(2). Other establishments for higher education, the university 
colleges, came into being during the nineteenth century 
e.g. Liverpool, Southampton, Bristol, but did not receive 
their charters until the present century.
(3). Harris op.cit.
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without further historical evidence on the university recorh 
of barristers in general, it is impossible to say v/hether, in 
so far as they are recruited mainly from Oxford and Cambridge, 
the judges are a representative sample of the senior branch of
the legal profession or whether they are an atypical group.
If the latter is true, then changes in the university composition 
of the bar will not result in a similar effect upon the Bench; 
but if the selection of judges is random in terms of the
university education of barristers then we may expect to see less
of an Oxbridge bias in future Benches.
Judicial Scholars•
"The office of a judge is really a sufficieit guarantee 
that its possessor is exceptionally gifted." Wrote Sir 
Francis Galton, almost a century ago, "In other countries 
it may be different from v/hat it is with us, but v/e all 
know that in England the Bench is never spoken of without 
reverence for the intellectual power of its occupier".(1)
A more objective assessment of the judges’ intellectual 
capabilities is provided by an examination of their university 
records; and, indeed, the following table, which analyses 
the classes obtained by the judges in their undergraduate degrees, 
gives considerable support to Gallon. As a group, the superior 
judiciary have consistently demonstrated a high standard of 
academic achievement; throughout the whole period covered 
by this study at least a third of those appointed to the Bench 
have been the holders of first-class degrees.
(1). Sir Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius. Watts, (1869)
(2). It is likely, of course, that a disproportionate number of 
those for whom the degree class is not Imown were placed
in the lower classes, but this does not affect the absolute 
numbers of those definitely known to have firsts.
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Table XIII /
Degree-classes taken by the judges' '
Period of
appointment 1820-75 1876-1920 1921-50 1951-68 1820-1968
Degree class
First 75.8% 63.9% 40.7% 36.4% 51.1%
25 39 24 24 112
36.8% 43.3% 30.0% 29.6% 35.1%
Second 9.1% 31.1% 35.6% 43.9% 32.9%
3 19 21 29 72
 ^ 4.4% 21.1% 26.3% 35.8% 22.6%
Third 9.1% 3.3% 18.6% 18.2% 12.8%
3 2 11 12 26
4.4% 2.2% 13.8% 14.-8% 8.8%
Pass 6.1% 1.6% 5.1% 1.5% 3.2%
(Fourth) 2 1 3 1 7
1%2.9% 1.1  3.8% 1.2% 2.2%
Total
Degree 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
class 33 6l 59 66 219
known 48.5% 67.7% 73.8% 8l.5% 68.7%
Degree 29 21 19 13 82^2)
class not 42.6% 23.3% 23.8% 16.0% 25.1%
known
Total 62 82 78 79 301
degrees 91.2% 91.1% 97.5% 97.5% 94.4%
No record 6 6 2 2 18
of degree 8.8% 8.8% 2.5% 2.5% 5.6%
Total with 68 90 80 8l 319
University 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
records
(1). Where more than one degree was acquired hy a judge, I have 
included in the analysis that in which the highest class 
was obtained.
(2). This includes 4 judges, - 3 appointed in 1921-50 and 1 in
1951-68, who were War Service candidates on shortened courses; 
all attained distinction.
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Some problem arises, however, when we attempt to define
more precisely the nature of such an achievement; for it is
necessary not only to estimate, by comparison with other groups,
the value of a high class of degree but also, since we are
dealing with data, much of which belong to a very different
educational age, to assess the simple worth of the degree itself.
Thus Ogilvie writes, "It is amusing to remember how Eldon
had taken his degree at Oxford in 1770; He was asked two
questions, - ’Vdiat is the Hebrew for the place of the skull?’
He replied, ’Golgotha'. 'Who founded University College?’
He replied, ’King Alfred', and having thus satisfied the
f 1 )examiners in Hebrew and History, he graduated."' '
J.W. Adamson's work on English Education 1789-1902 throws
(o\
some light on this disconcerting statement.' ' Until the 
nineteenth century examinations at the Universities (Oxbridge) 
took the form of disputations; students were required at stated 
periods to argue a thesis in the presence of their seniors. The 
disputations were conducted in a sort of Latin; the student 
"kept an Act" as respondent when he maintained a "question", or 
an "opponency" when he took the opposing side. However, by the 
nineteenth century, says Adamson, "keeping an Act had become 
a formality to be complied with rather than a useful element in 
University education".^ A l l  students were obliged by statute 
to take part in the disputations and they could still be very 
difficult exercises but the majority of students who did not 
intend taking honours, the 'poll-men', were allowed to get round
(1). V. Ogilvie, The English Public School.Batsford,(1957)P. 115(fn) 
( 2). jr.vf. jLckams(3n, English Education 1789 -1902. ( ISTZK))
pp.70 - 80.
(3). ibid. p. 74.
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the statute by a devise called "huddling". Adamson describes
one of these ceremonies which took place in 1837, two years
before the last Cambridge Act was performed.
"Thomas Styles from the Respondents’ seat speaking |
in Latin: ’Newton was correct; Wood was correct; :
Locke was correct’. John Noakes from the Opponents’ 
seat likewise speaking in Latin - ’If your disputations ;
are false, they fall; but they are false, therefore they 
fall’. These words are repeated until Thomas Styles 
has kept the requisite number of Acts, and John Noakes 
the requisite number of Opponencies. They then change 
places and Thomas Styles refutes John Noakes with John 
Noakes’s own syllogism, and Da capo ad libitum."(l)
This, then, explains the surprising manner in which Eldon
acquired his degree. But the disputations should not be taken
too seriously, nor their importance over-estimated. At Cambridge
from 1780 onwards they were subsidiary to the Senate House
Examination, instituted in the mid-eighteenth century which was
the effective test of scholarship and which decided the placings
in the class list. Similarly, at Oxford a public examination
C 2 )
was in force by 1802.'  ^ The examination at Cambridge was taken
by all candidates for the B.A. degree whether potential honours
men or not; but the test was not uniform - "the preliminary
sifting by college tutors and the prescribed university exercises,
sudh as the Acts and the like, draw a clear line between those
who aspired to honours and ’the poll’." ^
"At neither University" says Adamson, "was the standard
for a ’pass’ severe.(4) Candidates who ’gained a class’,
that is, passed with honour were placed in Class I or
(1). J.W. Adamson, op.cit. p.75. (quoting, B. Dann Walsh -
A historical account of the University of Cambridge and its
colleges in a letter to the Earl of Radnor, 1837)
(2), Public Examination Statute 1800.
3). J.W. Adamson, op.cit. p.76.
4). There were for some time two exceptions to the normal examina­
tion system. Until 1834, ^ew College, Oxford, examined its 
own students and until I85I students at Kings College , 
Cambridge, were given degrees on the recommendation of their 
tutors.
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Class II, the latter being divided between a first 
and second bracket. In the early days of the statute 
of 1800, the second bracket, virtually a third class, 
included the majority of honours men. Of all the 
successful candidates more than one-third as a rule 
gained a class; the remainder simply passed." (l).
The distribution of classes for candidates at twentieth 
century Oxbridge has, as Table XIV shows, been rather different, 
more students obtaining a second or third and very many fewer 
taking only a fourth or pass.
Table XIV
Class distribution of Oxford degrees (1921-36) 
and Cambridge degrees (1957-38) (2)
Oxford matriculants Men who left Cambridge
1921 - 36 in 1937 and
Pirst 9% 11%
Seconds 31% 36%
Thirds 2 7 % 26%
Pass 15% 19%
Pail 18% 8%
Total 100% 100%
(3.899) (280)
Alterations in the delineation of the classes themselves 
provide some explanation of changes in the distribution of 
degree classes gained by the j u d g e s . T h u s ,  a large percentage 
of those in the earliest group, for whom no degree class could be 
discovered, would undoubtedly have been ’pass’ students. Later 
judges stood more chance of obtaining a class. It is clear, 
though, that in comparison with the general distribution of
(1). J.W. Adamson, op.cit. p.78
(2). These data are extracted from tables given in T.H.J.
Bishop and R. Wilkinson, Winchester and the Public School 
Elite : A Statistical -Analysis. Paber & Paber,( 1967)pp. 142-3.
(3). Oxford and Cambridge, which provided in any case the university 
education of the majority of the judges are taken in this 
respect as being representative of all universities.
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Table XV
Comparison of degree-classes taken by Wykehamists
and .judges ( 1 )
Degree class
Pirst
Wykehamists 
born 1820 - 1922
23.6#;
443
9.3 I^/o
Judges appointed 
1876 -  1968
46.8/O
87
34.72%
Second 39.9#;
731
13.8#
37.1#
69
27.3#
Third 27.9#
524
11.0#
13.42
25
10.0#
Pass
Pourth
8,6%
162
3.4%
2.7%
2.0%
Total degree 
class known
100#
1,880
39.5#
100#
186
74.1#
Degree class 
not known(2)
1,553
32.6# 5321.1#
Total degrees 3,433
72.1#
239
95.2#
No record of degree 1,326
27.9#
12
4.8#
Total with
university records
4,759
100# 251100#
(1). Bishop & Wilkinson op.cit. - data taken from Table 5 pp.134-5.
(2). "Wykehamist modesty notwithstanding, it is likely that a 
disproportionate number of those who did not report won mere 
passes, or Fourths. The distortion however was probably 
minor", ibid. p.133.
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classes, their allocation of firsts and seconds has been 
disproportionately high. Further proof of judicial ability 
is provided by a comparison of their intellectual achievements 
with those of Wykehamists, the intellectual cream of the whole 
schools system. (Table XV). The judges appointed after 1875 
acquired significantly more firsts than Winchester boys of the 
same generations.
Of all the judges. Lord Justice Scrutton, (Queens Bench 
Division 1910, Court of Appeal 1916-34), had perhaps the most 
impressive academic record. At University College, London, he 
acquired a first in English, an M.A., an LL.B and a fellowship.
He also won a scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge, where 
he gained a first in both the Moral Sciences and Law Tripos, 
was senior Whewell scholar in international law and won the 
York prize for legal essay four times. He was President of the 
Cambridge Union and won two scholarships to the Inns of Court.
Though academic attainment is by no means the only, nor 
always an accurate, index of overall ability, the law has, 
undoubtedly, attracted some of the richest minds, drawn not 
only by its worldly prizes, but also by its intellectual 
intricacies and opportunities for oratory. It remains to consider 
whether the content of the education received by the judges has 
always been of a kind best suited to their future function.
Legal Education
The role of the ancient universities during the nineteenth 
century was as much social as intellectual, their primary object 
the production of gentlemen rather than scholars. Despite the
90
demands of industrialisation, the emphasis was on a liberal, non- 
vocational form of education and with the exception of the 
Church, Oxford and Cambridge had almost ceased to provide a 
training for the professions. The Oxford University Commission
of 1852 deplored it as "----  a serious loss, both to Oxford
and the learned professions that the Studies which would prepare 
young men to enter professional life, should have been so 
completely neglected." ' ^
The founding of the Vinerian chair of law of Oxford in 1738
had aroused no real interest in that subject and at Cambridge the
study of law involved little intellectual effort, even though
Trinity Hall had been founded as early as 1350 for the express
purpose of legal study. Commenting on the legal education
provided by Oxford in the mid-nineteenth century, Herbert Broom
marvelled "---- that in that ancient seminary where Vacarius
taught, and where in modern times the genius and eloquence of
Blackstone so conspicuously shone, the study of jurisprudence
/ 2)
and of the laws of England should be allowed to languish." ' '
Until about 1700 the Inns of Court had provided a very 
strict educational system for prospective barristers, consisting 
predominantly of public readings and disputation. But gradually 
the functions of the Inns as law schools fell into neglect and 
the next century and a half was distinguished by the almost 
total lack of educational activity within the Inns, Admission 
to the Bar was in no way restricted by formal intellectual
(1). P.G. Brooke, "The Early Victorian Years of London University 
Its Influence on Higher Education and the Professions".
(2). H. Broom, "Legal Education ", Transactions of the National 
Association for the Promotion of Social Science,(1858) p.123
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requirements: "Dining in Hall was the only survival and 
it was almost literally true that a man ate his way to the 
Bar", (i) Self-help was the only method of learning.
"The student would try to obtain a seat in a lawyer’s 
office where he could study the forms of pleading 
and conveyancing and would attend the courts when 
they were sitting to learn legal method. Most of 
his law would be learned from such books as he could 
afford to buy or borrow. If he began to practise 
too soon the chances were that he would never learn 
much law; but if he put it off too long he might 
confuse himself beyond salvation". (2)
A witness before the 1852 Commission described the 
"social routine of what is now called a legal education."
A young man
" entered at one of the Inns of Court, is
received as a pupil for a year by some eminent 
conveyancer to whom he gives a hundred guineas 
for the privilege of going daily to this chambers
  He finds that he has purchased the right of
walking blindfold into a sort of legal jungle.
Masses of papers are daily placed before him, 
every sheet of which contains numberless terms 
as new and strange to him as the words of a 
foreign language and the bare meaning of which 
he rarely arrives at before the clerk announces 
that the client has called to take the papers away
 . This unpropitious year at length over,
the youth is doomed to go through a second year 
of like probation, at the same cost and almost 
as unprofitable, in the chambers of a special pleader 
or an equity draftsman, and by the end of that 
year he is so bedevilled and so wearied that he 
gives up the attempt as hopeless and becomes 
a clergyman." (3)
This absence of organised education was not felt by
the profession as a reproach. As late as I883 Dicey wrote
"If the question whether English law can be taught 
at the Universities could be submitted in the form of 
a case to a body of eminent counsel there is no doubt 
whatever as to what would be their answer. They 
would reply with unanimity and without hesitation
(1). Council of Legal Education, Calendar ,p.2. quoted:-
C.H.8. Pifoot, Judge and Jurist, 1857 - 1901. Stevens (1959)
p. 21.
(2). J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal history
Butterworths Tl97TJ p. 76.
(3). Pifoot op,cit. pp.21-22.
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that English law must he learned and cannot 
he taught and that the only places where it 
can he learned are the law courts or chambers."(1)
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century 
successive attempts were made to remedy the sad state of 
legal education, but the response was lukewarm and progress 
slow. In 1846 a Select Committee on legal education stated 
that it was significantly inferior in England and Ireland 
compared to that in "all the more civilised States of 
Europe and America". Their recommendations included a 
qualifying examination, an examination on entry to the Inns, 
terms to be kept by attendance at lectures and not by eating 
dinners, and an extension in law teaching in universities.
After some delay the Inns reluctantly agreed to co-operate 
in the establishment of a Council of Legal Education, intended 
to maintain uniform legal education before admission but 
practical reforms were minimal. In the same year, 1852, 
the first examination was held on a voluntary basis; only 
seven candidates attended. Two years later, when threatened with 
a Bill, the Inns finally introduced a compulsory entrance exa- 
mination but the low-standard deprived it of much value. 
Compulsory examination for call to the Bar was delayed for 
another twenty years, the professional lethargy of the Inns 
encouraged by protests that it would deter "country gentlemen 
who wished merely to acquire such status and so much professional 
knowledge as would be useful to them as Magistrates, Politicians, 
Legislators and Statesmen". ' ^
(1). Dicey, Inaugural Lecture, "Can English Law be taught at the 
Universities?" delivered at Oxford, April 21, I8 8 3,
(quoted in Pifoot op.cit.)
(2 ). A. Harding, A Social History of English Law,
Penguin ( 1966) p..348
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In the middle years of the nineteenth century some
serious efforts at legal education began to emerge in the
universities. In 1851 Oxford established a B.C.L. degree
and three years later Cambridge set up a Board of Legal
Studies. These innovations were consolidated when an Honours
School of Jurisprudence was established as an independent
entity at Oxford in 1871 and two years later the Cambridge
Law Tripos became a separate study. Even so, for various
reasons, but mainly because it still carried a vocational
rather than an academic image, law at the older universities
failed for many years to atcract either good students or
prestige; the best students still read Greats or mathematics
or entered the new History School; and
" Law tended to be a refuge for those whose main
interest lay on the river or rugby field, in the Pitt
or Carlton. Some form of law degree could be acquired 
with an absolute minimum of knowledge".(1)
Yet the requirements for the Cambridge degree of Bachelor 
of Laws, described by Herbert Broom in 1858, seem quite 
rigorous :
" an examination must nov/ be passed in the ninth
term of residence ----. The subjects of examination
for honours are four-fold, being Roman Law, the Elements 
of English Law, The Constitutional History of England, 
International Law and the History of Treaties. Besides 
submitting himself to the examination, every candidate 
Ê3T honours is required to prepare an essay on some 
historical point of law, to be afterwards publicly 
recited, and he has also to discuss publicly a legal 
question with one of the examiners, who are the Regius 
Professor of Law and three members of the Senate chosen 
by the University. To qualify, moreover, for the degree 
of LL.B, attendance must be given at the lectures of either 
the Regius or Downing Professor of Law during at least 
two terms". (2).
(1). B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, In Search of Justice. 
Allen Lane (1968) p.57
(2). Broom, op. cit. p.123.
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Nevertheless at both Oxford and Cambridge those actually 
aiming at a legal career were encouraged to read more reputable 
subjects, so that academic Law had little influence in 
fashioning the minds of the nineteenth century Bench.
Disdained by the old universities, cultivation of the 
serious study of law was left to the new institutions of 
higher education in London and the industrial conurbations.
In particular, the ’Benthamite Institution’, University 
College, heavily patronised by secular Utilitarians, dissenters 
and Jews, enjoyed considerable popularity during the early 
years after its foundation. According to P.G. Brooke, John 
Austin’s early lectures on Jurisprudence were attended by 
many famous contemporary figures, including John Stuart Mill, 
Edwin Chadwick, Lord Brougham, the Romilly brothers and 
Lord Belper; professional law students were more inclined to 
seek guidance from his fellow professor, A. Amos. But 
competition from the Law Society which began to organise lectures 
in the 1830’s, the absence of compulsory professional 
examinations to provide an incentive to serious learning and 
the necessity of passing the B.A. before proceeding to the law 
degree, gradually undermined support for law in the college and
(1)the Chairs lapsed for a period of some years, '  ^ In their 
provision for the teaching of science, technology and medecine, 
London and the other civic universities and colleges achieved 
remarkable successes but as training grounds for the traditional 
’gentlemanly’ occupations they were still eclipsed by the 
ancient universities with their classical curriculum.
(1). Brooke, op.cit,
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"Like many judges of my generation," Lord Diplock 
once admitted, " I received no formal education in 
the law. I comfort myself that this was also true 
of the judicial architects of the common law during 
the whole of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
 " ( 1 ).
Table XVI shows clearly that until at least the 1920’s the 
courts were dominated by men who had received the traditional 
Oxbridge education, either classics, mathematics or a 
combination of the two. For, even ignoring the fact that the 
public schools also offered purely classical/mathematical 
curricula and that most undergraduates were therefore better 
qualified to read those rather than any other subject, whatever 
their future professional ambitions, during the eighteenth and 
most of the nineteenth century, the opportunities for alternative 
study in not only law, but any other subject, arts or science, 
were severely limited.
At Cambridge, until 1824, there was only one tripos, and 
although this included questions in ethics and metaphysics, it 
was essentially a mathematics tripos. A classical tripos was 
introduced in 1824 But for the next twenty-five years, 
this second tripos was open only to those who had achieved 
mathematical honours. Oxford, on the other hand, had a distinctly 
classical orientation, with mathematics in second place. The 
mathematical candidates were, however, sufficiently numerous for 
the degree examination to be divided into two schools, literae 
humaniores and mathematics, each having its own separate class 
list; it was quite common for a man to achieve "double honours", 
that is to appear in both lists, as some of the judges did.
Because most of the earlier judges - those who had attended 
university between the end of the eighteenth century and the
(1). Lord Diplock
Table XVI
Subject of degrees taken by the .judges
Period of Total
appointment 1820-75 1876-1920 1921-50 1951-68 1820-1968
Subject of Percentage of graduate judges taking each subject
degrees
Classics 6.5%
(4)
32.5%
(27)
29.5%
(23)
13.8%
(11)
21.5%
(65)
Maths 47.0%
(29)
12.0%
(10)
3.8%
(3) ^‘^(1)
14.2%
(43)
Classics and 6.5% 
Maths (Double (4) 
Honours)
9.6%
(8)
4.0%
(12)
Classics or 
Maths
14.5%
(9)
3.6%
(3)
4.0%
(12)
Total degees 74.2% 
in classics (46) 
and maths
57.8%
(48) ^^■(26)
15.0%
(12)
43.6% 
(132)
Law 12.9%
(8)
26.5%
(22)
47.4%
(37)
61.3%
(49)
38.3%
(116)
Law and 
Modern
— 4.8%
(4)
3.8%^^ 3.8%
(3)
3. J% 
(10)
History
Modern
History
11.5%
(9)
12.5%
(10)
6. 3% 
(19)
Other Arts — 12.0%
(10)
5.3%
(16)
Science 1.6%
(1)
1.2%
(1)
2.6%
(2)
Not known 12.9%
(8)
9.6%
(8)
5.1%
(4)
8.8%
(7)
8.9?;
(27)
Total
graduate
100%
(62)
100%
(83)
100%
(78)
100%
(80)
100%
(303)
(l). Some judges took degrees in more than one subject.
97
middle of the nineteenth, - were Cambridge rather than Oxford 
men, their educational backgrounds were more mathematical 
and less classical than those of their successors. "The 
qualities of speed and accuracy which brought success in the
Tripos," it has been observed, "were much the same as those
(ilwhich brought success in the law courts."'  ^ Both universities,
however, even when new schools were established, continued
to hold intermediary examinations which always included either
Greek or Latin, so that some study of classics was compulsory
for all B.A. candidates. It was no great exaggeration for a
nineteenth-century legal pundit to write,
"There have been men, indeed, who have risen to 
the very highest honours of the (legal) profession 
without the advantages of a classical education; 
but it would be as prudent to imitate their conduct 
as it would be to obtain for a son a lieutenancy 
in the French artillery, under the expectation 
that he would, therefore become emperor of the 
French." (2)
As Table XVI shows, it is only since the 1920*s that 
’lawyers* have constituted a majority of the Bench and the 
influence of the classicists waned. The proliferation of law 
departments within the universities and proposed reforms for 
the rationalisation of legal education will undoubtedly be 
reflected in an ever-increasing number of judges possessing 
a law degree; but the advantages of this trend will be limited 
unless the teaching of the subject is given a wider base. Since 
those members of the legal profession who constitute the subject 
of my study had for the most part completed their education before 
1949; I do not wish to dwell unduly on the state of 
contemporary legal education, particularly as this topic has
(1). J.P.Co Roach, "Victorian Universities and the National 
Intelligentsia". Victorian Studies Vol.II, No.2. Dec.1959.
p.133.
(2). Poison, op. cito p.5.
98
( A )
been dealt with very capably in a number of works. ' '
However, as one of the chief faults in the system has been, 
until very recently, a singular lack of reform, many of the 
criticisms of contemporary legal education may be applied to 
the past fifty years as a whole. The new scheme of education 
and training for Bar students introduced in April, 1970 may 
also merit brief consideration, for the purpose of predicting 
possible, though obviously far-distant, changes in the intellectual 
character of the judiciary.
Although, during the present century, many intending 
barristers have studied law at university, qualification for 
legal practise depends upon acquiring an independent professional 
qualification. To-day this qualification may be gained after 
eating the requisite number of dinners and by passing the Bar 
examinations. The standard of these examinations has aroused 
considerable criticism in the past. As recently as 1960 the 
Oxford Lawyer Editorial commented, that "the client pays for the 
advice of a profession whose qualifying examination would not even 
be a stiff test for a school-child blessed with a good memory",
This low standard has been partly due to the fact that those who 
set the Bar examinations have had to take account of the many 
candidates from overseas whose first language is not English. 
Ironically, solicitors , who enjoy less social prestige than 
barristers and who are largely excluded from consideration 
for the judiciary, have, until now, started their legal careers 
with much better educational qualifications. Since solicitor’s 
examinations are taken almost exclusively by persons who intend 
to practise in England, the test is considerably more exacting 
than that for the Bar. In addition a period of practical
(1). G. Gardiner & A. Martin, eds..Law Reform Now
The Oxford Lawyer, Vol.XIII, No.2, (Michaelmas,I960) 
Abel-Smith & Stevens, op.cit.
(2). The Oxford Lawyer, op.cit.
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apprenticeship is also required, of five years or three 
years for a graduate. The new regulations introduced hy the
Council of Legal Education are an attempt to remedy this 
situation. The reforms, based on a Memorandum of the Senate
( A )
of the Inns of Court to the Lord Chancellors committee,' ' 
involve both harder examinations and practical exercises in
advocacy; in line with this, academic standards for entering
the Inns have been raised.
The publication of the Ormrod Report'  ^ in March 1971 
advanced the cause of more radical change in professional 
training. The Report underlined the continuing inadequacies 
of the present system: "it involves duplication and overlap, 
leading to the poor utilisation of scarce resources, particularly 
accommodation, library provision, and perhaps most crucial of 
all, suitable teaching s t a f f " , T h e  answer to these problems 
it said lies in a closer alliance between the profession and 
uhe universities which teach law. To this end the majority 
report of the committee recommended that new vocational courses 
should be provided within the university and college of higher 
education structure, instead of in professional law schools.
But the general consensus of the profession was perhaps better 
represented by the minority of the committee who thought that 
the profession should continue to provide vocational training 
in its own schools. Substantial differences regarding the 
content and location of vocational teaching present a major 
hindrance to the implementation of the committee’s wider proposals.
(1). Published in November 1968.
(2 ), Cmnd 4595
(3). The Times (March 31st, 1969)
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The effect of reforms in the system of legal education 
and examination, both accomplished and proposed, will, if they 
fulfil their promise to produce a better qualified Bar, eventually 
make some mark on the Bench; hut, since the superior judiciary, 
particularly the Law Lords, are already something of an 
intellectual elite, greater benefit would probably be felt 
through some extension in the field of their learning, rather 
than through any improvement in the formal academic records of 
the judges.
Unlike their continental counterparts, contemporary English 
judges do not, before their appointment, receive any formal
( A )
training in penal methods,^  ^ Many individual judges attempt
to remedy this conspicuous weakness by their own efforts,
John Watson writes of one
" High Court judge who makes a practice of
obtaining regular reports from prison and 
borstal governors and the wardens of detention 
centres on the progress of the men and women 
he has committed to their care, ’Pew people 
except us*, said a high prison official,,,,,,
’have any idea of the trouble he goes to’,"(2)
In recent years some progress has been made on a more organised
and official basis. In the Report of the Streatfield
Committee emphasised that judges must keep themselves
informed by visits and by reading but they also recommended the
provision of a standard booklet giving information on forms of
sentence, together with data about national trends in crime and
research material on the treatment of offenders. This suggestion
(1), Of course, to advocate courses in penology for judges is to 
accept that they should continue to deal with sentencing as 
well as the determination of guilt; the more radical view 
holds that the function of sentencing should be taken away 
from the courts and vested in some expert body,(See, for
example, 8,& I,T . G-lueck, Later Criminal Careers (^^37) I 
M. Pry, The Puture Treatment of Adult Offenders (19^);
N. Walker, Sentencing in a Rational Society (1969).
(2). John Watson, ’’Judgement” The Times (Saturday Review) ( Jan,11th
1969)
(3), Cttee on the Business of the Criminal Courts (Cmnd 1289)
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was subsequently met by the publication of a Home Office guide.
The Sentence of the Court, an invaluable handbook for professional 
sentencers. Since 1964 the Queens Bench judges have held 
regular conferences designed to minimise inconsistencies in 
sentencing; these are attended by distinguisned criminologists 
who keep the judges up to date with recent developments in their 
field. The Lord Chancellor has also arranged for the provision 
of a voluntary week-long course in penology to be held annually 
for barristers appointed to lesser judicial offices.
But these are relatively minor improvements - too little
and too late. A barrister should be given every opportunity
for acquiring some grounding in the elements of penology as part
of his early training; and a judge should regard the treatment
of offenders as
''an ordinary subject to be studied as part of his 
professional equipment. Is it too much to hope,
”^ s  R.M. Jackson, "that the legal profession may 
come to regard the subject of sentencing as being 
as important as, say, the rules of evidence.”
Other reformers have been less temperate in their demands.
"The professional sentencer", writes Watson, "needs an 
appreciation of the social and economic conditions that tend 
to breed crime, the motivation of the criminal and 
some perception of his psychological make-up".(l)
As early as 1916 Judge Brandeis put the case rather more strongly
when he issued the warning that a lawyer who had not studied
sociology and economics was very apt to become a public enemy.
The notion that every potential recruit to the Bench should acquire
proficiency in a wider range of social science subjects clearly
lacks realism, but we might reasonably expect lawyers to have
(1). John Watson, op. cit.
(2). Lord Wilberfore, "Educating the Judges" Journal of the Society 
of Public Teachers of Law. Vol.X no.4. (Dec.i969)p.261.
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some understanding of those areas of other disciplines which 
are most pertinent to their own work. Both branches of the legal 
profession in England have indeed now begun to recognise the 
importance of including in the professional curriculum some 
study of social policy, of theories of deviance and of other 
non-law subjects of special concern to legal practitioners.
It is also widely recognised that the lawyer’s field of
practical experience needs to be extended. Lord Wilberforce
has particularly enphasised this.
"I would like to see it made part of the young lawyers’ 
training to spend a period, paid if you like, doing
social security work....... it would give him an
invaluable background on which to build later if
he is called on to practise or to act judicially in this
field."(1).
In relation to industrial injuries and the pathology of work with 
machines he has recommended that "the law student or the young
barrister during vacation or the judge on sabbatical leave
( 2)spend three months on an assembly line".^ ' Further,
"The educative process in all stages in both branches 
needs to bring the lawyer into touch with actuarial
techniques, and ....  accountancy methods, rather
than leaving him with the impression that a gentleman 
soils his hands by touching figures."(3)
But Lord Wilberforce remains, in common with most of his
fellow judges, convinced of the distinction that must be drawn
in the trial situation between the judicial decision and the expert
advice which either precedes or follows it. He concludes that
"broadening of education or training or experience is 
desirable for all lawyers, and all judges should be 
aware, and be helped to remain aware, of what movements 
there are in the sciences of the mind. But the 
lawyers’ job and the judges’ job do remain distinct 
from that of the expert."(4).
Lord Wilberforce, op. cit. p72b0"
ibid. p . 262 
ibid. p . 263 
4). ibid. p.262.
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PART II: THE JUDICIAL CAREER PATTERN
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Chapter 4
The Bar
Call to the Bar
(1)
The early working life of the average judge is not 
distinguished by a wealth of experience in fields other than 
the legal profession; for most, it provides their only paid 
employment. Professional tradition and restrictive practise 
have prescribed that the progress of a judge will be peculiarly 
uniform and well-ordered; a clear pattern emerges, ornamented 
at each stage by an antique terminology and ritual.
Every judge begins as a student at one of the Inns of
Court; to become a student, a person must satisfy the
(2)University matriculation requirements,^  ^ produce two character 
references and pay the necessary fees. A student at an Inn of 
Court must not be gainfully employed unless the Benchers allow 
that this is compatible with his position as a student; membership 
of another profession is a disqualification. A student is usually 
eligible for call to the Bar when he has passed, the Bar examina­
tions, kept eight di ning t e r m s , p a i d  the appropriate fees, 
attained the age of 21 and signed the Call Declaration. The 
student’s name and description must also be ’screened* in the 
Hall, Benchers’ Room and Treasurer’s Office of all the Inns for 
four days in the term of his call. Anyone who intends to 
practise at the Bar must in addition keep another four dining
(1). This section does not in general apply to those Lords of 
Appeal appointed from the legal professions of either 
Scotland or reland. For further details on the former 
see:-
D.M. Walker, The Scottish Legal System.Edin. W. Green 
19697^
N. Wilson, The Sociology of a Profession: The Faculty of
Advocates. Unpub. thesis.Ph.d. Edin. 1965.
(2), Since April 1969 the minimum educational requirement has been 
passes in five subjects of the G.G.E. Examination, at least 
two of which must be grade (C) A-levels. Previously only 
grade (s) was required.
(3). Term is kept by dining in Hall any three days in each term.
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terms and either complete a twelve month period of pupillage 
in the chambers of a barrister of at least five years standing
or complete the Practical Training Course provided by the Council
of Legal Education.
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, there has been 
a decline in the age at which the judges have entered upon their 
careers as barristers. Call to the Bar was delayed for a
Table XVII The judges’ average age of call to the Bar
.Period of appointment Age
1820-75 27.2
1876-1920 25.8
1921-50 25.3
1951-68 25.1
considerable percentage of the nineteenth century judges by their
practise as special pleaders. Until the passage of Indictment
Act, 1915; an indictment was a pleading on the part of the
Crown which, like any other pleading, was open to objection on
any one of a great variety of grounds. The pleader, therefore
had to anticipate every probable failure by the witnesses to
prove the main offence by inserting Counts in the indictment to
anticipate any alteration. His task demanded great erudition
and skill in all the niceties of pleading and though both the
fees and the status were low, special pleading was a recognised
method both of earning money and of attracting clients. It served
as an excellent apprenticeship to the Bar. Poison quotes an
eminent judge, - "There are but two ways of getting on in the law -
f 1 )special pleading or a miracle - I preferred the former."^ ^
But a number of years practise as a pleader meant that those with 
such experience were not usually csUed to the Bar until they were
over 30. If those judges known to have been special pleaders are
TT).A.Poison,Law and Lawyers.Vol.1.Longman.Orme.Browne.Green & 
Bongmans,(184oT p.27.
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not included, the average age of call to the Bar for the 
earliest appointments cohort, is reduced to 24.36 years, 
more in line with the later periods.
About 600 barristers are now ’called' each year to 
the English Bar: of these 75% are from overseas. Some 
4,000 Barristers are actually domiciled in Britain but for 
many of these it is simply a nominal occupation, which confers 
a saleable prestige; in addition, industry and commerce or 
the Civil Service sometimes prove more attractive and lucrative 
than the Bar. For some time the body of practising barristers 
stood at just over 2,000'“ '^ with only about 240 newly called 
barristers entering into practise each year. The professional
(2 )judiciary, whose numbers have increased appreciably, '
are, v/ith some minor exceptions, appointed exclusively from
practising members of the Bar; it therefore caused some concern
that the profession showed no signs of being able to attract
more recruits. The Report of the Beeching Commission drew
attention to this situation:-
"A factor which is even more restrictive than cost; 
both in the short and medium term is the capacity of 
the Bar. When applied as it is forced to be by 
the present court system, it is inadequate to satisfy 
the demands made on it to serve its double function 
of providing counsel and supplying the pool from which 
the judiciary is drawn. Although, provided there were 
suitable incentives, the Bar could no doubt be considerably 
enlarged, an extension of capacity at all levels of 
competence and experience w u l d  take many years to 
achieve. Moreover, the last to be affected by a larger 
recruitment to the Bar would be those levels from which 
the higher ranks of the judiciary are drawn. The present 
potential of the Bar, therefore, sets a limit to the 
possibility of increasing judge power without sacrificing 
judicial quality and without denuding the Bar of its 
leading members, and this limitation will only be eased 
slowly because, for many years to come, it will depend upon 
past changes in the strength of the Bar rather than upon 
any recent or future increase in the rate of expansion."(3)
(1). In the early nineteenth century there were about 800 barristers 
in practise.
(2). The number of High Court judges has more than doubled in the 
last thirty years.
(3). Report of the Royal Commission on Assizes and Quarter Sessions 
12,66-62, para. 115 (Cmnd 51431
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The long-term prospects are rather better. In 1971 
the Bar Council reported that the number of barristers now 
in practise in England and Wales is the highest ever recorded - 
2,584 - some thirty per cent higher than it was ten years ago 
and the greatest net increase (5.5 per cent) in a single year 
since statistics have been kept. '
The dilemma of staffing the courts from the resources 
of the Bar raises the vexed question of whether solicitors should 
be eligible for appointment to the higher judicial offices.
The traditional argument against the appointment of solicitors 
to the Bench is that in most cases a solicitor’s experience in 
dealing with pure points of law and his knowledge of court procedure 
and the conduct of trials will be considerably less than that 
of a barrister. Court skills might perhaps, not be very difficult 
to acquire, but the selection of judges from over 20,000 
practising solicitors, the majority of whom are never seen 
in action, would be problematic. There are a number of solicitors 
widely respected for their specialist knowledge in certain fields, 
such as company law, who rarely consult counsel except where 
compelled for pleadings and the like to do so; but for many of 
these judicial office would not present an attractive alternative 
to an interesting and financially rewarding practise.
The first breach in the Bar's monopoly over judicial 
appointments has been made by the Courts Act, 1971, under which 
a solicitor may indirectly become eligible for appointment as a 
circuit judge; by section 21(2) either a barrister or a solicitor 
of ten years’ standing may be appointed a recorder, and a recorder 
judge.(s.16). However, although a solicitor in private practice
(1). New Law Journal 1971.
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may find it possible to take an appointment as a recorder 
and in due course become qualified to be a circuit judge, 
a solicitor who is a stipendiary magistrate or county court 
registrar is not likely to be able to seek appointment as a 
recorder since a minimum of 30 days' service a year is expected 
to be required. Thus, as Professor Borrie has pointed out, 
solicitors whose existing work might be thought to make them 
particularly suitable for appointment as circuit judges are 
virtually ruled out.^ ^
Queens Counsel
After a number of years practise at the Bar a barrister 
may become a Queens Counsel. Opigij^ating in the use of
irregular retainers for ’learned Counsel' to assist the Law 
Officers with the Royal Work during the sixteenth century, the 
Queens Counsel had become by the eighteenth century an established 
legal order appointed by royal patent. By this time they had cea­
sed to be in any real sense the monarch's counsel and simply became
a body of counsel who for one reason or another, often political,
(3)(A
had been given a rank superior to that of ordinary counsel.
To-day any barrister of not less than 10 years standing may 
apply for silk by writing to the Lord Chancellor during February
( 1 ). G. Borrie, The Courts Act 1971, New Law Journal June3.1971 .n476
(2). Commonly known as 'taking silk’ because a Q.C. may wear a 
silk instead of a stuff gown.
(3). A special license was required for the purpose of appearing 
against the Crown, but this was refused only if the Crown 
wished to be represented by the Q.C. concerned. An increasing 
volume of litigation against the Crown and Crown Departments 
demanded the eventual abolition of this procedure and in 1920 
Queens Counsel were granted a general dispensation to appear 
against the Crown without a licence.(D.M. Walker op.cit.p.270)
(4). W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law. Vol. I 
Methuen & Sweet & Maxwell,7th e d . (196d )
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( 1 )asking to be recommended to the Crown.^  ^ An applicant
must be sponsored by two judges who are prepared to answer
questions on his ability and status.
The process of granting silk is shrouded in mystery; 
applicants are not told how to frame their applications and 
no one knows precisely what criteria are used for selection.
Abel-Smith and Stevens deduce
that the policy is to try to avoid flooding 
the market, to ensure that the total number of silks 
in particular fields is not greatly in excess of the
amount of work for them to do.....  It is also
assumed that the character of the applicants is
considered; any lapse in the highest standards of
professional conduct or even personal conduct may 
prevent a barrister from ever being appointed.....
In these matters it is believed that Lord Chancellors 
(or the Lord Chancellor’s Office) take the advice of 
the judges on the particular circuit or in the 
particular division in which the applicant practises."(2)
Until Jowitt’s Chancellorship (1944-51), virtually all 
applications for silk were granted unless there were some clear 
reason for not doing so. As a result taking silk merely 
indicated that a junior had reached the state when he would like 
to cut down on his smaller work. To-day the honour is not granted
quite so readily......"taking silk now involves entering into
a totally different existence, and the changing rules for 
appointment have made the process of applying for silk a test 
of gamesmanship or b r i n k m a n s h i p . O f  the hmdred or more
barristers who applyfor silk each year, only between twenty and
(5)
thirty are usually appointed,though the unsuccessful
applicants are not debarred from trying again the following year.
(1). Appointments are announced at the beginning of the Easter 
vacation.
(2). B. Abel-Smith & R, Stevens, In Search of Justice.
Allen Lane, (1968) p.118.
(5). ibid.
(4). 1969 was an unusually good year for silks. 38 were granted. 
Normally about 10% of the practising bar are Q.C.’s.
(5 ). The Times (April 5th, 1969) (Editorial).
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Youth may he a temporary prohibition.
There appears to be some doubt about the degree of political 
consideration still remaining in the appointment of Q.C.’s.
In 1958 Henry Cecil considered that it was still customary 
to grant automatically the application of those lawyers who were 
M.P.*s. and had been called a sufficiently long time.^ ^ ^ In 
the mid-sixties Nan Wilson also wrote, "There is a tradition 
that barristers who become M.P’s will be granted a patent of 
Q.C. on more lenient terms than others and hence, they are 
sometimes designated artificial silks by their professionally
(2 )more proficient brethren. ' P.G-. Richards, on the other hand,
while recognising this as an earlier practice, believes that 
it has now been stopped.
In April, 1966, 22 juniors were appointed Q.C’s. At the 
extremes one had been a junior for 33 years and another for 
only 13 years, but the average time from call to the Bar to taking 
silk was 19 .8 years - twice as long as the traditional period of 
10 years which must elapse before a junior applies to the Lord 
Chancellor for appointment as a l e a d e r . I n d e e d ,  since 1820, 
only 8 of the judges had become Q.Cis after just 10 years at the 
Bar. At least 6 of these judges had definite political 
connections; 2 were M.P’s when they were created silks, the other 
four reached the Commons after their elevation to that rank.
(1). H. Cecil, Brief to Counsel. Michael Joseph,(1958) p.150
(2). N..Wilson, The Sociology of a Profession : The Faculty of F 
Advocates. Unpub. Ph.D. Edinburgh (1965) p.38.
(3). P.O. Richards, Patronage in British Government.
Allen & Unwin (1963) p.13&.
(4). H.R. Harris, The Legal Profession in England and Wales 
Unpub. Ph.D. Reading. (1966) p.265.
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Significantly also, the majority were destined for the highest 
judicial office, among them. Lord Chief Justice Hewart and 
Lord Evershed, a Master of the Rolls, who was made a Q.C. at 
the very tender age of 3kf an achievement surpassed only by 
William Garrow one of the early nineteenth century Barons of the 
Exchequer who received his silk when he was only 33. Most of 
the judges were obliged to wait rather longer for the honour 
and as the following table demonstrates, there has been little 
change in the pattern of "promotion".
Table XVIII
The J Wges' average age of taking silk.
Period of
appointment Avarage age of taking Average time from call
silk., to Bar to taking silk.
1820 - 75 44. 0 17. 6
1876 - 1920 45.5 18. 1
1921 - 50 43. 2 18. 2
1951 - 68 45. 9 21
In Brief to Counsel, Henry Cecil emphasises that to remain a "
i
junior does not mean that a barrister is of small importance. J
Many juniors, he says, become County Court judges and a few become
(1 )High Court judges without ever becoming a Queens Counsel. ^
The immediate advantage that accrues to a barrister when he takes 
silk is that he will for the most part only deal with court work 
and will have the assistance of a junior. A Q.C. will also earn 
higher fees, although overall a junior may earn more than a Q.C.
A successful junior may indeed experience a sharp reduction in 
fees, if he fails to attract sufficient work as a leader.
(1). Cecil, op. cit. p.147.
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Yet if a barrister sets his sights on the Bench, it is almost 
imperative that he take silk. A Queen*s Counsel is, in 
Mrs. Caskell’s words, "as like to be a judge as a kitten is 
like to be a cat ;  ^ for the past century, over 80% of all 
the English judges have been drawn from their ranks.
During the earlier part of the nineteenth century, fewer, 
though still a majority of barristers trod the ’silken’ path to 
the Bench. Some chose instead, the alternative route by which 
a successful barrister might raise himself above the ordinary 
counsel, namely the acquisition of a patent of precedence. This 
conferred the same dignity and privileges as a silk but did not 
carry the disabilities v/hich attached to the office of a leader; 
until 1920 a Q.C. could not appear against the Crown without the 
Crown’s license and, as the office was a paid one, appointment 
to it vacated a seat in Parliament. A patent of precedence did 
not expose its holder to these disadvantages ; nor was he obliged 
to abandon the smaller work of the Bar. As the Law Journal 
commented in 1926 "It is not easy to say exactly why it has 
become extinct.
In the case of the nineteenth century judges, if those who 
had held patents are included with the silks, the percentage of 
the judiciary selected from amongst the ’senior’ barristers 
moves closer to the contemporary figure, almost 70%; but even 
allowing for this the trend is towards a greater silk monopoly.
This tendency was observed with regret, by Ensor some forty years 
a g o . ^ " S o m e  of the most learned and judicially minded men 
at the Bar at any given time will not be K.C’s or at any rate 
not fashionable ones. But in England it is difficult for 
Lord Chancellors - themselves always famous ex-advocates - to
give due weight to this," he wrote. Not so much regard should
T). Mrs. Oaskell. Wives and Daughters. Smith.Elder & Co.(1883)p576
2 ). Law Journal, (Oct. 30th 19^2)p.283.
3J. R.C.K. Ensor. Courts and Judges in France.Germany and England.
o.u.p. (19335 pTÏÔBl ------------ --------------  ----
Tat) le XIX
The Bar histories of the .ludlclary
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Percentage of judges who were:-
Period of Queen’s Junior Holders of Other Total
appointment Counsel Counsel to patents of Counsel judges
the Treasury precedence
(1)
1820-75 60. 5.7% 7 .5% 26.4% 100%
(6U) (6) (8) (28) (106)
1876-1920 8 3.2% 10.55^ 1.1% 5 .3% 10CÇ4
(79) (10) (i) ( 5) (95)
1921-50 8k. 9% 7.0% — 8,1% 100%
(73) (6) ( 7) (86)
1951-68 83.3^0 7.1% — 9 .5% 100%
(7 0) (6) ( 6) (84)
1820-1968 77. 7.6% 2.4% 12.9% 100%
(286) (28) (9) (W) (371)
(1). These figures do not include the Scottish or Irish Law
Lords , although most of them have been silks. The status
of Queen’s Counsel was not conferred upon Scottish 
advocates, except upon the Lord Advocate, Solicitor-General 
and Dean of Faculty, until 1897. "At this time", writes 
Nan Wilson, "members of the Scottish Bar of great 
seniority and experience were offended by the attitude 
of English ’silks’ who claimed precedence over them in the 
House of Lords, Privy Council and in Parliamentary Committees, 
where Scottish and English counsel had the right of audience. 
Accordingly in 1897 the Faculty petitioned the Queen to 
create a roll of Queen's Counsel in Scotland". Mrs. Wilson 
concedes that it is probably easier to become a 
Queen’s Counsel in Scotland than in Englandand that within 
the profession itself the office probably does not command 
the same prestige as it does in the South. (Wilson.op.cit.)
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be paid in appointing judges, to standing at the Bar, and more, 
said Ensor, to the possession of distinctively judicial qualities; 
his advice had little effect. An unfortunate consequence of 
appointing judges almost solely from Q.C’s. is that many able 
juniors and solicitors believe, though probably without
( 1 )foundation, that the judges will only listen to the silks.
Cnly one other category of barristers has a really favourable 
chance of being appointed superior judge, the Junior Counsel to 
the Treasury. These two Treasury ’ devils’ appear on behalf of 
the crown in civil cases, on the instructions of the Treasury 
Solicitor, - one in common law, the other in equity. The 
appointments carry considerable prestige and are reserved for
barristers of some standing; of the 26 Junior Counsel who held
‘ive
(3)
office 'between 1879^^hnd 1968, all but f  were, after a few
years, appointed to the High Court Bench.
Until 1873 it was traditional that, whether or not they 
were also Queen’s Counsel, all common law judges should be 
appointed from the ranks of the Serjeants-at-Law. The serjeants 
were the earliest and most exclusive of the various classes 
of lawyers; they rapidly acquired a monopoly of advocacy
in the Court of Common Pleas after its identity was clearly 
established in the thirteenth century and later as the practise 
of appointing ecclesiastics to the Bench died out, took over 
the prerogative for themselves, though the qualification of the 
coif was never laid down in a statute. But from the beginning 
of the seventeenth century onwards it was increasingly common
1). R.C.K. Ensor, op.cit. p.107 fn.1. 
2}. Prior)  to this date the names of the Junior Counsel to the 
Treasury are not recorded in the Law Bpst,
(3). The Junior Counsel to the Treasury should not be confused 
with the Treasury (or Crown) Counsel, who are the permanent 
prosecuting counsel at the Central Criminal Court; these 
counsel originally briefed by the Treasury Solicitor, hence 
the name, have since 1908 been instructed by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions.(J.U.J.Edwards.The Law Officers of the 
Grown. Sweet & Maxwell, ( 1964)PP. 390-91. (4). JJLBaker, A
History of the order of Serjeants at Law.Unpub.Ph.D.thesis. 
London. (1968)
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for barristers to be created serjeant and judge more or less 
simultaneously, and many famous judges, including Coke,
Blackëone and Mansfield, never practised as serjeants in the 
Common Pleas. In his thesis on the history of the order 
J.H. Baker observes that, "About half the members of Serjeants’ 
inn in the nineteenth century had gone there merely to satisfy 
the legal requirement; although some judges were still chosen 
from the serjeants, this had become the exception rather than
( 4 )
the r u l e .  ^ Thus of the 56 common law judges appointed 
between 1820-75 only I6 had been granted the title any 
significant time before their appointment to the Bench.
"After 1850 only two new judges (Hayes and Pigott) had been 
practising serjeants, whilst over thiry were appointed per saltum. 
The fiction", writes Baker, "reached its height when Sir 
Robert Collier, Attorney-General was made a serjeant in order 
to be made a justice of the Common Please in order to be made 
a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, a double
(2 )leap which occasioned a storm of criticism."^ '
i 3)The 1873 Judicature Act,'“-'^^ recognising the mere formality 
of the procedure, provided that no person appointed a judge 
should be required to take or to have taken the degree of serjeant- 
at-law. The first High Court judge without a coif was Manisty, 
appointed on October 31st, 1876. The eventual extinction of the 
order of serjeants had been determined in I67O when it was 
finally settled by a decision of Charles II that the King’s 
Counsel should take precedence over all except the King's 
Serjeants. The order itself was never dissolved but the last
(1). J.H. Baker, op.cit.p.
(2). ibid.p.270.
(5). 56 & 37 Viet. 0.66 8.88.
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non-judicial serjeants were created in 1868 and the last 
serjeant, Lord Bindley, died in 1921.
The would-he judge moves steadily up the legal hierarchy 
and, but for excursions to the Palace of Westminster, has 
little opportunity to acquire experience in other walks of 
life; most begin and continue without break in the legal 
profession, constrained by professional regulations, the high 
opportunity-costs incurred in any attempt to broaden horizons 
and the inexorability of the career process. The one time 
when he may acquire some extra-curricular experience is in the 
early, financially stringent years at the Bar when he may 
undertake some private work; but even this is usually confined 
to the legal sphere - tutoring candidates for law examinations, 
lecturing and examining in law at universities and for the In us 
of Courts, law reporting and writing legal articles. A number 
undertake some form of journalism but only about 10% of all the 
judges covered by this study are known to have been employed 
entirely outside the legal profession; these were in a variety 
of occupations - auditor, trainee architect, scientist and 
inventor, apprentice auctioneer, medical attendant, stock 
jobber and war-time broadcaster. Few of the most recent judges 
have deviated far from the legal path, though Mr. Justice Ormrod 
of the Family Division was for a while house physician at the 
Radcliffe Infirmary, Oxford and for many years lecturer in 
forensic medicine at Oxford Medical School, and Mr. Justice 
Glynn-Jones, formerly of the Queens Bench, is a qualified 
pharmacist.
Though the judges may have been reluctant to venture beyond 
the legal pale altogether, it has not been uncommon for them to
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Table XX
Judges with, experience In a solicitor's practice.
Period of Articled or Total judges Percentage
appointment Former otherwise emp- with experience of all/ . \
to the Bench solicitors loyed in a so- of solicitors' judges^ ^
licitor' 8 office work with such
experience
1820-75 4 15 19 17.9%
1876-1920 6 7 13 12.6%
1921-50 4 1 5 5.5%
1951-68 5 - 5 5.8%
Total
1820-1968 19 25 42 10.8%
(1). Scottish and Irish Law Lords are included in this table.
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sample life in the junior branch of the profession before
assuming the more prestigious, if sometimes less lucrative,
role of barrister. During the nineteenth century, such
experience was viewed very favourably. In 1840, one legal
mentor recommended "a clerkship in a solicitor’s office" as
"a useful school for the bar;" Lord Brougham, he said, had
once publicly declared in the Court of Gj^^ancery, that if he
had to recommence his legal studies he would begin as a clerk in
( 1 )an attorney’s office. ' And this was in spite of the fact that 
from 1762 onwards an attorney or articled attorney had to
discontinue practising as such at least two years before call
(o') \
to the bar.^  ^ Since 196I ' t i m e  spent as an admitted solicitor
has been included in years of standing at the Bar for the purpose
of meeting requirements for appointment to a judgeship, and
according to one former judge, though only a very few barristers
are intially solicitors, a high proportion of these find their
way to the Bench, demonstrating perhaps the possession of strong
achievement motimation Nonetheless, in the absence of any
actual data on the proportion of all barristers who begin their
professional life in solicitors’ offices, it is impossible to
assess properly the significance of such experience for future
success.
(1 ) Poison op.cit. pp.28-9
(2) R.Fletcher ed., The Pension Book of Grays Inn, 7ol II, 1669-1800 
Chiswick Press, (1910) p.xxiv
(3) Barristers (Qualification for Office) Act, 1961.
(4) Cecil op.cit. p.14
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Judicial experience.
Though becoming a Queens Counsel or a Treasury ’devil’ 
may be a prerequisite of appointment to the superior judiciary, 
critics of the system may not consider these ranks sufficient 
recommendation for the exercise of the judicial function; for if 
an English judge is the apotheosis of impartiàitty,then the senior 
members of the Bar, nourished by a diet of fierce advocacy, must 
lie close to the opposite pole. Yet the two roles are not wholly 
incompatible, nor the qualities which they require mutually 
exclusive ; for the barrister does not choose the position he 
must take up in any particular case, even though at times the 
assumed role and his own feelings may coincide. Indeed, the less 
the partiality shown by an advocate to his clients the better; 
a barrister has the advantage who appreciates and hence anticipate 
his opponent’s arguments. Siirther the years of practical 
experience at the Bar enables a judge to consider the arguments 
of counsel with greater discernment, discounting those elements 
which derive more from forensic art than from fact.
T"ord Diplock in a lecture given at Kings College, London, 
emphasised that ’by far the greater part of the Judge’s task 
was to find out what actually happens.'  ^^  Our judicial 
process is based on the adversary system and our Courts are bound 
by strict rules of evidence; these factors, he said, could 
easily bemuse witnesses and jurors. The good judge was he who 
could ensure that the facts were elicited from the recounting, 
within the rules of evidence, of the experiences of witnesses 
who are often of limited vocabulary and used to ’telling a story 
in their own words’. He had to make these facts clear to himself
(1). 3. Deo. 1969.
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and often also to a jury of ordinary men and women. It was 
Lord Diplock’s opinion that no one who had not himself had 
considerable experience of the practise of advocacy could 
successfully carry out this part of the judicial function.
Yet despite these affinities between Bar and Bench, the 
essential difference in function remains; the transition from 
barrister to judge might have caused more problems were it not 
for the fact that candidates for the higher judiciary have had 
the opportunity for acquiring some judicial experience in an 
inferior court, whilst they are still practising at the Bar.
At the Common Law Bar most silks and some juniors with criminal 
practices were, until 1972, appointed as Recorders, the sole 
judges of borough Quarter Sessions. Since this office was 
part-time only, the appointee might continue in private practice. 
It was also customary to supplement the numbers of the High 
Court judges on circuit by the appointment of silks as 
Commissioners of Assize. Both offices were often a prelude to 
appointment as a High Court judge. Some of the judges studied 
had also gained experience as Chairmen or Deputy Chairmen of 
Quarter Sessions and in various other inferior courts, such 
as the Salford Hundred Court of Record, the Crown Court at 
Liverpool, the Appeal Court of the Isle of Man and the Court 
of Bristol Tolzey; some of the Law Lords were, of course, 
appointed from Scottish or Irish courts. As Table XXI shows, 
it became increasingly rare for a barrister to be appointed 
to the superior courts without a ’trial-run’ in at least one, 
and often more, of the lower courts, so reducing the possibility 
of an ’unfortunate' appointment. But, with the replacement of
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Table XXI
The .judges’ experiences in the lesser courts.
Period of Number Percentage of Average number Percentage of
appointment of judges with of previous recorders among
Judges previous judi- judicial ofdœs the judges with
cial experience held by each previous judicial
judge with pre- experience
vious judicial 
experience
1820-75 106 35.8%
(38)
1 .1 3 65.8% 
(25)
1876-1920 95 35.8%
(34)
1.12 7 0.6%
(24)
1921-50 85 5 2.4%
(44)
1 .2 5 6 5.9%
(29)
1951-68 84 71.4%
(60)
1.93 8 5.0%
(51)
1820-1968 370 47.6% 
(176)
1.43 73.3%
(129)
The figures in this table are somewhat distorted by the 
inclusion of the Chancery judges, v/ho do not normally have 
the opportunity to acquire judicial experience before their 
appointment to the Division. A clearer picture of the 
majority of the judiciary may be given by ommitting the 
Chancery bench from this analysis. The percentage of judges 
in each period from 1876 onwards, having experience of the 
lower courts, then becomes 47.2%, 68.8% and 82.1% respectively.
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quarter sessions, assize courts and the ancient local courts
by the Grown Court system, it is estimated that there will be
a considerable reduction in the use of part-time recorders and
that the appointment of deputy Circuit and High Court judges
will be less necessary than the frequent appointment in recent
( 1 )years of commissioners of assize.  ^ Future opportunities 
for acquiring preliminary judicial experience will therefore be 
much reduced; accordingly the need for some form of training 
for judges after appointment v/ill become more pressing.
(1). G. Borrie, "The Courts Act, 1971" 
New Law Journal, (June 3, 1971)
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"Every judicial appointment is a leap in the dark and 
the wonder is that v/e do not more often fall into a 
crevasse" - Mr. Justice Megarry (l)
"---- anyone who is appointed a judge is, I suppose,
as astonished at the metamorphosis which is forced 
upon him as a colourless grub that suddenly finds, 
he can fly with painted wings" - Lord Wilberforce (2)
Chapter
Judicial Office 
Appointment to the Bench
The judges, we have observed, are usually appointed from 
amongst those who are considered the most eminent members of the 
Bar - the Queens Counsel and the Treasury Counsel. Baldwin once 
told Laski that when a judgeship was vacant "an average of 
100 KC’s. write in to explain their claims . . . . Apart from 
professional competence, the only other requirement is 
unquestioned moral probity; before the war no divorcees were 
appointed to the bench, and even now, according to Abel-Smith and 
Stevens,
" having been the guilty party in a divorce case would
be a serious detriment to anyone wishing to reach the
bench  Even a bachelor with a reputation for high
living might find himself out of favour with the Lord 
Chancellor’s Department". (4)
The only formal qualification for appointment is years of 
standing at the Bar; a (puisne judge of the High Court must be 
a barrister of at least ten years standing; a Lord Justice of 
Appeal must be either a barrister of fiteen years standing or 
an existing High Court judge; the Lord Chief Justice, Master 
of the Rolls and the President of the Probate, Divorce and 
Admiralty Division must also have spent fifteen years at the Bar,
(1). R.B. Megarry, Lawyer and Litigant in England (Hamlyn Lecture).
Stevens 0962) p. 146
(2). Lord Wilberforce, "Educating the Judges", Journal of the 
Society of Public Teachers of Law. Vol.X.No.4.(Dec.1969)p .
(3), Holmes-Laski Letters (The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes 
and La ski, 0916-3^, ed. Mark de-Wolfe Howe O.U.P. ( 1953)p. 997.
(4). B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, In Search of Justice Allen Lane
(1968) p.177.
Table XXII
Average age of first appointment to all the 
superior courts (1)
Period of appointment
1820
1876
1921
1951
75
1920
50
68
â£â
54.93 years
54.32 "
54.32 "
54.56 "
(1), Includes Scottish and Irish Law-Lords.
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Table XXIII
Average age of appointment iû. .ClQ.ur.t.
Period of appointment
1820 - 75^^^
1876 -  1920 
1921 -  50 
1951 - 68
54.58 years 
55.82 "
54.21 "
54.60 "
(1). Includes the Vice-Chancellors.
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or be a High Court Judge or a Lord Justice of -Appeal; and the 
Law Lords must be barristers of fiteen years experience or be 
High Court or Court of Appeal Judges of two years standing.
These basic qualifications are usually fulfilled long before 
there is any chance of judicial appointment. Only one judge 
since 1829 has been appointed under the age of UO - Lord 
Justice Thesiger, who was appointed direct to the Court of 
Appeal in 1877 when he was only 39 and had had precisely 
fifteen years experience at the Bar. The vast majority of the 
superior judiciary have not been appointed until they are well 
over fifty years old.
Though it is frequently suggested that it is now 
customary to appoint younger judges, Tables XXII and XXIII 
show that there has been virtually no variation for at least 
a century and a half in the average age of appointment to the 
Bench. Further, an examination of the most recent appointments, 
that is the nineteen judges appointed to the High Court between 
1966 and 1968, reveals a similar average age of 54^79 years.
The one change which has occurred since 1820 is in the 
distribution of the ages of individual judges. Thereas the ages 
of those appointed between 1820 -75 ranged from i+0 to 75 
(giving a standard deviation of 6.5), the range for those 
appointed since 1951 extends only from ip6 to 67 ( a standard 
deviation of k » k ) • The Bench now receives fewer recruits of 
either very tender or very advanced years.
Promotion
One notable feature of the appointments to the High Cowt, 
demonstrated in Table XXIV, is that tnose judges destined for 
promotion to the Court of Appeal or to the Appellate Committee
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Table XXIV
Average ages of first appointment to the High Court 
related to subsequent career pattern
"'HU.—» I ■ .'1 ,1.1 ..«M— m HX— »«»«— .» ■ »■ I— ........... .... « « — * ■ II-.H —"'I — '.'I—I
Period of
appointment Average age of appointment to the
High Court.
Judges promoted to Judges promoted
the Court of Appeal to the Appellate 
All judges Committee
1820 - 75 54.58 53.33 46.6?^'’^
1876 - 1920 53.82 52.0 48.75
1921 - 50 54.21 51.68 51.75
1951 - 68 54.60 52.23 50.40
(1). Only 3 judges.
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were, on average, appointed earlier than those who remained 
in one of the High Court divisions.
I use the term "promotion" cautiously; a regular career 
system has long been considered incompatible with judicial 
independence but recent practice has not always given strong 
support to the doctrine. There used to be a convention that 
judges after appointment should not be promoted, because the 
possibility of promotion might tempt them to seek through their 
decisions the favour of the promoting authority. Certainly this 
has generally applied to the County Court judiciary. Since the 
creation of the County Courts in 18^6 there had been only one 
County Court judge promoted to the High Court (in 1920) until 
the immediate post-war years when 3 County Court judges and the 
judge of the Salford Hundred Court were appointed to the High 
Court. But, as Geoffrey Sawer comments, the rarity of such 
appointments is probably due more to a theory as to the 
basic qualifications required of judges in the two types of 
court, rather than regard for the convention of non-promotion,
which, as far as the superior courts are concerned, is now largely
i 1 )disregarded.  ^ The promotion of judges from the High Court to 
the Court of Appeal and from both to the House of Lords has 
become quite customary, as has the appointment of the Chief 
Justice and Master of the Rolls from among the existing members 
of the Bench.
In the 1930’s appointment from among the Supreme Court judges 
to the higher judicial offices and to the House of Lords was 
exceptional. So R.K. Bnsor wrote, "It is a fair thing to say 
that when a man is appointed to the Supreme Court he does not
(1). G. Sawer, Law in Society. Oxford, Clarendon Press,(1965)
pp.73^^
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( 1 )look for promotion but takes his job ..... as something final."
Of the important offices, only the Master of the Rolls was 
commonly promoted from the Bench, presumably because the position 
called more definitely for juristic accomplishment than that of 
either Lord Chief Justice or Lord Chancellor, whom the Prime 
Minister usually chose from among the highest in Bar rank of 
his political followers, that is, the Law Officers.
The only High Court judges whom Cnsor considered to have 
any significant prospect of promotion to the Court of Appeal 
were those of the Chancery Division. Table XXV(a) shows the 
composition of the Court of Appeal in terms of the High Court 
divisions to which the Lords Justice of Appeal were originally 
appointed. Judges from the Queens Bench have always formed 
the majority of the Court of Appeal; in fact their representation 
has gradually increased. But tiiis is to be expected, simply 
because they numerically dominate the High Court, considerably 
outweighing the combined forces of the other two divisions. If 
this is taken into consideration, to give the proportionate 
representation of each division, a quite different picture 
emerges; it is the Chancery judges who have been consistently 
over-represented, as one might also expect from the nature of 
their work. Table XXV(b) demonstrates that a Chancery judge 
has a rather better than fifty-fifty chance of being appointed 
to the Court of Appeal. That no Probate judges were appointed to 
the Court until after 1920 is largely explained by the fact that 
four of the five judges in the division were promoted to the 
office of President.
(l). R.C.K. Ensor, Courts and Judges in France, Germany and England
O.Ü.P. (1933) p.5.
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Table XXV
Appointments to the Court of Appeal related 
to initial appointment in the High Court
(a)
Period of 
appointment 
to the Court
of Appeal 1876 - 1920 1921 - 50 1951 - 68 1876 - 1968
Total
Division of
original
appointment
Percentage of Lords Justice of Appeal 
from each division (Numbers in brackets)
Queens Bench 
Division
37.8%
(14)
46.75^ 
(14)
66.7% (16)
48.4/i 
(44)
Chancery Division
29.7%
(11) ^^‘(11)
20. 8%
( 5)
29.7%
(27)
Probate,Divorce 
and Admiralty 
Division
6.7#
( 2)
29.2#
( 7)
9.9#
(9)
Common Pleas 5.4#
Division ( 2)
2.2#
(2)
Exchequer
Division
5.4#
( 2)
2.2#
(2)
Appointments
direct from 
the Bar
21.6#
( 8)
13.25b 
(12)
Total appoint- 100# 
ments to(1) (3 7)
Court of Appeal
100#
(30)
100%
(24)
1005b
(91)
(l). The numbers of judges from all the divisions - plus direct 
appointments - is greater than the total number of 
appointment to the Court of Appeal from 1921 onwards, 
because a few judges sat in both the Queens Bench and 
PDA Division.
Table XXV
(b)
Period of 
appointment 
to High Court. 1876-1920
Division of original 
appointment.
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1921-50 1951-6 8(1) 1876-1968
Percentage of judges from each 
division who are promoted to the Court of
Appeal
(The number of judges appointed to a 
division during each period is given 
in brackets)
Queens Bench 
Division
3 0.2#
(5 3)
34.8%
(46)
20.0%
(55)
28.3%
(154)
Chancery
Division
3 6.a
(2 5)
5 2.4%
(2 1)
18.2%
(1 1)
47.4%
( 57)
Probate,
Divorce and
Admiralty
Division
( 5)
12.5#
(24)
19.6#
( 46)
(1). No conclusions may be drawn from the figures for
1951-6 8 , since 'promotions' from this group are not 
yet completed; the move to the Court of Appeal is 
made on average after nearly nine years service in 
the High Courts.
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It is no longer the practice, as it was during the first 
seventy years of the Court of Appeal’s existence, to make 
appointments direct from the Bar. Between 1876 and 1900 over 
a quarter of the Lords Justices of Appeal were provided by
the Bar; significantly 9 (75#) of them had been M.P's. and
( 11all but 2 of these were Law Officers.^  ^ The last direct
appointment to the Court of Appeal was that of Lord Justice
Somervell in 1946. Similarly, it is twenty years since a member
of the English Bar was elevated straight to the lofty heights of
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, without having
first spent some years in either the High Court or the Court
of Appeal or, what has been most common, both. Until the 1930* s
the appointment of political favourites with no judicial expe-
rience was more usual, so that commentators such as Ensor and
Laski, writing at about this time, considered that the chances
of a Supreme Court judge being promoted to the Lords were
relatively remote.
"Here, if anywhere", wrote Ensor, "it might be thought 
that the principle of promoting tried judges from below 
would apply; and so it does, but not on a scale that 
can occalon very great expectations In the breasts of 
judges of the Supreme Court. For here, too. It is a 
common practice to appoint barristers who have rendered 
service in politics but held no previous judicial 
post." (2 )
In fact the early lack of judicial advancement owes rather 
more to the practice of reserving a proportion of the places 
on the Appellate Committee for representatives of the Scottish 
and Irish Bench and Bar than to political preferment; whilst 
only four of the 22 Law Lords appointed before 1921 were recruited 
direct from the English Bar, 8 were Scottish or Irish lawyers, -
(1). See Chapter 7.
(2). R.C.K. Ensor, op.cit. p.4.
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five of them judges and three barristers. Since 1921, when
Carson v/as raised to the Appellate Committee, only one Irish
judge. Lord MacDermott, has received this legal accolade;
it is still customary, however, for two or three of the Law
(1)Lords to be of Scottish origin; apart from these - 6 in all - 
the thirty-nine Lords of Appeal appointed between 1921-68 have 
all been drawn from the Supreme Court.
During the early nineteenth century, when the courts had 
in any case overlapping jurisdictions, it was not uncommon for 
judges to be moved from one branch of the superior courts to 
another; but, towards the end of the century, apart from 
automatic changes arising from the statutory reorganisation of the 
courts in the 1870’s , the practise of transferring judges within 
the High Court system was abandoned, and not resurrected until 
1945. Since then seven judges have been appointed initially to 
the P.D.A. Division and later transferred to the Queen’s Bench. 
Apart from these permanent moves between divisions, the judges 
of the two divisions sometimes assist temporarily in each others 
courts. The Chancery division is more isolated; the experiment 
was once tried of sending Chancery judges on circuit, taking 
criminal cases but, "after the purity of the Chancery Division, 
they were so horrified whn they were brought face to face with 
real criminals that they imposed astronomic sentences. The
( 2 )experiment has not been repeated."' '
o F £ h d l T S ® t h f  House
(2). H.Cecil, Brief to Counsel.Michael Joseph,(1958) p.48.
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H  )Retirement from the Bench' ^
"A judge/’ surmised Laski, "is in the first five 
years of his service, fairly convinced that most 
of his opinions are wrong in critical cases; in 
the second five years he will be equally 
convinced that they are right, and afterwards he 
will hear himself with serenity whether they be 
right or wrong. vVhen that serenity becomes 
habitual, it is time for him to retire." (2)
The Judicial Pensions Act 1959 introduced a retiring 
age for the judges of the superior courts; those appointed 
after the passing of this Act and those who choose that its 
provisions apply to them now retire at the age of seventy-five. 
Both the St, Aldwyn Commission of 1913 and the 1936 Peel 
Commission recommended that judges should retire at seventy-two, 
the normal retiring age in many offices and the age at which 
County Court judges, since 1934, have usually vacated office. 
This age limit, however, may be extended to seventy-five for 
both County Court judges and Circuit judges: it was, therefore,
hardly possible to go to a lower figure for the superior 
judges.
An analysis which confined itself only to those judges 
who voluntarily retire from office would not give an accurate 
picture of the judicial cycle, since a considerable percentage 
of the judiciary do not resign but die whilst still in office. 
Thus Table XXVI(a) demonstrates that for at least a century 
and a half, the average judicial career, whether terminated by
1), This section includes the Scottish and Irish Law Lords. 
2;. H. Laski, A Grammar of Politics Allen & Unwin, 5th ed.
(1 9 6 7 )  p .  550.
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Table XXVI
Avereige age of judges at the termination of their
career
a) All.Judges
Period of 
appointment
Average age of
either retirement Percentage of 
or death whilst judges over 
Total judges in office 
vacating office (to 1 dec.place)
75 at end of 
judicial career
1820 -  75 
1876 -  1920
1921 - 50
1951 - 68
105
105
77
7
(1)
(1)
6 9 .5 years
7 0 .7 "
7 0 .6 " 
67.9 "
18.4#
(
2 5.5#
(19)
'(24)
23.4/4
(18)
14.3!yo
( 1)
b) Judges dying in office
Period of
appointment
1820 -  75 
1876 - 1920
1921 - 50 
1951 - 68
Number of 
judges dying 
in office.
(percentage of (to 1 dec. 
all judges) place)
Average age 
of dying
Percentage 
over 75
47
(44.5#)
44
(4 2 .7#)
22
(2 4.2#)
1
( 1.2#)
c) Judges retiring from office
68.2 years
68.8 " 
7 0 .6 " 
6 7 .0 "
14.9#
20.5#
9.1#
(7)
(9)
(2)
Period of 
appointment
Number of
retiring judge s 
(percentage of 
all judges)
Average age Percentage of
of retirement retiring judges
(to 1 dec. place) over 75
1820 -  75 
1876- 1920 
1921 - 50 
1951 - 68
56
59
I
55
(5 2.8%)
(5 7.3%) 
(6 0.4%) 
’( 7.0%)
70 .1 years
7 2 .0 "
7 2 .0 "
68.0 "
21.4#
(
25.4#
i
2 9.1#
16.7#
12)
(15) 
’( 16) 
( 1)
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(1). 3 judges have been omitted from each of these 
groups because the data needed to complete the 
relevant averages has not been obtained.
136
resignation or the death of the judge, has come to an end 
some five years before the age which has now been set as the 
desirable limit to holding office. Une might expect that those 
judges who died in office would be typically older than those 
who chose to retire, men of declining years reluctant to 
surrender their high stations; but an examination of the ages 
at which they died shows that they were rather men whose 
judicial careers were brought to an untimely end whilst they
{>1 >
were still relatively young; only a few of them were over 7 5 .
The average retirement age for the remaining judges 
appointed before 1950 was both constant and below the new 
statutory retiring age, although, of course, these averages 
mask a wide spread of ages; some twenty to thirty per cent, 
of the retiring judges did not surrender their office until 
they were over 75. The retirement age of the most recent 
cohort is lower than that for the previous groups but most of 
these judges are far from retirement age; it is, therefore, 
impossible to generalise a trend from this figure. Of the 
91 judges appointed between 1 9 2 1 -5 0 only 11 were still in 
office at the end of 1968, but all of these, apart from Lord 
Reid, were still within the retirement limit. Judges 
appointed before the Judicial Pensions Act have not in general 
taken advantage of the exemption clause; considering only 
those judges who, irrespective of the date of their appointment, 
have resigned from office since 1959, gives an average 
retirement age of 7 1 . 5 years, well below the statutory 
retiring age, though not significantly lower than in previous 
periods. In contrast, the American federal judges, particularly
(1). Until the provisions for pensions were changed by the 1959 
Act (see Chapter 6), some judges whojwere still able to 
sit, but who were not in really good health, were 
compelled to remain in office for the full fifteen-year 
term, in order to qualify for a pension.
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those of Lhe Supreme Court, are, despite liberal retirement
provisions, more reluctant to leave active service. Far more
( 1 )vacancies occur as the result of death in harness.' '
Until 1959 a superior judge obviously incapacitated by 
senility could, technically, be removed from office on a 
parliamentary a d d r e s s ; a p a r t  from this there was nothing to 
stop him sitting in extreme old age. And some did; at least 
24 (6#) of all the judges appointed since 1820 were still in 
office at or beyond the age of 80, the oldest of them all,
Mr. Justice Cleasby, still sitting in judgement on his fellow- 
men when he was 92. Such tenacity was encouraged by the old 
system of pensions; cases of real disability apart, these were 
only paid to judges who had completed a full fifteen years’ 
service. Older judges whose powers were failing, but who were 
still capable of sitting, had therefore a strong inducement to 
struggle on until they had fulfilled the qualification.
A fixed retirement age for the superior judges was 
established only after a great deal of controversy. It was 
opposed principally on the grounds that the Bench might be 
deprived of men quite capable beyond that age; examples may 
certainly be cited, notably Lord Reid, who in his eighties is 
still a mainstay of the Appellate Committee. But these are 
exceptions and justice may be vitiated by the dimming faculties 
of old age; for any of the small and powerful body of High 
Court judges to be unfit in any way is a serious problem. The 
Court of Appeal can correct some mistakes but justice may be 
defeated, especially in a jury case, by inattention or partisan­
ship, without committing any technical misdirection or explicit
1)o H.J. Abraham, The Judicial Process O.Ü.P. (1968) p. 43.
2). Though see below pp.175-79.
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twist of the law with which the Court of Appeal could deal.
Errors of judgement are not the sole prerogative of the old hut 
it is essential that judges inspire confidence, and the public, 
whether or not there is individual cause, tend not to have so 
much confidence in a generation that is generally both 
physically and mentally inactive. Mr. Justice Avory, who 
continued to sit on the bench until a few days before his 
death at the age of 8 3 , was undoubtedly in full possession of 
his faculties, but nevertheless, observes K.M. Jackson, "It
was difficult to escape the feeling ---- that a man so old
( 1 )should have no place of power in our society."'  ^ In similar 
tone an article in the Economist, written before the establishment 
of a fixed retirement age, criticised the fact that judges were 
allowed to continue'ïn a job which requires the keenest 
faculties at an age when other men are deemed suitable only for
(2 )some gentle gardening".  ^ ^
Laski, surprisingly, was one of those who objected to a
retirement age for judges. In 1935 he wrote to Mr. Justice 
Holmes, "I am having an amusing time with the Lord Chancellor 
just now trying to prevent him putting an age retirement for 
judges into his new Bill. I note with amused pleasure that 
some of the best work in the law is done after 7 5 ; that as a 
rule the younger English judges have not been tire most 
successful; that the older judges are not a whit less radical 
than the young".
Some feel that even now the retirement age is too high; 
a Sub-Committee of Justice has for example advocated that some
(1). E.M. Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in England C.U.P.
TÏ972y, 6th td., p:' 373.------ -----
2). The Economist, August 15th, 1956.
3). Holmes-Laski Letters, ed. Mark de Wolfe Howe., O.U.P.
(1953) P. 1475.
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( 1 'juistinction be made between trial and appeal judges.'  ^ A
trial judge, has to deal with complex issues of fact and law, 
summing up immediately the argument in a case is completed.
The pace of the appeal courts is more leisurely; there is less 
reliance on oral proceedings and judgement is often reserved. 
Most important, appellate decisions are not the decisions of 
a single judge. The Sub-Committee therefore recommend that 
the retiring age of all trial judges should be lowered to 70, 
whilst that for the Court of Appeal remains at 75.
From one point of view, however, it is just as well that 
some of the more elderly members of the judiciary like 
Mr. Justice Stable, Lord Justice Danckwerts and Lord Reid, have 
remained on the Bench beyond the retiring age; there is a limit 
to which the Bar can, without seriously diminishing its own 
resources, be called upon to supply recruits for the ever- 
increasing number of judicial posts.
In August, 1970, the question of judicial retirement took 
on a whole new aspect, when Sir Henry Fisher, judge of the 
Queen’s Bench Division decided to leave the Bench after only 
two and a half years to take up a position in the City at a
C p)
substantially higher salary than he was receiving as a judge.^ '
The move was wholly unprecedented and profession and press
reacted sharply: the Solicitor’s Journal commented,
"It should not be too much for the country to ask 
that, in return for the constitutional guarantees 
of security in their appointments. High Court 
judges should refrain from resigning unless there
are exceptional circumstances". (3 )
Many lawyers thought the action inexcusable, a threat to
(l). Justice Sub-Committee, The Judiciary Stevens (1972) pp. 62-66
2). See below pp.182-83.
3). Solicitor’s Journal, August 7th, 1970.
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the judges’ reputation for probity and impartiality, to their
almost sacrosanct status; to accept so readily the enticements
of the commercial world was an insult to the Grown, the Bench
and the whole profession. Yet, as R.M. Jackson has pointed out,
much of the ordinary run of judicial work is characterised by
"appalling boredom and low intellectual content ----
If a man does accept a judgeship and finds that he 
has made a mistake it seems very questionable whether 
he should stick it out until he can retire without 
comment, for a judge v/ho is bored with his work can 
hardly be a good judge." (l)
It is clear though that any further departures of this 
kind would, with the resources of Bar and Bench as stretched 
as they are at present, pose a serious threat to the quality 
of the Bench.
(1). Jackson op. cit. p. 375.
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"A judge should try to look as wise as he is paid to 
look", Lord Hewart G.J.
Chapter 6.
Judicial Remuneration
"Until judges were paid a comprehensive salary and 
prohibited from adding to it in any way, it is 
difficult", writes Henry Cecil, "to say exactly 
how much each of them was paid. At one time all 
judges were permitted to add to their salary either 
by selling offices which were in their patronage or 
by retaining some of the monies which were paid by
suitors for services provided by the Court and it’s
officers....... " (1)
For centuries the patronage of the Lord Chancellor and the
Chief Justices had provided them with incomes considerably
in excess of their basic salaries. Until 1833, the Lord
Chancellor held eleven offices within his benefice, said to
be worth some £24,000.^^^^^^ Among the most valuable offices in
his gift were those of the Masters in Chancery; these had the care
of the suitors’ money and earned handsome incomes out of the
interest on that money, for which they were under no
obligation to account to the suitors. An act of 1551 had
forbidden the sale of any office concerned with the administration
of justice, but the Lord Chancellor paid little or no attention
to the prohibition; Lord Eldon, who probably made more out of
the Great Seal than any other man, died in I838 worth more
than £7 0 0,0 0 0. But all "fringe benefits" from fees and
patronage were brought to an end in I833 when the Lord Chancellor's
income was set at £10,000.
(1). H. Cecil, Tipping the Scales. Hutchinson,(1964), p.209.
(2 ). A list of the officers formerly in the gift of the Lord 
Chancellor is given in VV. Holdsworth - A History of English 
Law. Vol.I,
(3). H.Cecil, op.cit. p.225.
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The Lord Chancellor continued to receive on appointment 
a customary 'outfit allowance* of £1,843: 13:0; this 
covered the cost of items for which he was made liable by 
acceptance of office, such as state robes, equipages and the 
stamps on Letters Patent. The Lord Chancellor was apparently 
expected to spend £1,000 on a silver dinner service, though 
not all did so; Lord Halsbury used the money for general 
purposes. In 1912 this part of the allowance was discontinued 
at the request of Lord Haldane and since then no fixed sum 
has been granted; instead the Treasury settles the necessary
( 4 )
expenses of each individual Chancellor.' '
During the early nineteenth century, a number of
Parliamentary Committees sat to consider the judges' salaries.
According to the report of the 1810 Committee, Chief Justices
received a salary of £4,000 per annum and were entitled to
keep all their suitors' fees; the Lord Chief Baron of
Exchequer had a fixed salary of £3,500 and could receive up to
£1,500 in fees; while puisne judges received £2 ,4 0 0 plus a
possible £1,600 in fees. Pecuniary independence was imposed on
the Bench by the Judges' Salaries Act of 1826; the Chief
Justices lost their rights to sell offices and all the judges
( 2)were given fixed salaries.' '
The Chief Justice of the Kings Bench was given a salary 
of £10,000 and the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, £8,000; 
the Master of the Rolls and the Chief Baron of the Exchequer
(1). Public Records Office . 1912-18 Lord Chancellors:
appointments and retirements. Ref. L.C.C.2. 326 1522/2.
(2 ). In 1836 the bishops were also given a regular stipend 
by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners.
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received £7,000, the Vice-Chancellor £6,000 and the puisne 
judges £5,500. All the judges were awarded substantial 
pensions. Because of the opposition which the innovation 
of fixed salaries had aroused, more than due recompense was 
paid for the loss of the previous supplements. Later, the 
salary of the Chief Justice of the Queens Bench was reduced 
to £8,000 and that of the other Chief Justice to £7,000; the 
puisne judges all lost £500.
The salaries of the higher judiciary are normally 
safeguarded by being charged on the Consolidated Fund, so 
that unlike most other items of national expenditure, they do 
not have to be renewed in Parliament each year. Not 
surprisingly, salary reductions have always been strongly resented 
and fiercely resisted by the judges. In 1873, Gladstone proposed 
a cut from £5,000 to £4,000 in the interests of economy.
"The judges were furious. \Yhen asked for comments 
on the Judicature Bill, they almost all wrote letters 
to the Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor expressing 
disgust at the pay cut and almost ignoring the 
invitation to discuss reform of the courts."(l)
The suggestion was withdrawn.
Again in 1931, the National Government decided to reduce 
the salaries of the judiciary by twenty per cent in accordance 
with general cuts applied throughout the whole civil service: the
cuts were made under the National Economy Act which provided that 
the salaries of "persons in His Majesty's Service' might be 
reduced. The judges, ably supported by Holdsworth '  ^ argued 
that they could not properly be regarded as servants of the 
Crown and that if their salaries were reduced in this way.
(1). B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts. 
Heinemann, (1967) p. 127.
(2). W. Holdsworth, "The Constitutional Position of tke Judees"' 
48 L.Q.R. (1932), pp. 25-36.
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the independence of the judiciary would he seriously impaired. 
A collective memorandum was sent to the Prime Minister.
"We believe", it said, "that the respect felt by
the people for an English judge has been partly due 
to his unique position, a feeling which will survive 
with difficulty if his salary can be reduced as if 
he were an ordinary salaried servant of the Crown.
If the salaries of the judges can be reduced almost 
sub silentio by the methods recently employed, the 
independence of the judiciary is seriously impaired.
It cannot be wise to expose judges of the High Court to 
the suggestion, however malevolent and ill-founded, 
that if their decisions are favourable to the Crown in 
revenue and other cases their salaries may be raised 
and if unfavourable may be diminished." (1)
This attitude was not likely to endear the judges to the
general public, whether it arose from an overdeveloped sense 
of status or concealed more mercenary motives; all the judges 
had in fact declared a willingness to share in the common 
sacrifice but felt the apparent lack of recognition for the 
independence of their position as "a grievous wrong" not to be 
endured. One irate judge refused to pay his super-tax and 
challenged the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to sue him 
for it.' ' Others, including Mr, Justice Macnaghten,
Mr. Justice Maugham and Mr. Justice Avory, threatened to present 
a Petition of Right. But the government remained adamant 
and refused to restore the cuts until the economic climate 
improved. To-day, the judges’ concept of pecuniary independence 
from the State is better supported by the Department of 
Social Security which spuriously classifies each of them as 
self-employed person.
(1). Pari. Det)s..H.C. July 27, 1933.
(2). Holmes-Laski Letters. (The Correspondence of Mr. Justice 
Holmes and Harold Laski, 1916-35), ed. Mark de Wolfe Howe . 
O.U.P. (1953) p.1456.
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Since 1934 when the emoluments of judicial office were 
increased for the first time in 124 years, the judges have 
received fairly regular increments and now receive the 
substantial salaries shown in Figure III.
Figure III
( 1 j
Judicial salaries' ^
Judicial office Salary
Ik^d Chancellor £18,500
(£14,300 as a judge and £4,000 as Speaker
of the House of Lords)
Lord Chief Justice £18,500
lÆTds of Appeal In Ordinary £17,250
Master of the Rolls £17,250
President of the Family Division £17,250
Lords Justice of Appeal^^) £15,750
Puisne judges £15,750
An independent review body has now been established which 
advises the government on the salaries of the judiciary, together 
with senior civil servants, senior officers of the armed services 
and the boards of nationalised industry. Increases in the 
salaries of the higher judiciary, which since 1965 have been made | 
by Order in Council approved by a resolution in each House of 
Parliament, will in future under the Administration of Justice 
Act, 1973, be determined by the Lord Chancellor.
Under the Judicial Pensions Act 1959, the judges receive a 
maximum pension of one half of their salary on completion of 
fifteen years service or on reaching the age of seventy. Judges
1). June, 1973.
2). V/hen the Court of Appeal was created the Lords Justice were 
given the choice of being made Privy Councillors or of 
receiving higher salaries than the puisne judges: they 
chose the former.
I
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v/ho retire after only five years in office receive a pension 
equal to one quarter of their salary and for service of between 
five and fifteen years, the pension is fixed on a jqrq rat^ 
basis.
The salaries of the superior judiciary have long been a 
favourite topic of discussion amongst socio-legal commentators, 
who appear to see the generosity of their remuneration as 
standing in need of explanation and justification. Rarely have 
others in high public office been subjected to similar comment, 
other than in the course of general egalitarian theses. Yet 
most of the arguments seem to have ignored the fact that though 
the office is, both in terms of income and pension, a financially 
attractive one, the real value of the judicial salary has 
suffered a dramatic reduction. For over one hundred and twenty 
years from I830 - 1954 the judges’ salaries remained constant 
whilst the cost of living and taxation grew steadily; 
subsequent increases in salary, though considerable, have not 
been sufficient to offset the losses. Most senior judges are 
now priced only a little higher than top civil servants and 
receive considerably less than the chairmen of nationalised
(1)industries.' '
In examining the question of judicial remuneration, it is 
well to dispense quickly v/ith the notion that the high salaries 
are designed to lessen the chance of corruption by ensuring that 
a judge is in a position where he is unlikely to be tempted.
There is no evidence to suggest that continental judges, who 
receive far lower salaries than their English counterparts, are
(1). G . Routh, Occupation and Pay in Great Britain, I906-6O
Cambridge U.P. (1965) p. 70.
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open to bribery; and the declining standard of living of the 
English judiciary over many years is a clear indication that, 
once incorruptibility is established, salary has no influence 
upon integrity.
In 1 9 6 3, the Times wrote:
"It is of first-rate public importance that they 
(the judges) should continue to be men of substance 
and security. The vast moral authority of the law 
in this country is bound up in the public mind with 
the visible dignity of the men who dispense the 
Queen’s justice." (1)
In short, a judge must have sufficient funds to maintain 
a way of life befitting his station; though since a judge’s life 
outside the courts is notoriously private, the point loses some 
of its force.
Yet the significance of a high salary may be less one of
practical dignity and more one of symbolic prestige. Hilda
Kahn, in a study of salaries in the public services, has
observed that
" in the case of some very august offices, the
salary appears to contain an element of tribute to 
such office as well as pecuniary reward for its 
holder. Thus part of the not inconsiderable 
differential between the pay of a High Court judge 
and that of a county court judge may well be due 
not to the actual difference in knowledge and 
judicial capacity between the two categories, but 
to the exalted position of the former. A superior 
judgeship is somehow more conspicuously the 
repository of the dignity of British Justice than 
a county court judgeship - which is more of a 
bread-and-butter affair". (2)
Another explanation of the high salaries is that they are 
designed to lure successful men from lucrative practice at the 
Bar. Yet only a very few eminent counsel can expect a ve^y
1). The Times, March I4th, I9 6 3.
2 ). H.R. Kahn, Salaries in the Public Services in England and
Wales Allen & Unwin (19 6 2) p. 36T.
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high income and this may be severely diminished by taxation, 
which can fall particularly hardly on those who, like barristers,
live by fees and similar payments. Estimates of barristers’
earnings show them on average to reach a peak in middle age and
( 1 )subsequently to suffer some decline,'  ^ partly because of 
judicial appointments for the abler but also because of the 
sheer physical strain involved even in maintaining an already 
successful practice. A judge’s salary with pension is worth 
more than most barristers’ practices. Yet there may still oe 
some argument for saying that although promotion to the 
judiciary undoubtedly means a substantial increase in income for 
most, the pattern is determined by the really successful. "The 
salaries", wrote A. Samuels, "should not be such as to deter 
the best men from accepting judgeships because of much higher 
earnings at tlie Bar".^ ^
The position of the retiring barrister has been more
difficult since March 1968 v/hen the Chancellor of the Exchequer
decided to withdraw tax-free allowances on post-retirement
receipts. This also affects those appointed to the Bench; for
the outstanding fees of the successful barrister were usually
sufficient to provide for his outstanding tax liabilities and
to cover any immediate drop in his income. At least one judge
recently had a minus income and had to sell some capital to pay
(off the surtax he owed.' ' The real financial advantage of the 
Bench lies in the prosperous security it provides for the 
lawyer’s later years; a factor which is likely to maintain the 
present age structure of the Bench.
1). Sunday Times, February 5th, 1967.
2). New Law Journal, 1966.
3). Observer, August 7th, 1970.
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Chapter 7
Judicial Independence
The Political Experiences jcf the Judiciary
It is ironical that, despite the apolitical ideal, the 
only real exception to the judges' lack of experience outside 
the lawyers' world, has been the time spent by some of them in
political activity. The judges themselves have been excluded
( 1 )from the Commons since 1/01^ ' out the ties between Parliament
and the Bar have always been close, with barristers consistently
the largest profession in politics. Discussing the structure
of politics in the eighteenth century, Sir Lewis Namier wrote,
"Debates and business in Parliament being of an 
eminently legal character, 'the gentlemen of the 
long robe' were welcome in the House, while to 
tnem it offered distinct advantages. Most of 
the highest honours of the profession were usually 
reached through the House of Commons."(2)
Lord Carson once observed, appropriately enough, that "Though
the House of Commons have always disliked lawyers, lawyers
have never shown any dislike for the House of Commons.
To-day, roughly a fifth of all M.P's. are or have recently 
been in legal practise, the majority of them as barristers; 
according to the Times Guide to the House of Commons 196^,
100 of the 6^0 ^embers of Parliament were barristers, (64 of them 
Conservative, 32 Labour and 4 Liberal). Similarly, the general 
election of 1966 returned 95 barristers, (54 Conservative,
(1). Though for two months, from 13 November 1918 to 14 January 
1919, Lord Cave was both a Lord of Appeal and Home 
Secretary. (R.P.V. Houston, Lives of the Bord Chancellors 
Oxford, Clarendon, (1964) p.420)' ’See 'also belov/ "^ §7 '
(2). Sir Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the accession
of George III. Macmillan, 2nd VdTTT^W)' p.437
(3). T. Mathew, Lawyers and Others, William Hodge (1938)
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Taule I'lTVII
Political Ixpexdences of the Judiciary
Period of :tal
a p p o in tm e n t 1820-75  1876-1920 1921-50 1951-68 I8 2 0 -1 9 6 8
rumuer 01
judges
appointed
Former 
8.
Former
Parliamentary
candidates
Total
'political' 
judges
Percentage of 
'political'
iiidpes
106
V'
o
57
R X P'
11
54
91
20
7
66
9
566
11^
1 4^.7
o: 0 2 9 .7h 1 0 .5p 58 .1 ;
able XXVIII
Party Affiliations of 'Political' judges(1)
Period of Total
appointment 1620-75 1676-1920 1921-50 1951-68 I62O-I968
Conservative
(Tory)
Liberal ( Jliig) 
Labour 
hot Known
3t. 3/
(19)
(26)
48.lu 
(26)
11-8.1)0 
(2 6 )
^"(^2)
59 .37
29«bp
66.77
(6)
( S) (2)
7.4;-■ 1 1 .1 ;
( 2)
" ‘t l )
(1)
45. by 
(67)
43.5;=
(6 4 )
2.04 
( 3)
(13)
Total
Political
Judges
100; loop
(57) (54)
1004
(2 7 )
100;.
(9)
100‘o
(147)
(1), Until the rise of modern mass parties in the latter part
of the nineteenth century, party labels were not so clearly 
defined. This means that references to party affiliations 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries must 
be treated with some reservation.
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38 Labour and 3 Liberal), and the 1970 election 94 
(3 6 Conservative, 35 Labour and 3 Liberal and other).
But while the number of lawyers entering Parliament has 
remained fairly constant, the number of lawyer-politicians 
appointed to the Bench has, as Table XXVII shows, declined 
significantly over the past 150 years. Indeed, no M.P. 
or parliamentary candidate has been raised to bhe judiciary 
since 1962 when Lynn Ungoed-Thomas, a Labour M.P. was 
appointed to the Chancery Division and the Presidency of the 
P.p.A. Division was conferred on a Conservative M.P. ,
Jocelyn Simon.
;
The decline in the number of judges who were once active 
politicians may be attributed to a fuller acceptance of the |r
idea, energetically propagated by Harold Laski and other early 
twentieth century radicals, that the exercise of justice 
should be completely free of all political associations. Yet, j
while praising all conscious efforts to eradicate any suspicion '
of patronage from judicial appointments, we have also to recognise !
r
that it is no longer easy to combine effectively a successful [
practise at the Bar with being an M.P., particularly for those ■
who aspire to the Bench, Longer sessions in the House of Commons, 
the growing demands of committee work and the pressure of
r
constituency business make it increasingly difficult to have both r
I
a legal and political career. There are still many barristers la
the House of Commons, but with one or two exceptions, these men 
are not the most eminent members of the Bar and probably aim at 
ministerial rather than judicial advancement. "Politics and law
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have drifted a little apart from each other through
a combination of political and economic pressures," writes 
P.G. Richards, "And this is not a matter for regret".
Of course political experience is not undesirable per se ; 
indeed, it may be valuable in extending a lawyer's range of 
experience. Certainly, that pillar of neutrality. Lord 
Chancellor Haldane, believed that a House of Commons training 
helped "in checking the dangers of abstractness in mental 
outlook".(^)(^^hat is undesirable is if judicial appointments 
are actually influenced by political considerations, either as 
a reward for political service or to remove a political opponent. 
One of the tragedies of an appointments system controlled by 
politicians is not only that incompetent judges may be appointed 
but that a potentially first class judge may be lost because he 
is non-political.
Undoubtedly in the past much attention has been paid to
party claims. In his famous six hours speech on the State of the
Law, 1 8 2 8, Lord (then hr.) Brougham said, in reference to the
appointment of judges, that it was a custom "that party as well
as merit" should be studied.
"One half of the bar is thus excluded from the 
competition; for no man can be a judge who is not 
of a particular party. Unless he be the known 
adherrent of a certain system of Government - 
unless he profess himself devoted to one scheme of 
policy - unless his party happens to be the party 
connected with the crown, or allied with the 
ministry of the day, there is no chance for him; 
that man is surely excluded. Men must be on one 
side of the great political question to become 
judges...."
'.G. Richards, Patronage in -British Government. Allen &
UOTin, TT963) 2.129
(2 ). Lord Haldane, An Autobiography. Hodder and Stoughton (1929)
P.69.
(3 ). Though this remark referred specifically to the Law Lords.
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Giving examples of men who had changed their
party in order to fulfill their political ambitions,
Brougham went on,
"The judges have this leaning - they must have it - 
they cannot help having it - you compel them to 
have it - you choose them on account of their 
notoriously having it at the Bar; and you vainly 
hope that they will suddently put it off when they 
rise by its means to the Bench. On the contrary 
they know they fill a certain situation and they 
cannot forget by whom they were placed there or 
for what reason."(1)(2).
A letter sent by Disraeli to the Lord Chancellor, Lord
Chelmsford, in 1868 bluntly exposes the political basis
of judicial appointments.
"Dear Lord Chancellor", he wrote, "After all, I 
regret to observe that hr. Justice Shee is no more.
The claims of our legal friends in the House of 
Commons, supported as they are by much sympathy 
on our Benches, must not be treated with indifference, 
and therefore I venture to express a hope that 
you will not decide on the successor of Hr Justice 
Shee with any precipitation. Yours very faitnfully,
B. Disraeli." (3)
Chelmsford, to his credit, refused to comply with this
’request’ though his refusal apparently cost him the woolsack.
But Lord Cairns, his successor, was more amenable and accepted 
Disraeli’s nomination for the vacant judgeship.
Throughout the nineteenth century, patronage was wielded
quite indiscriminately at all levels of the judiciary.
According to Laski, out of 139 appointments made to the superior 
courts between 1832 and 1906, 80 were M.P’s. at the time of 
appointment and of these 63 were appointed whilst tneir party
(1). A. Poison, Law and Lawyers , VOL. II. Longman, (1840)pp.189-90
(2). Though see below pp.174-75.
(3). Lord Birkenhead, Points of View.
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{' i )was in office; anotner 11 had been Parliamentary candidates.' '
Since I906 a further 227 judges have been appointed to the
superior courts: only 23 were h.P's at the time, 19 of them
appointed by governments or their own political persuasion.
Perhaps the most well-known series of political appointments came
during Lord Halsbury’s tenure of the Lord Chancellorship.
Halsbury, who had won the position of solicitor-general in
Disraeli’s government by saving Conservative seats in trials
of election petitions is said to have almost invariably put
service to the Conservative Party above judicial qualities. Yet
according to H.F.V. Houston, Halsbury’s correspondence with
Salisbury, his Prime Minister, revealed that the possession of a
House of Commons seat might be a distinct disadvantage to a
candidate for judicial office, however qualified he might otherwise
be, since the whips might object to a by-election. Indeed at
one stage in the life of the third Salisbury Government, there
was a rule requiring the approval of the whole Cabinet before
 ^2")an M.P. was appointed ro the Bench.'  ^ But for this inbuilt 
restriction, the influence of Westminster on the judicial process 
during this period might have been more disastrous. On the other 
hand much of the criticism of Halsbury’s appointments may have been 
exaggerated; Prof. Heuston has estimated that only 7 of Halsbury’s 
30 higher appointments warrant oven the ghost of a suspicion that 
quality may have been sacrificed on the altar of party patronage.
It has also to be remembered that patronage, of a personal
as well as political kind, was until the middle years of the 
nineteenth century, widely exercised in all walks of life and 
v/as the accepted method of distributing desirable posts; it was 
not then seen clearly as a form of corruption,, as an uiijust 
deviation from some more democratic norm.
(1). H.J. Laski, "The Technique of Judicial Appointment", Studies 
l.n Law and Politic s. Allen & Unwin, (1932)
(2). P.V.V. HeustonZ Judges and Biographers. Inaugural lecture 
at the University of SouthamptonT^llb/) p.12.
(3)0 Heuston op. cit. Chap 5.
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"You may not like patronage, unless it was 
on your side, but you had to accept that it 
existed, that it was respectable, that it 
was the only known method of selection for a 
great many official and unofficial appointments, 
and that it would generally be exercised for 
personal, political and family advantage."(l)
Indeed, the law, where the possession of some basic learning
and integrity was more obviously necessary, was in some ways
less susceptible to patronage than say the civil service, the
church or the armed forces.' ^
It was not until ^ord Haldane's Chancellorship (1912-15) 
that the policy of political appointments clearly changed, 
although later Chancellors were not always able to achieve 
his neutrality, perhaps due to greater pressures from 
their Prime Ministers. Haldane was clearly fortunate in 
having as his Prime Minister, Lord Asquith, himself a 
practising barrister, v/ho was careful to see that every judicial 
appointment made during his tenure of the office (1906-18) had 
professional approval. "V/ith Asquith's cordial assent," wrote 
Haldane, "we decided that in filling the vacancies we would 
appoint only on the footing of high legal and professional 
qualifications."^
Since the 1950's political appointments have been 
increasingly infrequent. The Chancellors from 1945 to 1955,
Lords Jowitt and Simonds, paid little or no attention to political
i
activities; service in the House of Commons was apparently neither ■ 
and advantage nor a disadvantage. Abel-Smith and Stevens cite 
as examples of this neutrality the appointment as a Lord of i
Appeal of dames Reid, a leading Opposition spokesman, by the I
I
TÏT. V'/. J. ReadeTT^rofessiona 1 Men (The" Rise of the Professional 
Classes in Nineteenth Century England). Heidenfeld &
Nicolsonl (1 9 6 6) p.4 .
2). See above pp.pO-pl,
3 ). Haldane, op.cit. p.253.
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Labour Government of 1949, and in 1951 the conferring of a 
High Court judgeship by a Conservative government on a 
Labour M.P., Terence Donavan.(^) In September 1958 
Mr. Grimond referred in a speech to the Liberal Assembly 
to "the patronage and privilege by which both Socialists 
and Tories manipulate our politics." Lord Attlee in a letter 
to the Times, replied, "I was responsible for a large number 
of appointments to the judiciary and of promotions. Of these 
the only ones whose political views I know were Lord Somervell 
and ^ord Reid, Conservatives, and Lord Birkett, a Liberal.
However, in an interview with the Economist in 1964,
Lord Gardiner did suggest that there had been a revival of 
political appointments in the not so distant past; a reference, 
presumably to Lord Chancellor Kdlmuir who considered that 
rewarding men who voted the right way with judgeships was a way 
of encouraging a higher standard of lawyers in the Commons.
He also believed, as did Haldane, that parliamentary life was 
a way of adding breadth to the otherwise dangerously narrow life 
of a lawyer, and that such experience should be taken into 
account in making judicial appointments. Yet even Kilmuir's 
attitude was a very long way from the overt political patronage 
which vitiated the judicial system until the 1930's; the road 
to the Bench is no longer paved with political affiliations and 
the most recent appointments of M.P. - lawyers have definitely 
given no cause for renewed anxiety.
(1). B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, In Search of Justice. Allen Lane
(1968) p.176.
(2). Thomas Balogh, "The Apotheosis of the Dilettante", H.Thomas 
ed. The Establishment. Anthony Blond (1959) pp.117-18.
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An examination of the political 'records' of the judiciary 
takes no account of course, of those judges with political
( 1 )leanings who make no overt hid for office witnin their party,' ' 
and it has been suggested that the eradication of party patronage 
has in effect led to a greater imbalance within the judiciary 
in terms of basic political orientation, that the de facto surrender 
of judicial appointments to the profession has resulted in a 
virtual Conservative monopoly. The danger here lies in confusing 
that small-c conservatism, which is an integral part of the law, 
with the policies ^nd machinery of the Tory party. Moreover, 
as Abel-Smith and Stevens point out, not only for the legal pro­
fession but for the English in general, being non-political often
( 2 )means being a moderate or inarticulate conservative.' ^
Judicial -^ i-eferment
Until recent times the threat to judicial independence 
posed by the political antecedents of the judges reached its
height in the preferment of the Law Officers to the most important 
judicial posts. Since the sixteenth century the offices of 
Attorney-General and Solicitor-General have provided spring­
boards to the Bench, judicial preferment being granted as a reward 
for political services. Though whether by ancient right or 
through sheer political expediency is uncertain. It is clear
(1). The preceding analysis is, moreover, confined to judges active 
in national politics; those few judges who participated in 
local politics only have not been included.
2). Abel-Smith & Stevens op.cit.p.177.
3). There is evidence of a similar right of preferment in the Irish 
Republic. "In the instance of a vacancy on the High Court or the 
Supreme Court the Attorney General has usually the 'first right of 
refusal as it is called. The Attorney General has been named to 
such a post seven times under the present Constitution. Only Mr. 
Patrick Lynch and Mr. Patrick McGilligan were not so appointed"
(P.C. Bartholomew, The Irish Judiciary, Notre Dame Press,(1971) )•
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however that the chief legal advisers to the Cabinet are not 
the men best suited to fill judicial offices where they might be 
called upon to consider matters arising from government measures.
At a time when such appointments were common, Laski advised that 
as a safeguard the Law Officers should be disqualified from 
appointment to the Bench for a period of seven years; in 1932 
he wrote,
"If a vacancy occurs in the highest judicial 
offices, existing members of the Bench will find 
themselves barred from access thereto. At the 
present time, for instance, the Chief Justiceship, 
the Mastership of the Rolls, and the Presidency 
of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division 
are all held by men who played a great part in 
politics during the last half-dozen years".(l)
An examination of all those who have held high judicial
( 2 )office' ' since 1820 does however not fully confirm the 
existence of a "doctrine of succession". There has obviously 
been a strong association between the Law Officers of the Crown 
and the higher reaches of the Bench. Pour of the six barristers 
appointed to the Chief Barony, between 1820 and the 1870's, 
when the office was abolished, had been former Attorney-Generals; 
and of the twenty-one Masters of the Loiis appointed since 1820, 
nine had been former Law Officers, - 3 of these Solicitor-Generals, 
1 an Attorney-General and the remaining five having held both 
offices. Not all these appointments were made direct from the 
Law Offices to the Bench however, and it is doubtful whether 
they were actually 'of right'. Indeed, according to J.B. Atlay, 
Campbell was probably the only Attorney-General who attempted to 
assert his "unquestionable right to the Rolls".
(1). Laski, op.cit p.
(2). Preferment to the Woolsack is considered in Chapter 9.
(3). J.B. Atlay, The Victorian Chancellors. Smith Elder (1906)
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Tbe mest controversy has arisen, though, over t]be
Law Officers' right of preferment to the Chief Justiceship.
B.LL.J. Edwards, who has produced a comprehensive study
of the Law Officers, tells of a number of pronouncements from
r 1 'j
various quarters recognising a limited right of succession.' '
In 1850, for example, when questioned by the Select Committee 
on Official Salaries on the issue of Judicial patronnage.
Lord John Russell, the Prime Minister stated that the Attorney- 
General of the day had "no claim except for the Chief Justiceship 
of the Common Pleas". But, says Edwards, the foundation for this 
belief is not convincing. Out of 42 Chief Justices of the 
Common Pleas from the beginning of the seventeenth century to 
the Judicature Act of 1873, mo more than eighteen had previously 
been Attorney-General, and not all were direct appointments.
During the same period, out of 34 Chief Justices of the Queens Bench 
twelve had been Attorney-General. These figures do not, as 
Edwards says, bear out a particular right of preferment to the 
Common Pleas. However, there appears to have developed by the 
nineteenth century, if not an actual right, certainly a general 
bias in the appointment of both Chief Justices in favour of the 
Law Officers. Thus of the 10 Chief Justices of the Common 
Pleas in office from 1820 until 1880, when the two justiceships 
were merged, three had been Solicitor-General and five both 
Solicitor-General and Attorney-General; from 1820-1968 there 
have been thirteen Chief Justices of the Queens Bench or as they 
are now called. Lord Chief Justice ; nine of these were former 
Attorney-Generals, 6 of them also Solicitor-General.^^^
(1). J.LL.J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown. Sweet &
Maxwell (1964).
(2). Lord Inskip was the only Lord Chancellor ever to be 
appointed Lord Chief Justice.
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Table XXIX
Political experiences of the Lords Chief Justice
M.P.
Solicitor- Attorney- 
General General
Lord Tenterden 
(Charles Abbott)
Lord Denman 1819-26,
1830-32
Lord Campbell 1830-34, I832
1834-
Lord Cockburn 1847
Lord Russell 1880—94
Lord Hev/art 1913-22
Lord Caldecote 1918-29 
(Thomas Inskip) 1931-39
Lord Goddard
1850
Lord Coleridge 1863-73 I868
Lord Alverstone 1883-1900 -
(Richard Webster)
Lord Reading 1904-13 1910
(Rufus Isaacs)
Lord Trevethin 
(Alfred Lawrence)
1916
1830
1834
1831-32,
1832-36
1871
1886-
1892-94
1883-8 6, 
1886-92, 
1895-1900
1910-13
1919-22
1922-2 4, 1928-29/
1924-28, 1932-36^^ /
1931-32
Lord Parker
Lord Chief 
Justice
1818-32
1832-50
1850-5 9(1)
1859-80
1880-94
1894-1900
1900-1913
1913-21
1921-22
1922-40 
1940-4.6
1946-58
1958-71
r
(1). Lord Campbell was also Lord Chancellor from 1839-1861.
(2). Lord Reading was the first Attorney-General to become a member
of the Cabinet and in 1931, ten years after his retirement 
from the Bench, he was made Foreign Secretary.
(3). Also Secretary for Dominion Affairs 1939, Lord Chancellor
1939-4 0 , Dominion Secretary 1940 and Leader of the House 
of Lords 1940.
162
Table XXX
Political experiences of the Chief Justices of the Common Pleas
1820 -  1880
Solicitor- Attorney- Chief Justice of 
M.P. General General the Common Pleas
Lord Dallas 1802-06 1813 — 1818-23
Lord Gifford 1817 1817 1819 1824
Lord Best 1802-
1 8l 2—
- - 1824-29
Lord Tindal 1824-29 1826-29 — 1829-46
Lord Truro 
(Thomas Tilde)
1831-32, 
1834-41,
1841-46
1839 184.1 ,1846 1846-5 0(1)
Lord Jervis 1832-50 1046(2) 1846 1850-56
Lord Cockburn 1847 1850 1851-52,
1852-56
1856-59
Lord Erie 1837-41 - — 1859-66
Lord Bovill 1857 1866 — 1866-73
Lord Coleridge 1865-73 1868 1871 1873-80
(1). Lord Chancellor 1850-52.
(2). For three days only.
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In 1872 Gladstone had informed the Queen,
"that the Cabinet have taken this opportunity 
of recording their opinion that, with the passing 
of the Judicature Act, all claims of either or 
both Law Officers to a succession as of right 
to any particular judicial office (claims which 
were never adequately established) have naturally 
dropped; so that their promotion would henceforth 
rest on qualification and service only, not on 
the possession of the post of Law Officer".(1)
Again, in 1937, during debates on the Ministers of the 
Crown Bill, the government of the day denied that there was 
any foundation for the Opposition's suggestion that the Law 
Officers were in any v/ay entitled to high judicial office.
Yet despite these expressions of just intent, the claim to 
the Chief Justiceship seems to have continued until 1946, and 
to have engendered in 1921 an unpleasant political intrigue
(2 )of doubtful constitutionality.' ' Lord Reading, the Lord Chief
Justice, bored with judicial work, v/as anxious to return to the 
"glitter of diplomacy" he had enjoyed as Ambassador to Washington. 
V/hen the Viceroyalty of India, the choicest prize in the Prime 
Minister's patronage fell vacant, Reading, a close personal and 
political friend of Lloyd George, was therefore the main 
contender. Gordon Hewart, then the Attorney-General, was 
consequently expected to exercise his 'right* to first refusal 
of the Chief Justiceship and succeed Reading. Lloyd George, 
however, wanted Hewart to temporarily give up his claim because of 
his value to the government in the House of Commons; he planned
(1). Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd series. Vol.II. p.290, 
cited in Edwards op.cit.
(2). The following account is taken from a number of sources, 
mainly the biographies of the chief protagonists.
R. Jackson, The Chief - The biography of Gordon Hewart,Lord
Chief Justice of England 1922-40 Harrap,'( 1959) Chap 7.
H. Montgomery Hyde, Lord Reading.Heinemann.( 1966)pp. 51 3-4i4.
F.E. The Life of P.E. Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead, by his |
son the Second Early of Birkenhead. Eyre & Spotteswoode, ( 1969)
pp.4 0 2-0 7.
P.G. Richards, Patronage in British Government.Allen&Unwinf1963)
164
meanwhile to find some ageing and tractable judge who would 
fill the post until requested to surrender it to the Attorney- 
General.
Hewart. was unhappy about the proposal and at first 
refused to stand down, but under pressure of persuasion 
from Lloyd George and Reading, - he was told that Reading's 
going to India depended entirely on his agreement to the plan, - 
and threatened with the possibly permanent loss of the Chief 
Justiceship, he finally succumbed. It was agreed that he should 
be given the opportunity publicly to refuse an offer of the postj 
but this condition was subsequently ignored and press reports 
were released from Downing Street to the effect that Hewart. had 
agreed to be passed over. The Attorney-General was worried; he 
had, he realised, received nothing in writing from either the 
Prime Minister or the Lord Chief Justice mentioning the agreement. 
Further cause for concern was revealed by Carson to whom Lloyd 
George had previously confided that though Reading wanted to be 
made Viceroy, there was some difficulty about money; Reading 
had lived expensively, he had not completed his full term for 
pension as a judge and the Viceroyalty carried no pension. Lloyd 
George and he therefore intended that another judge would fill 
the post only until Reading had wearied of India, when he would 
come back to take up his office again in qualify for the pension.
If this was their true intention and Hewart had simply been 
fobbed off with the tale of his own political indispensability, 
it was never carried out. Reading apparently had second thoughts 
about depriving Hewart. of the Chief Justiceship, temporarily or 
permanently; at his departure to India he addressed a farewell note 
to Lloyd George begging him to appoint Hewart, "if you can possibly 
do it". Montgomery Hyde, Reading's biographer, suggests that
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the Prime Minister, annoyed at this about-face, may therefore
have seen himself to be released from any earlier plan 
to re-appoint Reading.' ^
Lord Chancellor Birkenhead, a firm supporter of Hewart's
interests, who, suspiciously, had been abroad during the 
'discussions' over the appointment, was furious when he heard 
what had been arranged; he wrote to the Prime Minister setting 
out in strong terms his o b j e c t i o n s . ^ ^ " T h e  matter is, 
in my opinion", he wrote, "of the gravest importance both in 
relation to the future of our judicial system and to the credit 
and indeed the existence of the present Government". 7/hat they 
intended was a clear infringement of judicial independence; the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act 18?3 provided that judges of 
the High Court should "be removeable only for the most serious 
judicial misbehaviour and then in the most public and open 
manner". "The proposal under contemplation, however, would make 
the Lord Chief Justice a transient figure, subject to removal 
at the will of the Government of the day, and the creature of 
political exigency."
If the plan were to become public knowledge, he emphasised, 
the credit and reputation of both the government and the courts 
would suffer incalculable harm. Despite Birkenhead's protests 
and murmerings within the legal profession as a whole, the plan 
went ahead. In April 1921 Mr. Justice Lawrence was at the age of 
77 appointed Lord Chief Justice of England "According to report",
(1)• Montgomery Hyde op.cit. p.333.
(2 ). The full text of this letter, Lloyd George's reply and a 
further letter from Birkenhead are given in Appendix D
(3 ). The Life of F.E. Smith, pp.402-07.
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writes Montgomery Hyde, "before the appointment was made Lawrence 
wrote out his letter of resignation, leaving the date blank, 
which document he gave to the Prime Minister."'  ^ The 
following year before the coalition fell he read of his ov/n 
resignation in the Times. Hewart and Lloyd George had meanwhile 
resumed their friendship; the bargain v/as kept and Hewart 
became Lord Chief Justice. The incident stands as one of the 
grossest abuses of the judicial appointments system in recent 
times and it is ironic that Hewart who appears, by comparison, 
as the moi-e sympathetic personality in the proceedings was later
to be indicted as "perhaps the worst Lord Chief Justice of England
(o\
since the seventeenth c e n t u r y . ^
In 1946 the pattern of appointments to the Chief 
Justiceship was changed when Mr. Attlee selected for the post 
Lord Goduard, a judge of some fourteen years experience, at all 
levels of the superior courts, who, though he had run as an 
Independent Conservative candidate in the 1929 election was not 
an active lawyer-politician. In 1938, when the retirement of Lord 
Goddard was though to be imminent, letters appeared in the Times 
pressing for a similar appointment; the petition was granted in 
the person of Mr. Justice Parker of the Queens Bench Division.
It has been suggested that Gladstone, who repudiated the 
Law Officers' right of preferment to the Chief Justiceship, was 
himself largely responsible for the establishment of a new claim 
to the Mastership of the Rolls. The grounds for this are to be
(1). Montgomery Hyde op.cit. p.344.
(2). Heuston op.cit. p.319.
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found in letters written by Gladstone in 1881 and I883 
to Sir Henry James, bis Attorney-General, in which it was 
apparently assumed that he was entitled to be offered the offices 
of Lord of Appeal and Master of the Rolls respectively.
Similar overtures were made to Parrer Herschell, Solicitor- 
General from 1880-83; he, too, declined the posts. But the 
evidence is not wholly convincing; the offers, comments 
J.LL.J. Edwards, probably owe more to outstanding personal
( 1 )qualifications than to any renewal of a right to advancement.' ' 
The same judgement might be applied to the last two incumbents 
of the Presidency of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty 
Division, who were both former Solicitors-General. Sir Jocelyn 
Simon, particularly, was the leader of the divorce bar.
In 1871 Robert Porret Collier, a former Attorney-General, 
was appointed to the Bench of the Common Pleas; he was the last
of the very few nineteenth century Law Officers, mostly
Solicitors-General, to accept an ordinary puisne judgeship 
and his was in fact, only a token appointment for a few days,
a technical qualification for the paid judgeship on the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which he was then given. 
Since that time only one other former Law Officer has been made 
a High Court judge; Lynn Ungoed-Thomas, Solicitor-General in 
1931 was, in 1962, raised to the Chancery Bench. Law Officers 
have usually been inclined to covet the more illustrious 
judicial prizes.
(1). Edwards op.cit.
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(a )
I have suggested earlier'  ^ that the past membership
of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords has been less 
vitiated by political appointments than some writers have 
led us to believe; Tables XXXI (a) and (b) illustrate the point. 
Of the 62 Lords of Appeal appointed between 1820 and 1968,
4-0 (64.5/o) had no political record whatsoever; and of the 
18 (29.0%) Law Lords who had formerly been Law Officers, only
five were English, the remainder being appointed from either
-1 ( 2 )the Scottish or Irish Bars.' The tables also demonstrate quite
clearly that the vast majority of the Law Lords, whether or not
they had previously been active in politics, had, contrary to
Ensor's view been promoted from some other superior court.
In defence of Laski and Ensor, it must be said that the 
appointment of politician-lawyers to the Lords was most prevalent 
in the period of their writing, and the activities of some of the 
higher judges more political than at any time since.
(1). See Chapter 3.
(2). The practice of appointing the Scottish Law Officers 
to High judicial office persists. In D.M. Walker’s 
words: "Appointment as Lord President or Lord
Justice-Clerk is usually made direct from the Bar, 
usually by the promotion of a Law Officer. Only 
occasionally has the Lord Just ice-Clerk been promoted 
Lord President, and it is rare for a judge already on 
the Bench to be promoted Lord President or Lord 
Justice-Clerk. It is apparent that promotion to 
the Bench is commonly the reward for political service 
or support, and there is practically no chance of 
promotion to the Lgnch for the advocate who is politi­
cally inactive, unless he should attain the office 
Dean or Vice-Dean of Faculty, though it is fair to say 
that the system has brought to the offices of Lord 
President and Lord Justice-Clerk and to the Bench some 
outstanding lawyers whose contributions to the development 
of Scots law have been of permanent value . Some others 
have been merely adequate." (The Scottish Legal System, 
Edin. Green 1969)
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Table XXXI
Judicial and Political experiences of the haw Lords
a) English
Period of
appointment
Number of
English Law 
Lords
to Appellate appointed
Committee
Law Lords with 
previous experience 
in the superior
during period courts
Law Lords with 
no previous 
experience in 
the superior 
courts
Law Law
Officers M.P’s. Others Officers M.P’s Others
1876-1920
1921-50
1951-68
1876-1968
15 1 1 7 5 1
(1005=) {1.7%) {7.7%) (53.84) (2 3.15=) (7.7i)
18
(1004)
17
(94.44) (5 .64)
14 1 1 12
(1004) (7.14) (7.14) (85.74)
45 2 2 36 3 1 1
(1004) (4.44) (4.44) (8 0.0 4) (6.74) (2.gq (2 .2 4):
b) Scottish, and Irish 
Number 6Î
Period of Scottish and Law Lords with Law Lords with no
appointment Irish Law previous experience previous experience 
to Lords in the superior in the superior
Appellate appointed courts of Scotland courts of Scotland
Committee during period or Ireland or Ireland
Law Law
Officers M.P’s. Others Officers M.P’s Othos
1876-1920 8
(1004)
5
(62.54)
— — 3
(37.54)
— —
1921-50 6
(1004) (16.74) (16.74)
3
(50.04)
— 1
(16.74
1951-68 2
(1004)
1
(5 0.0 4)
— 1
(50.04)
—
■
1876-1968 16
(1004) (4 3 .84) ( 6.34)^6.34)
6
(37.54) ( 6.34)
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( "I ')The Law Lords,' as full members of the House of
Lords, eligible to take part in all the work of the 
( 2)
House, ' ' are, more than any of their fellow judges, 
at continuous ’political risk’. A convention debarring 
judicial peers from participation in dabates of a politi- 
cally controversial nature is now meticulously observed; 
in the past it has been much abused. Thus in April 1925,
Laski wrote to Mr. Justice Holmes, "Here, at the moment there 
is a tendency to judicial nepotism that is harmful and judges 
are doing more (e.g. Carson and Summer) in the Lords than is,
I think, wise."(^)"
The appointment of Edward Carson as a Lord of Appeal 
in 1921 had been ill-advised. Carson, a successful 
barrister and was at the heart of the violently
I
I
controversial Irish question, had become indeed the 
acknowledged leader of the Ulstermen both in and out of 
Parliament and was reckless in his devotion to the Orange \
cause. Even on a professional basis, the appointment was 
a surprising one; Lords of Appeal are, as P.A. Bromhead 
observes "generally men who have distinguished themselves 
in the rather more narrow fields of the Law than
(1). The term Law Lords, may be used in a broad sense to in­
clude all peers holding or having held high judicial 
office; here it is used to designate only the Lords of 
Appeal in Ordinary, the Lord Chief Justice and the Master 
of the Rolls, i.e. all the sitting judicial peers, except 
the Lord Chancellor.
(2) It is possible for a Law Lord to be appointed to an ordina­
ry ministerial office. Lord Macmillanwas appointed Minister 
of Information in 1939, but, writes P.A. Bromhead, this 
wartime precedent should not be regarded as of general 
validity. (The House of Lprag and Contemporary; Politics 
1911-57.Eoutledge (1958)
(3 ) Holmes-Laskl Letters (The Correspondance of Mr. Justice 
Holmes and Harold Laski 1916-35)0.Ü.P.(I953)p.733.
(4) Carson was a Unionist M.P. from 1892-1918, held office as 
First Lord of the Admiralty in the Conservative Government
1917) and was a member of the Coalition War Cabinet.
1917-18).
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Lord C a r s o n . Of all this Lloyds George and Birkenhead, 
who selected him, were fully aware. If, as Carson’s 
biographers suggest, they had by the appointment reckoned
( 2)on procuring his silence, they had seriously miscalculated.'  ^
.Then, soon after Carson’s appointment the Coalition negotiated 
a Treaty between England and Ireland setting up the Irish 
Free State, the new Law Lord not only spoke in the House of 
Lords on this explosive political question, but also made a 
violent speech at a meeting in Burton-on-Trent in which he 
denounced the ’treachery’ of tjhe government to tihe loyalists 
in Southern Ireland. His conduct qas severely criticised and 
the general question of the Law Lords right to free political 
comment discussed at some length in the House of Lords.
Most of Carson’s fellow judges strongly disapproved of his 
activities. Involvement in controversial political issues, said 
Lord Buckmaster, must inevitably damage the reputation of the 
whole judicial system. Judges should be impartial in politics 
as in law. The Loid Chancellor's reaction was more heated;
"If a Law Lord in this House is to be at liberty 
to go upon a political platform and to make party 
attacks upon the Government of the day", he demanded,
" is there anything in the world to prevent the
whole body of our Judges and Nisi Prius Judges 
distributing themselves in political hordes over 
the country, supporting and opposing candidates, 
impeaching or defending the Government of the day?"(It)
Viscount Finley and Lord Sumner supported Carson, but 
Sumner was far from being a neutral commentator himself. His
1). Bromhead op.cit.
2). ;s. Marjoribank & I. Colvin, The Life of Lord Carson
Gollancs
(3). Pari. Debs. (HL). Vol. XLIX, 22nd, 27th, 27th Karch.
(4). ibid 22nd March cols. 903-5.
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participation in the legislative v/ork of the Lords was probably
( i )greater than that of any of his fellow Law Lords,' and in 
1926 Laski wrote of him, I can see in recent years here
definite signs  of a definite interaction between Ihis
decisions in the Lords and the speeches he (very wrongly)
( 2 )makes there in eager defence of Toryism".'  ^ In t]re debate on 
Carson, Sumner’s evidence on the political activities of earlier 
legal peers was firmly rejected by Haldane; Lord Chief Justice 
ailenborough had certainly sat in the Cabinet but his presence 
there had given rise to sharp public criticism,
" so sharp that no Lord Chief Justice will ever
sit in the Cabinet again Lord Macnaghten, it is
said, took part in debates, and I dare say that Lord 
Jatson(3) did also. jBut these eminent men made it 
perfectly clear that although they claimed the right 
as Peers they never spoke on great partisan questions. 
They felt that if they did it would be disastrous to 
bhe prestige and confidence enjoyed by your Lordships’ 
House as a judicial body. It is difficult to combine 
the functions of a judge and a politician."(4)
Laski’s reaction to the debacle was surprisingly light- 
hearted.
"The latter (Carson) is now the stormy petrel of 
the Lords", he wrote, "and though I agree with 
Birkenhead that his political activities are intolerable 
in a judge, I must say that he adds to the spice of
life."((5 ).
Despite the furore, Carson remained in office; but from 
that time the non-political role of the Law Lords was more 
clearly established and the situation has never been repeated.
(1). G. Drewry & J. Morgan, "Law Lords as Legislators" 
Parliamentary Affairs. VolXXII. No.3 1969, p.233.
(2). Holmes-Laski Letters, p.845
(3). Lord Macnaghten, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, 1887 - 1913. 
Lord Watson, " " " " " 1880 - 99.
4 g  JteJi..._B5t?.-laL)Vol.XLIX. 22nd March, 1922, col.721+
5). Holme8-Laski Letters, p.415
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There was indeed a conscious policy at the end of the 
twenties to replace obviously political Law Lords who
( "1 )retired with ’professional’ men such as Atkin and Russell. ^
A recent study of the legislative activities of the Law Lords
(during the period 1952-67, demonstrates that their 
contributions to House of Lords debates are now confined 
principally to discussing the legal/moral implications of law 
reform. By and large the contemporary Lav/ Lords, unlike their 
1920 forebears live up to their image as a politically neutral 
caucus of legal advisers.
(1). R. Steven¥, ^^ 'The Role "of 1a ^ Pinal Appeal Court in a
Democracy; The House of Lords Today". Mod.Law Rev.I6I 
XXVIII No.5 . (1965) p.5 1 7.
2). vThich is given in support of this thesis.
3). Drewry & Morgan, op.cit.
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Security of tenure
Once in office, it is essential to freedom that tlie 
judiciary be v/holly independent of the executive; if a judge is 
under the direction of a government or can be removed from office 
at will, his impartiality will be at risk whenever a case comes 
before him in which the government is involved as a party or is 
likely to favour a particular decision, Laski was emphatic on 
this point,
"For it is obvious that if the executive could shape 
judicial decisions in accordance with its own 
desires, it would be the unlimited master of the 
State. The interpretation of the lav/ must, 
therefore, be entrusted always to a body of persons 
whose will cannot be bound by the will of the 
executive. They must be able to call the 
executive to account", (i)
Both British and American experience have shown that if 
the independence of the judiciary is ensured, then even overtly 
political appointments may be rendered virtually harmless; for 
membership of a political party, however formerly active, is 
no guarantee that a judge will hand down judgements in keeping 
with the official party line. Thus Geoffrey Sawer contends 
that "identification with the organised profession remains the 
main social determinant for the views of such appointees, 
irrespective of the party affiliations accompanying their 
political o f f i c e s " . Entrenched legalistic principles^and 
the weight of professional opinion will usually be the major 
factors in deciding a judge’s future behaviour on the Bench - 
what Henry J. Abraham calls his "real politics"f^^ and these 
may differ quite crucially from his political label. This
(1). H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics, Allen & Unwin, 5th ed.
, , (1967), p. 54 2.
(2). G. Sawer, Law in Society, Oxford, Clarendon (1965).
'5). See below pp.250-5 4.
4 ). H.J. Abraham, The Judicial Process, O.U.^ P. (1968), pp. 75-78.
i??;
"uncertain quantity" once caused President Truman to observe 
that
" packing the Supreme Court can't be done,
because I’ve tried it and it won’t work ----
Whenever you put a man on the Supreme Court he 
ceases to be your friend. I’m sure of that". (l)
He might have been forewarned by the words of Charles
Warren, an authority on the Supreme Court, who, some 20 years
before had written,
"---- nothing is more striking in the history of
the Court than the manner in which the hopes of 
those who expected a judge to follow the 
political views of the President appointing him 
have been disappointed". (2)
Even in America, where politics play a prominent role in 
the legal system, the judicial mind retains an unusual degree 
of independence. How much more so in England where the links 
between the political and legal worlds have been so 
attenuated?
The most important support for judicial independence 
derives from the judges’ security of tenure. In the more 
Hobbesian days of the Stuart Kings, the English judges held 
their office "durante bene placito nostro" (according to our 
good pleasure) and were, therefore, to all intents and 
purposes the Sovereign’s tools. The judges were lions, "yet 
lions under the throne, being circumspect that they did not 
check or oppose any points of sovereignty,
(1). Abraham, op.cit. p. 76 (from a lecture at Columbia University,
April 28th, 1959).
2). ibid.
3). Francis Bacon, "Of Judicature" in The Essays, Dent (1906)
p. 165.
(ip). Chief Justice Edward Coke was the exception; though his
arguments were in many quarters considered treasonable, he 
stood firm for judicial independence and the rule of 
common law over royal prerogative, refusing to be cowed 
by either Crown or Woolsack.
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Though even from the very earliest times, according to Sir 
Kenneth Roberts~V/ray, some of the judges - certainly the Barons 
of the Exchequer - were appointed during good behaviour, the 
Royal displeasure then being manifested not by dismissal but 
by suspension; presumably, comments Roberts-Tray, dismissal
at the ipse dixit of the Sovereign would have violated the
( 1 )common law.^ '
Judges actually ceased to be appointed ’during pleasure’ 
from the beginning of the reign of William III, though the 
practice did not receive statutory backing until 1701. The 
Act of Settlement then provided that the judges of the 
superior courts should be appointed for an indefinite term 
"quam diu se gesserint", (as long as they will have performed 
well). Later statutes seemed to confirm that not only should 
a judge continue to hold office "during good behaviour" but 
that he should be dismissable only by the Crown on an address 
presented by both Houses of Parliament. Under such terms,
the judges receive better protection than they would have been 
given, had it been laid down simply that in order to remove 
one of them a statute was required; for the House of Lords 
cannot be by-passed and thus the removal of a judge would 
have to be endorsed by the leading men of his own profession.
The term "good behaviour" is imprecise and parliament probably 
has complete discretion to decide what constitutes sufficient
1). Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Common Law (1966).
2). Appellate Jurisdiction ActT I8 7 6, s.6 .
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925,
s.k2 (1).
(3). Appellate Jurisdiction Act, I8 7 6, s. (6), Supreme Court 
of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, s. 12(l).
The Lord Chancellor is, of course, an exception. It 
should also be noted too that security of tenure is in 
no way vitiated by the legislature setting a reasonable 
age for retirement, provided the retiring age is fixed 
in a general way for each judicial rank.
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grounds for terminating a judge’s tenure, though, writes Henry
Cecil, "the principle has been established that removal should
not be asked for unless real moral blame is attributable to
a judge or he is incompetent by reason of mental and physical 
( ^
ill-health",  ^ No English judge has, however, been removed 
under the provision of the Acts,'  ^ and their interpretation is 
by no means certain.
One authority, Sir Kenneth Koberts-V/ray, maintains that 
the superficially simple language of the Acts conceals two 
major weaknesses; it is not clear, he says, first, whether 
removal by the Queen on an address is the only method of 
removing judges and secondly, whether good behaviour is the 
only condition of tenure, or whether they may be removed, either 
on an address or by other procedures on other grounds as well. 
Ebberts-Wray considers that judges are removable by an address 
on grounds other than strict misbehaviour and that for misbehaviour 
alone are removable by other means;' ' thus a judge might be 
removed by a criminal information in the Queen’s Bench Division 
at the suit of the Attorney-General, or under the "good 
behaviour" clause by dismissal by the Queen v/ithout address from 
both Houses. A judge might also be deprived of his office by 
its abolition in the course of judicial re-organisation; the 
oft-repeated proposals for the abolition of the appellate 
jurisdiction of the House of Lords are a case in point.
1). H. Cecil, Tipping the Scales, Hutchinson (196U),
2). Since 1701 only nine petitions for the removal of an 
English judge of the superior courts have been brought 
under the Act of Settlement and none have been successful; 
the one effective case was brought against an Irish judge. 
Sir Jonah Barrington, who was found guilty of malversation 
and removed from office in I83O.
(3). Robert8-Wray, op. cit., pp. 483-90.
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In so far as no method of removal has been employed for
at least 150 years, discussion of possible procedures appears
to be a rather academic exercise. More important, if, as
Roberts-Wray contends, the liability to removal on parliamentary
address was intended as "a qualification of, or exception from,
the words creating a tenure during good behaviour, and not an
( 1 )incident or legal consequence thereof",'  ^ then the statutory 
foundations of judicial independence begin to look a little 
hollow.
"It may be asked why Parliament, having laid down 
the principle that a judge holds office during good 
behaviour, should take to themselves an unqualified 
power of removal. In 1700 Parliament had had its 
own quarrel with the Crown but it was not hand-in- 
glove with the Judges; and, as Coke’s experience 
shows, the Judges were not to be trusted to maintain 
their own independence. So it may be that 
Parliament, though content to leave the removal of 
a Judge for provable acts of misconduct to judicial 
process, reserved to itself, and to no one else, an 
overriding power to remove a Judge who had lost their 
confidence."
Roberts-./ray concludes,
"If one is asked whether this safeguard for judicial 
independence in England is satisfactory, the answer
must be that it is not. ----  Emphasis on this
negative answer should however, be tempered by the 
reflection that a series of conflicts between the 
Legislature and the Judiciary during the eighteenth 
century and nineteenth century have established a 
tradition of mutual respect for each other’s rights; 
and if today an address for the removal of a Judge 
were to be proposed, it is to be hoped that one 
could confidently assume that there would be no 
question of putting on the party Whips." (2)
Constitutional formulae can never in themselves provide a 
permanent guarantee of judicial independence, for they may at 
any time be swept aside by the authority of Parliament; but
1). Roberts-Wray, op. cit., p. 485.
2). Ibid., p. 484.
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judicial independence is now firmly founded in a strong public 
and professional consensus that deplores executive interference 
in uhe dispensation of justice. And in effect under the present 
system such are the complexities and difficulties in the 
successful operation of any formal removal procedure that not 
only is the independence of the judiciary as a whole ensured, 
but it also seems that in most cases an individual judge, if 
so determined, will be able to stay in office, even though 
he may be genuinely incapable of properly performing his function) '
Unless there is a motion for an address for his removal, 
a judge may not, by convention, be criticised in Parliament.
One of the rare occasions when this took place was in 1924 when
George Lansbury tabled a motion for the removal of Mr. Justice
McCardie. Gumming up in the libel case, 0 ’Dwyer -v- Nair,
McCardie had expressed the view that General Dyer who had given
the order to fire on the Amritsar mob, had been wrongly
punished by the Secretary for India. The motion was withdrawn
after a statement from the Prime Minister reprimanding the judge.
"His Majesty’s Government ', he stated, "v/ill always 
uphold the right of the judiciary to pass judgement 
even on the Executive if it thinks fit, but that 
being the right of the judiciary it is all the more 
necessary that it should guard against pronouncements 
on issues involving grave political consequences 
which are not themselves being tried." (2)
The rebuke was a timely one; in modern times the dangers
of judicial involvement in politics were probably never greater
(1). Though the recent Administration of Justice Act, 1973, 
provides that if the Lord Chancellor is satisfied by 
medical evidence that a judge is disabled by permanent 
infirmity from the performance of his duties or in such 
a way as not to be able even to indicate a desire to 
resign, he might, with the concurrence of other senior 
judges, declare the judge’s office vacant.
(2). Pari. Debs. (H.C.), June 17th, 1924, cited in E.S. Turner,
May It Please Your Lordship, Michael Joseph- 
(1971),1). 229.
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than they were in the nineteen twenties. The relative detachment 
of contemporary judges from the political arena makes it easier 
for both judges and politicians to maintain an atmosphere of 
mutua1 respect.
Outside Parliament, the conduct of the judges and the 
decisions of the courts are more frequently eÿmcsea to 
criticism, especially by the media; though even here tl-e 
judiciary nave achieved extensive immunity against allegations 
of partiality or incompetence by their development of the 
doctrine of contempt. The respectful silence which hy the 1330*s 
had superseded the often virulent critiques of judicial 
appointments and judicial behaviour heard in earlier y
undoubtedly well-earned; but it also owed much to tin judres’
increasing use of their power to commit for contempt those 
who criticised them. There is no limit to the amount that a 
defendant on a charge of contempt may be fined or the length of 
time he can be imprisoned, and the judges’ punishments, 
particularly those dealt out to the press, have sometimes seemed 
excessively iiarsh,
f 1 )The recent widespread criticism of proceedings for contempt' ' 
have centred largely on the issue of freedom of the press, but 
this apart, it is doubtful whether the reputation of the 
judiciary is enhanced by the suppression of genuine criticism. 
"Justice," said Lord Atkin, "is not a cloistered virtue; she 
must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, though 
outspoken, comments of ordinary men."' ^
(1). The Phillimore Committee set up in 1971 to consider possible 
changes in the law of contempt has yet to publish its 
report.
(2). Ambard v. Att. Gen. for Trinidad and Tobago /l93^
A.0.323 at p.335.
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The degree of immunity from criticism which the judiciary 
now enjoy would he easier to justify were it counterbalanced by 
a reciprocal form of protection for others engaged in the legal 
process. But a judge enjoys absolute privilege in his judicial 
capacity; he may not be held for civil or criminal proceedings 
because of anything he may say or do as a judge, even if it is
alleged to have been malicious or in bad faith, unless he has
( 1 )acted outside his jurisdiction;' and the latter exception 
cannot in practice apply to a superior judge who enjoys unlimited 
jurisdiction. The privilege is nowadays rarely abused; but still 
it is not unknown for a judge to make unnecessarily critical and 
offensive remarks about a litigant or counsel appearing before 
him. Judicial improprieties of this type may often be dealt 
with through the Court of Appeal, but for those which do not 
fall within the Court's jurisdiction, there exists no alternative 
procedure for formal complaint. It is debatable whether the 
institution of an official complaints procedure would be an 
infringement of judicial independence; its precise effects would 
obviously depend on a number of variables: the composition of
the complaints' authority, its sphere of competence and its 
pov/ers. It is certain, however, that judicial inviolability 
by suppressing criticism of individual judges is more likely 
to diminish rather than increase public confidence in the 
judiciary as a whole.
Judicial independence has usually been discussed in terms 
of freedom from interference by the executive or legislature.
(1). Anderson -v- Gorrie I QB 668 (1895).
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but a recent article in an American journal carried the 
following warning,
"In modern times ---- anyone concerned with the Rule
of Law and the risks apparent in judicial conflicts 
of interest must stress also the need for independence 
of the judiciary from business or corporate interests 
of all kinds." (l)
The judicial ethic guarantees that no one holding full 
time judicial office will undertake any commercial employment; 
the position of the retired judge is more equivocal. Though 
there is a tradition that on retirement a judge will not engage 
in business, this has not been strictly observed; Lord 
Chancellors Birkenhead and Kilmuir both took up a number of 
company directorships after leaving the woolsack. The Lord 
Chancellor's unique constitutional position and the precariousness 
of his tenure of office may entitle him to be excepted from the 
general rule^^^ nevertheless these events, together with the 
unexpectedly early retirements of Lords Radcliffe and Devlin, 
prompted Abel-Gmith and Stevens to comment in 1968 that, "If 
this habit were to spread to the High Court judges, there might 
well be pressures to impose some bar on post-judicial 
activities, to protect the 'mystery' of the judicial office.
The danger lies not so much in any erosion of esoterism as in 
the suspicion that judicial independence is jeopardised if a 
judge has appearing before him a company which is in a position 
to give him a lucrative directorship.
Two years later the issue was resurrected in dramatic
fashion when Mr. Justice Fisher retired from the High Court 
Bench after only two and a half years in office to join the
(1). G. Borrie, "Judicial Conflicts of Interest in Britain",
American Journal of Comparative Law,
Vol. XXVIII, Ho. 4, p. 697.
(2). Former Lord Chancellors are prohibited from returning to 
practice at the Bar.
(3). Abel-Smith & Stevens, op. cit., p. 178.
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board of Schroder ./agg, the city merchant bank. The judge’s
( 1 )action was widely condemned on a number of grounds,' in
particular that
"----  after it became known that judges were likely
to be in negotiation with big business concerns over 
their future employment, their reputation for 
absolute impartiality and integrity, which is as 
valuable as the impartiality and integrity themselves 
would suffer." (2)
The bad publicity attendant on this sudden exchange of wig 
for bowler underlines the necessity for the maintenance of a 
strong judicial ethic of noninvolvement in commercial as much 
as political affairs; and one which extends to post-retirement 
activities.
1). See above p. 139.
2), Solicitors’ Journal (7th August, 1970).
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Hiapter B
The Lord Chancellor
This office, "one of great antiquity, much dignity and
considerable importance," dates at least from the reign of
Edward the Confessor (1042-66) and possibly even from as early
( 1 )as the Seventh century. ' ' The Chancellor was then a kind of
secretary to the King, attending to documents containing royal
grants or charter and acting as custodian of the King’s Seal.
Gradually the position grew in status and importance, until
the Lord Chancellor became the sovereign’s confidential advisor.
For centuries the holder of the office was invariably an
ecclesiastic, largely because the Church had a virtual monopoly
on literacy^ but Queen Elizabeth’s appointment of Nicholas Bacon
( 2)as Lord Keeper of the Great Seal' ' set the trend for appointing 
eminent lawyers to the office and by the beginning of the following 
century the precedent was firmly e s t a b l i s h e d . ^ T h e  Lord 
Chancellor is the first subject in the realm after the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, and altnugh it is not strictly necessary for the 
fulfilment of his functions on the Woolsack, every Chancellor 
in modern times has been created a peer immediately upon his 
appointment.
The most notable feature of the office of Lord Chancellor is 
that it combines three quite separate functions. The holder is 
head of the legal profession and senior juuge, Speaker of the 
House of Lords, a member of the Cabinet and the government’s chief
(1). R.F.y. Houston, Lives of the Lord Chancellors, 1885-1940.
Oxford, Clarendon Press, (19o4) p.XV.
(2). An office which carried the powers of the Lord Chancellor’s 
office but did not have the same prestige. It was therefore, 
used in former times when for various reasons it was thought 
inexpedient to confer the greater dignity.
(3) Though the Lord Chancellorship requires no legal qualification 
and it is theoretically possible for a layman to be appointed.
Table XXXII
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The Lord Chancellors
Lord Eldon (John Scott)
Lord Lyndhurst (John Singleton Copley)
Lord Brougham (Henry )
Lord Cottenham (Charles Christopher Pepys) 
Lord Truro (Thomas Wilde)
Lord St. Leonards (Edward Burtenshaw Sugden) 
Lord Cranworth (Robert Monsey Rolfe)
Lord Chelmsford (Frederick Thesiger)
Lord Campbell (John )
Lord Westbury (Richard Bet hell)
Lord Cairns (Hugh McCalmont  )
Lord Hatherley (William Page Wood)
Lord Selbourne (Roundell Palmer)
Lord Halsbury (Hardinge Stanley Gifford)
Lord Herschell (Farrer .)
Lord Loreburn (Robert Threshie Reid)
Lord Haldane (Richard Surdon )
Lord Buckmaster (Stanley Owen )
Lord Finlay (Robert )
Lord Birkenhead (Frederick Edwin Smith)
Lord Cave (George  ____)
Lord Hailsham (Douglas McGarel Hogg)
Lord Sankey (John )
Lord Maugham (Frederick Herbert )
Lord Caldecote (Thomas Walker Hobart Inskip) 
Lord Simon (John Allesbrook )
Terms of office 
1801-06, 1807-27
1827-30, 1834-35,
1841-46
1830-34
1836-4 1 , 1846-50 
1850-52 
1852
1852-5 8 , 1865-66
1858—5 9 , 1866—68
1859-61  
1861-65  
1868, 1874-80 
1868-72
1872-74, 1880-5
1885-86, 1886-92, 
I895-I905
1886, 1892-95
1905-12
1912-1 5, 1924
1915-16
1916-19  
1919-22
1922-2 4, 1924-28
1928-2 9, 1935-38
1929-35
19 38 -39
1939-40
1940-45
'le KXATI (Cent.)
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Bord Jowitt (Tilliam Allen 
Lord Sinionds (lavin Turnbull ^
Lora Kilmuir (David Pati-ick Ha:a/ell Pyf
Lord DilAorne (Reginald Edward. L ,aiiningnam-Auller; 
Lord Gardiner (Gerald Austin  /
Te_rms _qf__qfEice_
19 45 -51
1951-54
1954-62
1962-64
19S4-7C
187
legal adviser. He is the only man who combines the powers 
of the judiciary, the legislature and the executive, a living 
negation of Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers:
"That anomalous figure who contradicts and completes the strange 
logic of the British constitution".
It is the holder of this controversial office who, ultimately, 
must take responsibility for the appointment of superior court 
judges. Yet, as we have already seen, though political 
affiliation has in the past been a significant factor in the 
selection of the judges, candidates have rarely, if ever, been 
selected purely on the basis of political considerations, nor 
judicial independence subjugated to executive interest.
It is invevitable, given an office with such wide scope 
and discretionary power, that the manner in which the numerous 
duties of the Lord Chancellor are performed and the relative 
emphasis given to each function, will depend largely on 
the personality of the holder and, indirectly, on the 
characteristics of the government to which he belongs. Some 
Chancellors have accentuated the political importance of the 
office. Birkenhead, for example, was an undoubted power in the 
Cabinet; but most of his successors have been less prominent as 
members of the executive, for as one of than wrote, "with the 
increasing pre-eminence of the Commons in controlling legislation 
and policy, no minister in the Upper House can have more than a 
secondary influence".^The Lord Chancellor now tends to have
(1). Judges Summed Up, The Economist Dec 15.1956.
(2). Viscount Simon, Retrospect. Hutchinson (1952)
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something of an 'elder statesman' role, - witness, for
example, the part played by Lord Dilhorne in the 1963 battle 
for the Tory leadership. Further, acceptance of the 
Chancellorship means an end to the highest political ambitions.
Hence Lord Birkenhead's equivocal reaction to the proffered 
Woolsack.
"It was a dazzling prospect even for F.E. Smith,
who never set limits to his ambition. To become, 
at forty-six, the head of the English Judiciary 
and to preside over the House of Lords would have 
fulfilled the wildest dreams of almost any 
brilliant barrister, iind yet there was reason to 
hesitate. The acceptance of the Woolsack meant 
that he must leave the House of Comimons and thus 
virtually abandon all hope of becoming leader of 
his party and, if the fates were kind, of taking 
office as Prime Minister".(l)
Since the war the ^ord Chancellors have had less time
for sitting in their judicial capacity with the Law Lords,
and have concentrated more on their legislative and
/ pi
administrative functions;' ' Lord Gardiner in particular sat 
hardly at all during nearly six years of office. He considered 
the appointment of judges his most important function as Lord 
Chancellor, more important than his office of Speaker of the 
House of L o r d s . Y e t  a considerable amount of his time was 
spent in legislative sittings of the House; a record of the 
number of sitting days on which each peer attended the House 
during the period 1 9 6 3 -6 8 shows him to have had an attendance 
rate of 90%,
( 1). F.E. The Life of F.E. Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead.
by the Second Earl of Birkenhead, Eyre & Spottiswoode
(1959) p.350
(2). Lord Hailsham has proved a remarkable exception to this
rule. (G. Drewry, 'Lord Chancellor as Judge' New Law Journal
28 Sept.1972,p.885)
(3 .) Pari Debs, H.L. 28 Jan 1968 Vol 288 col.636.
(4 ). House of -^ords Paper (No.66) - Lords Attendance. 26th March
1969.
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The Lord Chancellor’s main task, as an earlier 
Chancellor, Lord Kilrnuir saw it was "to be responsible 
for seeing that the machinery of law and administration 
is in Y/orking order". In addition to his traditional
duties of appointing judges, Queen’s Counsel and the 16,000 
Justices of the Peace, the Lord Chancellor now has general 
responsibility for the exercise of judicial functions by those 
special and administrative tribunals that the welfare state 
has conceived in such proliferation. The office also carries 
considerable ecclesiastical patronage, and various duties 
connected with the Land Registry, the Public Trustees and 
Public Record Office, and the care of lunatics; post-war 
Chancellors have been further burdened with the increasingly 
important responsibilities relating to legal aid and Law reform,
- consolidating, simplifying and reconciling the law with changing 
social needs.
In the performance of this arduous role, the Lord Chancellor
has, of course, the assistance of his own small department of
civil servants; some of the work too is shared by the Law
Commissioners and the three standing committees, the Statute Law
Committee, the Law Reform Committee, and the Committee on Private
International Law. Yet it is difficult not to sympathise vvith
the plea of successive holders of the office that "it is beyond
the strength of any one man to perform the work that ought to be 
( 2ldone".' ' On the other hand, the Lord Chancellor is, unlike
(1). A. Sampson, Anatomy of Britain To-day. Hodder & Stoughton,
,  ^ (1964) p.174.
(2), Report of the Machinery of Government Committee. Cmmd.9230 
(1 9 1 8), ch. X, para.3., cited in R.M. Jackson, The Machinery 
of Justice in England C.U.P. 6th ed. 1972.
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Other Ministers, always an expert on the business of his 
department; in particular, he has ths advantage of being 
a Dumber of that closed professional circle from which 
judicial appointments must be made and is in a position 
to gather well-informed opinions about possible candidates 
for the Bench.
It is inevitable, even disregarding overt political patronage, 
that a Lord Chancellor in nominating the judiciary will still be 
the subject of certain biases; it is reasonable to assume that 
he will tend to select those with origins and experience similar 
to his own. An analysis of the Chancellor's social background 
gives general support to this assumption though it is impossible 
within the limitations of this study to measure in any precise way 
the extent of such insidious influences.
The Social and educational backgrounds of the Lord 
Chancellors 1820-1968.
In terms of basic social origins, the 31 Lord Chancellors
in office between 1820-1968 differed little from the judges they
HIappointed; using the same method of classification,'  ^ the 
majority, some 55%, rank quite definitely as members of the upper 
middle class. Fewer were drawn from Classes I and II but the 
only significant difference was in the higher proportion of Lord 
Chancellors from the lower middle class; it is probable though 
that some of this difference may be accounted for by the non­
response factor in the judicial analysis.
(1). See Appendix B.
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Table XXXIII.
Comparison of the social class origins of the 
Lord Chancellors and the Judges.
Class I II i;i IV V Not known
Lord Chancellors 9.7% 9 .7^ 54.8ÿc 25.8% - —
(3) (3) (17) (8)
Judges 15.3% 12.7% 47.4% 9.6% 1.3^ 0 13.5%
(5 9) (49) (183) (37) (6) (5 2)
Over the whole period studied, there were no significant
variations in the pattern of social recruitment to the
Chancellorship, nor any relationship between the class origins
of the appointee and the politics of the party in power. My
observations on the parentage of the Lord Chancellors differ
slightly from those of R.P.V. Houston, who has compiled an
authoritative biography of the twelve holders of the Great Seal
( i 1from I885-194O;'  ^ these were, he says, with two exceptions, 
from solidly middle-class backgrounds. The difference is partly 
one of terminology and possibly also of discrepant personal 
prestige scales; Houston tends to down-grade individual social 
origins.' ' Thus the fathers of Lords Lo reburn and Halsbury were.
(1), R.P.V. Houston, op.cit.
(2 ). The 'down-grading* propensity of great men and their 
biographers was summed up by the Second Earl of Birkenhead, 
who wrote of his father, F.E. Smith, "The life at home to 
which he was afterwards fond of referring as though it had 
been one of grinding poverty, was happy, regular and 
prosperous.......... It was his habit wilfully to
distrt the picture of his youthful indigence, in the same 
way as some men are tempted to recall imaginary grandeur, 
because he saw his past in creditable contrast with his 
later fame and prosperity". (P.M., The Life of F.E. Smith. 
First Earl of Birkenhead, by the Second Earl of Birkenhead 
Eyre & Spottiswoode.
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according to him, simply barristers; he omits to say that 
Lord Loreburn* s father was also a colonial judge and a knight, 
and that Halsbury* s father was of sufficient note to be included 
in the Dictionary of National Biography in his own right.
His two "lowlier" exceptions are Lord Sankey, son of a draper 
in a provincial town, and Lord Buckmaster, son of an agricultural 
labourer, later an inspector in the Science and Art Department, 
South Kensington. Buckmaster Senior in fact rose to be Professor 
of Chemistry in that organisation, which was to become part 
of Imperial College.
A more detailed analysis of fatliers* occupations also
reveals few differences between the Chancellors and the judges;
rather predictably the largest group of fathers were themselves
lawyers, though none had occupied the Woolsack or sat in the
H Isuperior courts; '  ^ the most illustrious, forensically, were 
Lord Loreburn* s father. Sir James Reid, chief justice of the 
Ionian Islands protectorate, and Lord Cottenham*s father.
Sir V/illiam Weller Pepys, master in Chancery. More surprising, 
perhaps, is the lack of obvious connections with sources of 
political power and patronage; of the nineteenth century 
Chancellors, only one. Lord Hatherley the son of Sir Mathew Wood, 
businessman, political reformer. Lord Mayor of London and friend 
of Queen Caroline, appears to have had influential parentage.
It is obviously impossible, however, to be certain about this 
without more detailed information on family backgrounds; 
political or financial championship for Chancellors, or judges, 
may sometimes have come from less immediate sources; some of the 
well-represented *Reverend* fathers, whose own careers were,
(1). Until June 1970 when Quintin Hogg son of Lord Hailsham,
a former Lord Chancellor, was appointed to the Woolsack.
Occupations of the
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Lord Chancellors* fathers
Table XXXIV
Occupation Percentage of fathers in 
each occupational group
Law 25.8^8)
Church 19.4%(6)
Medicine 6,5%(2)
Politics 9.7fo(3)
Teaching (all grades) 6.5^2)
Armed forces 3.2fo(^)
Ent rep reneuri al» 22.6%(^)
Administration 3.2fo(i)
Landowning 3.2fo(^)
The arts 9.7%(3)
Not known 3.2%(^)
* For an explanation of the last four occupational groups see 
the corresponding analysis for the judges.
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^Ghq_ql8 attended by the Lord Chancellors 
Table XXXV
Type of School» Percentage of Lord Chancellors
attending each type of school
1. Clarendon
2. Other public ^^*^^(10)
3. Direct grant ^*^^(3)
4o Other independent S
5. Maintained
6. Private 6.
(3)
(2)
7. Foreign 3.2%/^\
8. Private tuition 3.2%(1)
* See above p,
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IPliZGZsitie8 attended by the Lord Chance 1 lors
Table XXXVI
University
Oxford*
Cambridge*
Edinburgh
London
Trinity, Dublin 
St. Andrews 
Foreign
Percentage of Lord Chancellors 
attending each university
19.4%
(15)
(6)
9.7%
6.5%
3.2%
3.2%
9.7%
(3)
(2)
(1)
(1)
(3)
Total Lord Chancellors 
attending university**
Lord Chancellors not 
attending university
Total Lord Chancellors
87.1%(27)
13.0%(^) 
100% (31)
* The numbers of Lord Chancellors produced by the individual 
colleges were as follows:
Oxford: Wadham - 3, Balliol, Magdalene and New - 2,
Christs, Christ Church, Jesus, Merton, St. Johns, 
Trinity and University - 1.
Cambridge: Trinity - 4, Trinity Hall and Kings - 1.
** Three Lord Chancellors attended more than one university.
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during the nineteenth century, so highly dependent on patronage,
rosy f ^OT example, have been younger sons of* more well—endowed
and well—situated families than their own occupation initially 
( 1 )suggests.
The school and university experiences of the Lord Chancellors 
have been largely what one would expect, similar to those of the 
judiciary and of most other elite groups. For over a century 
attendance at a university has been something of a prerequisite 
for a Chancellor : only four of the total 31 did not attend any 
institution of higher education, and three of these held office 
before 1868. The majority of the Chancellors v/ent to either 
Oxford or Cambridge, although since 1885 Oxonions have clearly 
been predominant; no 'provincial* university in England has 
succeeded in producing an occupant for the Woolsack.
According to some sources the Chancellor must be a member
of the Church of England, and for this reason, it is said,
( 2 )neither Lord Russell of Killowen, a Roman Catholic,'  ^ nor 
Lord Reading, a Jew, was appointed to the office; both were 
given instead the Lord Chief Justiceship. Certainly, although 
some of the Chancellors have been non-conformist or declared 
agnostics, none have been Jewish or Roman Catholic. The question 
is of some contemporary relevance as the present Attorney-General, 
Sir Peter Rawlinson who might otherwise be deemed heir apparent
(l). This reflects a general shortcoming of all class analysis 
based solely on parental status.
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to the Woolsack, would appear on account of his Roman 
Catholicism to he ineligible to hold the office.
Authority for the belief that Roman Catholics are still 
debarred from the Lord Chancellorship rests principally on the 
combined effect of G. 12 of the Catholic Relief Act, 1829, 
and 0.2 of the Test Abolition Act, 1867. However a notable 
exception to the usual interpretation of these Acts has recently 
emerged. The Plowden Legal Society, an association of Roman 
Catholic Lawyers, has unearthed the text of an opinion given 
in 1900 by Lord Haldane and two colleagues for an anonymous 
client, later revealed as Lord Russell; their opinion was that 
on a true construction of the statutes there was no absolute 
bar cm the appointment of members of the Roman Catholic church
Cl)
to the Lord Chancellorship.'  ^ Nevertheless, the apparently 
ambiguous nature of the provisions regarding religious exclusion 
from that high office indicate the advisability of repealing 
the enactments concerned to remove any remaining doubt;
" their survival," observed the New Law Journal, "is
contrary to the policies of non-discrimination which ought
to inform our public life..... 'In any event, the range of
choice (of candidates for the Lord Chancellorship) - never 
likely to be wide - ought not to be avoidably restricted.
(1). The Times I8th June 1971.
(2). July 2, (1970) 9 607.
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Career pattern•
The Lord Chancellors like the judges were on average 
called to the Bar when they were a little over twenty-five 
years. The next significant stage in the legal careers was 
reached rather earlier; twenty-seven of the Lord Chancellors 
took silk at an average of 40.4 years as against the judges* 
overall average of 44.1 years. This difference is probably 
to be explained by the future Lord Chancellors* closer 
involvement in politics; the ten who were actually in the 
House of Commons when they took silk were the youngest group 
of all, with an average age of 36.7 years. The age of 
appointment to the Lord Chancellorship, dependent as it is on 
political as well as professional factors, varies considerably 
around an average of about 6l years; the youngest since 1820 
was Loxd Birkenhead who was 47 at the time of appointment and 
the oldest Lord Campbell who was eighty.
Twelve of the Lord Chancellors sat in the superior courts 
before being appointed to the Woolsack, most of them holding 
one of the higher judicial offices. Only two Lord Chancellors 
have been appointed to the superior courts for the first time 
after leaving the Woolsack, Lord Caldecote who became Lord Chief 
Justice (1 9 4 0-4 6 ) and Lord Dilhorne, who was created a Lord 
of Appeal in Ordinary in 1969. Lord Simonds was re-appointed 
a Lord of Appeal at the end of his period in office as Lord 
Chancellor (1951-54) and sat on the Appellate Committee for 
another eight years.
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Table :(XXVII
The Bord Chancellors’ experiences in the 
superior courts
Puisne Judges
Lord Eldon
Lord Lyndhurst
Lord Cottenham
Lord Truro
Lord Cranv/orth Exchequer Baron,
1839-50
Vi ce-Chancellor,
1850-31
Lord Campbell
Lord Cairns
Lord Hatherley 
Lord Cave
Lord Sankey
Lord Maughan
Appeal .judges Senior judges
- Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas, 
1799-1801
- Master of the 
Rolls 1826-27
Lord Chief Baron
1831-34
Master of the 
Rolls, 1834-36
Chief Justice of 
the Goimon Pleas
1846-50
Lord Justice in 
Chancery,l851-52
- Chief Justice of
the Queens Bench
1850-59
Lord Justice -
in Chancery,
1866-68
Vice-Chancellor
1853—68
Lord Simonds
Kings Bench 
Division
1915-18
Chancery Division
1928-34
Chancery Division 
1937-44
Lord of Appeal 
in Ordinary, 
1918-22
Lord Justice of 
Appeal,19 2 8 -2 9
Lord Justice of 
Appeal,1934-35
Lord of Appeal in 
Ordinary,1935-38
Lord of Appeal in 
Ordinary,1944-51 
1954-62
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The Law Officers
One of the most notable features of the Chancellor's social
backgrounds probably lies not in any similarities between
them and the judges whom they appoint but rather in the extent
to which they have in the past differed from their fellow
politicians; this is revealed by '/.L. G-uttsrnan's work on the
( i )British political elite.  ^ Guttsman's study thoroughly confounds 
the Marxist notion that the government is essentially a committee 
representing the dominant producers of the country* though 
industrialisation produced a new, economically powerful urban 
bourgeoisie , until the later years of the nineteenth century 
the institutions of political power remained firmly in the hands 
of the territorial aristocracy. Restrained from direct action 
by their own interests, by the difficulty of attacking the 
political power of land, without also attacking the general 
principle of private property, the industrial and commercial 
classes, were obliged to await the slower erosion of landed 
interest by agricultural depression, and the aristocracy's 
ov/n long-term instinct for self-preservation. Yet some of the 
more ambitious members of the frustrated upper and middle cbsses 
managed to surmount the social, economic and legal obstacles 
and achieve individual political success; most of these 'new 
men' who reached the predominantly aristocratic Cabinets of the 
Victorian era, did so as occupants of the Woolsack.
The men who presided over the House of Lords for most of 
these years, were as we have seen, anything but aristocratic in 
origin, and few were from eminent political or legal families.
(1). W.L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite. MacGibbon & Kee
Cf963)
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C -1 )
But Guttsman does not think this at all surprising; ' '
Law Officers (the Lord Chancellor, Attorney-General, and 
Solicitor-General) are, he says, all 'working-class politicians'. 
They are appointed as much for their legal experience and 
forensic skill as for their parliamentary ability and political 
affiliations; and their political life develops rather 
than hinders their professional careers. Appointment to the 
Chancellorship invariably means a significant rise in income,
(the Lord Chancellor receives a higher salary than the Prime 
Minister); and the office, though precariously dependent on
( o')
the fortunes of the government, carries a substantial pension.' ^
The roles of Attorney-General and Solicitor-General may also 
be seen as profitable ones for, in addition to their generous 
salaries' ' neither were, in the past, debarred from cultivating 
their own private practices. Further, the Law Officers of the 
nineteenth century had every reason to hope ultimately for some 
judicial appointment, perhaps to the Chancellorship itself.
"One cannot help suspecting", writes Guttsman, "that there were 
among them (the Law Officers) quite a fev/ who entered Parliament 
with an eye on the main chance".
On the other hand it should be remembered that a contender 
in the legal political stakes had to be fairly confident of his 
prospects, for entering parliament was in the nineteenth century 
a very costly enterprise; seats were expensively 'purchased*
(1). W.L. Guttsman, op.cit.
(2). In part to compensate for the prohibition against returning 
to practice at the Bar.
(3). The Attorney-General now receives &I3.OOO.
(4). W.L. Guttsman, op.cit.
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and there was no immediate return in the form of a regular salary. 
Campbell, for example, received an invitation in 1825 to stand 
for the Stafford seat but was forced to wait another five 
years before accepting the offer, owing to the high cost of the 
seat, estimated at about f5 - 6,000.
Table XXÎvVIII indicates the extent to which the occupants
of the Woolsack have been drawn from the ranks of current and
former Attorney-Generals and Solicitor-Generals. Since 1820,
twenty-five (8l>0 of the Lord Chancellors had at some time
acted as one or both of the governments legal advisers; of the
other six, both Lord brougham and Lord Haldane had had considerable
parliamentary experience. Of the seventeen Attorney-Generals who
reached the Woolsack, only 5 were appointed direct from the
position of first Law Officers; others took a more indirect path,
some via other political offices and some first acquiring judicial
experience; both Lord Eldon and Lord Truro were Chief Justice
of the Common Pleas, Lord Lyndhurst, Chief Baron of the Exchequer,
Lord Campbell, Chief Justice of the Kings Bench and Lord Cairns
a Lord Justice of Appeal. The Solicitor-General*s chance
of being appointed Lord Chancellor have been almost as good: of
those who did not also become AttorneyGleneral, 8 have since 1&2C
received the higher accolade. But it is the opinion of
J.Ll. J. Edwards, an authority on the Law Officers of the 
( 1 )Crown, '  ^ that according to past precedent neither Lav/ Officer 
has an actual right of preferment to the Chancellorship, The 
eighteenth century, he says, provides few examples of either 
Law Officer being appointed directly to the woolsack. He 
admits, however, that this may be partially explained 
unusually long time for which some of the Chancellors of t&ls
( 1 ) J.Ll.J. Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown.Sweet A
' ' ( 1 yoijk) .
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Table XSŒVIII
The Lord Chancellors* experiences in the 
House of Commons.
Lord LI. P. Solioitor-
General
Attorney-
General
Lord
Chancellor.
Eldon 1783-99 1788 1793 1801-0 6, 1807-27
Lyndhurst 1818-2 1819 1824-26 1827-30, 1834-35 
1841-46
Brougham 1810-12
1815-30
— - 18 30-34
Cottenham 1831-34 1834 - 1836^ 1 , 1846-50
Truro 1831-32
1835-
1839 1841,1846 1850-52
St. Leonards "62 8 -3 2  
(a) 1837-
1829-30 1852
Cranworth 1832-39 1834,
1835-39
1852-5 8 , 1865-66
Chelmsford 1840- 1844 1845-46
1852-58
1858—5 9 ,1866-68
Campbell 1830-34
1834-
1832 1831|.
1837-41
1859-61
lïestbury 1851- 1852 1856-58
1859-61
1861-65
Cairns 1852-66 1858 1866—67 18 68, 1874—80
Hatherley 1847 1851-52 1868-72
3elbourne 1847- 
1861—66
1861 1863—66 1872-74
Halsbury 1877-85 1875-80^'’^ - 1885—8 6 , 1886—92 
1895-1905
Herschell 1874-85 1880-85 1886, 1892-95
Loreburn 1880-85
1886-1905
1894 189 4-95 1905-12
Haldane 1885-1911 — — 1912-1 5, 1924
Buckmaster 1906-1 0,
19 11-14
1914 — 1915-16
Finlay 1885-92
1695-1906
1910-16
1895-1900 1900-06 1916-19
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Lord M.P.
Solicitor- Attorney- 
General. General
(c)
Birkenhead i906-18 
Gave 1906-18
ilailsham^®^ 1922-28
Sanlcey
Maugham -
Galdecote (f) 1918-29
1931-39
Simon (g)
Jov/itt(h)
Simonds
Klliiiuir*'
jjilhorne
Gardiner
1906-18
1922W+0
1922-24
1929-32
1939^.5
1935-54
1943-62
1915
1916-17
1922-24
1924-28
1931-32
1910-13
1940-42
1942-45
1951-54
1915-19
1922-24
1925-28
1928-29
1932-36
1914-15
1929-32
1945
1954-62
Lord
Chancellor
1919-22
1922-2 4, 1924-28
1928-2 9, 1935-38
1929-35
1938-39
1939-40
1940-45 
1945-51
1951-54
1954-62
1962-64
1 9 6 4 -7 0
Other political offices held by the Lord Chancellors :-
a. Irish Chancellor 1834-35, 1841-46
b. Sec, of State for War 1905-
c. " " " " India 1924-28^^^
d. Home Secretary 1916-18
e. Sec. of State for /#ar 1931-35.
f. Minister for the Co-ordination of Defense 1936-39
Sec. for Dominion Affairs 1939.
II H If II 19^0.
g. Home Secretary 1915-16, 1935-57.
Foreign Secretary 1931-35 
Chancellor of the Exchequer 1937-UO
h. Paymaster-General 1942.
Minister without portfolio 1942-44*
Minister of National Insurance 1944-45.
i. Home Secretary.
( 1 ). Lord Halsbury was given his first legal appointment in tlie 
government before he found a place in the House of Commons.
(2). Birkenhead was the first ex-Lord Chancellor to hold another 
Cabinet office since 1784 when Lord Camden was made Lord 
President of the Council.
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period held office. Lord Hardwicke, for example, held the Great 
Seal for nearly twenty years without interruption, from 
1737 to 1756.
It may he said that though the former practice of 
appointing ex-Law Officers to other high judicial offices
may be deplored and indeed any political contamination of the
judicial system be best avoided, the parliamentary, as 
well as the legal experiences, of the Attorney-General and 
Solicitor-General serve as a useful apprenticeship for the 
duties of the Woolsack. As Edwards writes,
"With the Lord Chancellor's functions apparently 
in the process of shifting from the predominantly 
judicial duties to a position where the holder is
first and foremost the principal spokesman and
advocate for the government in the House of 
Lords, a much stronger case can be made for the 
elevation of the Attorney-General to the Lord 
Chancellorship than to any of the more permanent 
judicial offices".(l)
A. Harding in his Social History of English Law,^ ' suggests 
that as politics have become more professional and it has become
increasingly difficult to combine political and legal careers, 
the tendency has been to choose the Lord Chancellor from 
amongst those successful politicians who happen to have the 
necessary legal qualifications rather than from amongst 
eminent lawyers with the appropriate political affiliations.
The facts do not appear to support his argument. Over the past 
forty years, four of the eleven Lord Chancellors had never sat 
in parliament prior to their appointment. In 1929, the
(1). J.Ll. Edwards, op.cit.
(2). A, Harding, Social History of English Law. Penguin(1967)p-393
206
Labour government broke with political tradition by appointing 
as Chancellor a Liberal, Lord Sankey, and when government v/as 
assumed by a nalnly conservative coalition, he remained in office; 
Sanlcey was a Lord Justice of Appeal with some fourteen years 
experience of the superior coui-ts. Two of his successors.
Lords Maughan and Simonds were also experienced judges, both 
Law Lords and both with relatively ’non-political’ backgrounds. 
The last Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, though lacking in such 
judicial experience had also never sat in the House of Commons. 
The legal expertise of other recent Chancellors has rarely been 
seriously questioned.
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Chapter 9,
The Method of Judicial Selection - a  Comparative Survey
The superior judges are in theory appointed by the Crown,
in practice by the government of the day, the Lord Chancellor 
nominating the puisne judges and the Prime Minister, relying 
heavily on the Chancellor’s advice, filling the higher judicial 
offices. The appointment of the judiciary is thus ultimately 
in the hands of a man who, while he is the head of the legal 
profession, is also a member of the government and as such can 
never be non-political. This system of appointment by the 
executive has in former years been severely criticised; 
recommending the exclusion of the Lord Chancellor from the 
Cabinet, Laski, with some though not complete justification, 
wrote,
"On this basis, ---- it would be possible at long
last, to reform the whole system of patronage, which 
still bears on its face the character of the age of 
Lord Eldon rather than our own. Certainly, with the 
possible exception of ecclesiastical appointments, it 
is difficult to think of any area where the exercise 
of the patronage power has been performed to less 
advantage in this country." (1)
The disappearance of political patronage in judicial 
selection in England indicates however that the vitiation of 
judicial appointments by political considerations is not 
inherent in a system where appointments lie at the discretion 
of the executive, and that the determinants of judicial 
independence must be sought within a wider institutional and 
cultural context rather than in the specific system of judicial 
selection employed by any given society. The following
(i). H.J. Laski, Reflections on the Constitution Manchester
University Press (1951) p. 155.
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examination of the available methods of selection and their 
application in various countries, though too brief to lead to 
any definitive conclusions, is an attempt to clarify this point.
The possible alternatives to nomination by the executive
were considered in some detail by L a s k i . E l e c t i o n  by the
people seems in theory a system nearer to a realisation of the
democratic principle, ensuring freedom from the influence of
the executive; in reality, very definite objections may be cited.
"Of all methods of appointment", Laski wrote, "that 
of election by the people at large is without 
exception the worst. For either the candidate is 
chosen for purely political reasons, which is the 
last ground upon which he should be made a judge, or 
those who vote for him are not in a position to 
weigh the qualities upon which his choice ought to
depend. ---- Knowledge of the law, the balanced mind,
the ability to brush aside inessentials and drive to 
tile heart of a case - that a candidate will possess 
these qualities can, at best, be known only to a 
few —— —" (2 )
Most of the great judges in English history, men like
Blackburn, Bowen, V/atson, Macnaghten, were entirely unknown to 
the public outside. Of course election by the people does not 
wholly preclude the appointment of some very eminent men, but 
nor does it exclude the totally incompetent. Inevitably under 
such a system the people will choose the judges not on the basis 
of judicial qualities but, as American experience has so vividly 
demonstrated, according to political considerations.
Election by popular vote is widespread in America at state 
level. The judges sometimes appear on bipartisan or even 
nonpartisan tickets but loyal service in politics tends to be a 
prerequisite for n o m i n a t i o n . ^ M a r t i n Mayer, in his work on
(1). H.J. Laski, "The Technique of Judicial Appointment", Studies
in Law and Politics Allen & Unwin (1952H
2 ). ibid. p.
3). H.J. Abraham, The Judicial Process O.U.P. (1968) 2nd ed. p. 492,
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American lawyers, reports that in New York it is generally
believed that a contribution of at least 010,000 to a political
party is necessary before anyone will be nominated for a
judgeship. Across the country, it is quite common for judges
not only to be politically active but to run for other office;
in 1966 a justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was a
candidate in the Democratic gubernatorial primary; and a
justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court ran, as ’Judge Jim’, for 
i 11governor.' ' Curtis Bok, Philadelphia judge and novelist has
said that, "a judge is a member of the Bar who once knew a
(o')
Governor".' '
The elective term of office for state judges is on average 
six years; only a few judgeships are held for life. In some 
states the period of election may be as short as two years, 
though this is rare. But in any case where responsibility to 
the electorate is coupled with insecurity of tenure, the judge’s 
impartiality is exposed to severe strain, the need to stand for 
re-election being more harmful than the initial election of a 
judge. Pew are able to resist the temptation to win the favour 
of those whose support they need in order to stay in office and
are it seems much less likely to ’vote’ against ’their’ party
(on the Bench than are appointed judges.'^' As Justice Luramus
of the Massachusetts Supreme Court wrote,
"There is no certain harm in turning a politician 
into a judge. He may be, or become, a good judge.
The curse of the elective system is the converse, \
that it turns almost every judge into a politician".
The original Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted by the
1). M. Mayer, The Lawyers New York, Harper & Row (1966) p. 496.
2). C. Bok, The Backbone of the Herring New York, Knof (1941) p. 3<
3). Abraham op. cit. p. 40.
,4 ). Mayer op. cit. p. 495.
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American Bar Association in 1924 called upon judges to "avoid
making political speeches, making or soliciting payment of
assessments or contributions to party funds, the public
endorsement of candidates for political office and participation
in party conventions". In 1951 in a rather humiliating retreat,
the A.B.A. had to add the sentence,
"i/here, however, it is necessary for judges to be 
nominated and elected as candidates of a political 
party, nothing herein contained shall prevent the 
judge from speaking at political gatherings, or from 
making contributions to the campaign funds of the 
party that has nominated him and seeks his election 
or re-election". (1)
Election by the legislature, an alternative method of
appointment practised in some American states, appears to raise
the same problems. The number of members of the legislature
competent to choose the judiciary is usually very small and most
are thus swayed by precisely the same political considerations
as the popular vote. Comparison with Swiss experience shows,
however, that under certain conditions a system of legislative
election may work well. In Switzerland judges are elected by
the two federal chambers, the Nationalrat (200 members) and
the StMnderat (44  members), sitting jointly as the Bundesversamm-
lung, still a relatively small body. The aim is to ensure that
German, French and Italian speaking lawyers are appropriately
distributed on the Bench and political appointments are
virtually excluded from consideration by statute. More
important, re-election is the norm, so that to all intents and
( 2)purposes the judges have security of tenure.' ^
With this exception, executive appointment of the judiciary
(1). Mayer op. cit pp. 495-6.
(2). Abraham op. cit. p. 34.
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has proved the preferred method of selection in most Western
countries. As Henry Abraham writes,
"Someone ---- has to assume responsibility for staffing
the courts; it might as well be the executive, who ----
possesses the expertise and has access to all pertinent
d a t a  . At least in theory, the people are alv/ays
in a position to hold (him) accountable in a free 
society. To make him responsible for unfortunate 
judicial appointments is more meaningful and more 
palatable to the electorate than an arrangement that
requires the latter ---- to submerge judges in the
political arena ----". (1)
Since the war the general tendency has been for countries 
where appointment rests ultimately with the executive, to 
refine the precise means of selection in order to maximise 
freedom from the possibility of political influence. Thus in 
Prance since 194-6 candidates for the higher judicial offices 
have been filtered through the eleven-member ’Conseil Supérieur 
de la M a g i s t r a t u r e * . This council, which consists of the 
President, the Minister of Justice and nine persons of legal 
background, produces a short-list of prospective judges, from 
which the President and the Minister make the final choice. 
Opportunities for political patronage are in any case limited 
by the size of the group of qualified men from which the 
selecting authorities must make their choice, for this is small, 
both in terms of the number of judicial appointments available 
and of the size of the comparable bodies of candidates in 
England and America.
Similarly in America, where all of the federal judges are 
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate, 
the power of the executive has been mitigated by the increasingly
1)o Abraham op. cit. p. 34-.
2). The French Judicial System, published by the French Embassy.
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significant role of the American Bar Association’s twelve
member Committee on the Federal Judiciary, Also established
in 1946, this body has held a position of real influence for
at least the past fifteen years. The Committee investigates the
qualifications of every person considered by the Attorney
General as a possible candidate for judicial office. It first
makes an informal report on each name under consideration and
follows up with a formal recommendation on the candidate picked
by the Attorney General. If the Attorney General recommends
and the President actually nominates, a person rated unqualified
by the Committee, it still has an opportunity to oppose the
nomination in the Senate, but it has no special priority and
( 1 )must operate as any other interest group.' ' The Committee
operates only on the sufferance of the Attorney General and the
and the Senate Judiciary Committee but, according to Joel
Grossman,."  though its relationship is informal, the
prospective continuity of this relationship is enhanced by the
strong and favourable influence of the articulate press.
The existence of the Committee and the increasing importance
of consultation with the sitting judiciary as part of the
appointments process, is a recognition of the special
competence of the legal profession to assist in the selection
of judges. It has been effective primarily in setting minimum
standards of qualification for judicial office and in preventing
the selection of judges purely on the basis of political
considerations. Nonetheless in all federal judicial appointments
(political factors may still be decisive.'^'
All the 96 men who have sat on the Supreme Court Bench,
(1). Joel B. Grossman, Lawyers and Judges John Wiley (1965)
pp. 47-0.
(2j. ibid. p. 80.
Abraham op. cit. pp. 28-31.
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except Mr. Justice George Ghiras (1892-1903)> had engaged in
at least some public service at various levels of government,
( ■])
often elective, or had been active in politics;'  ^ and 
according to Abraham, it is a rather firmly adhered to unwritten 
law that the President will not normally nominate a candidate 
for the supreme Court from the political opposition. "After 
all, as many a President has been told by his political advisers.
Republican or Democratic as the case may be, * why should
we give these plums to the other guys? ---- surely there are
just as many good and deserving lawyers on our side of the
( o\
fence?*."' ' It is, however, customary to have at least one 
member of each political party on the high bench, and to satisfy 
this "requirement" Presidents have occasionally chosen "out-party" 
judges. The principle of religious and geographical balance in 
the composition of the Supreme Court, though apparently not a 
binding consideration, is also influential. The * Jewish* seat, 
for example, which began with the appointment of Louis Brandeis 
in 1 9 1 6, has never been vacant.'^'
In fairness, it must be noted that the United States 
Supreme Court has an exceptional jurisdiction and its exact 
counterpart does not exist in England; to the extent that it 
has the power to hold unconstitutional and judicially 
unenforceable an act of the President, the Congress, or a state, 
the Court is as much a political^^^ as a judicial institution.
"In retrospect", wrote Times Correspondent, Louis Keren, "the 
so-called nine old men can be seen to have brought about greater 
changes in the last 15 years than the 535 senators and 
representatives and the President with his legions of advisers
1). Abraham op, cit. p. 6 1.
2). ibid. p .  7 1.
3 ). Grossman op. cit. p. 29. 
,4 ). But not party political.
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and b u r e a u c r a t s . A t t e m p t s  by President Nixon to restrict 
the activist nature of the court, developed under Chief Justice 
Warren, by the nomination of "strict constructionalists" like 
Clement Haynsworth and Harrold Carswell, have so far been
resisted by the Senate.
For the selection of American judges at state level, 
five distinct systems are currently in use: executive and
legislative appointment; popular election by partisan and 
non-partisan ballots; and the Nonpartisan Court Plan. The 
first four of these methods are based on the common assumption 
that men who occupy judicial positions are like other government 
officials and should, therefore, be chosen by political figures 
such as governors or legislators, or should be elected directly
(2 )by the people.'  ^ The contrary viev/, that judges are a unicue 
type of public official for which the legal profession should 
have special responsibility has long been advocated by the 
American Bar Association, their argument for professional 
involvement in the judicial selection process being based on 
professional self-interest in maintaining the quality of the 
Bench and on their special competency to assess which of their 
numbers are properly equipped for judicial office.
Failing to increase their influence under existing systems, 
the American Bar Association developed a new scheme, the 
Nonpartisan Court Plan; combining both elective and appointive 
features, this was designed specifically to give lawyers a 
crucial voice in choosing members of the bench. First adopted 
in Missouri in 194-0> the Plan is now in use in 18 states and
H). The Times, April 21st, 19
(2). P.A. Watson & R.G. Downing, The Politics of the Beiica
the Bar John Wiley (1969) pp. 329-30.
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under consideration in many others; recently it has been 
proposed for the selection of federal judges as well,' '
The modus operandi varies from state to state but the common 
aim is to minimise political influence, to promote professional 
standards and to provide some security of tenure while yet 
retaining an element of popular control.
( 2 )
The Missouri Plan,'  ^ the best known version, provides
for the constitution of a non-partisan, non-salaried board,
composed in equal numbers of lawyers appointed by the bar
association and laymen appointed by the governor; no
commissioner may hold public office nor an official position
in a political party. For each judicial vacancy the commission
recommend three candidates from whom the governor makes the
final choice. After a probationary period of at least one
year, the appointed judge must offer himself to the electorate
for a fall term of office, six years in the trial courts,
twelve in the appellate courts; he runs at the time of a
general election on a separate, unopposed ballot which asks
simply whether or not he should be retained in office. The
political parties have by and large made no effort to influence 
f ? \
the elections,' / and the system, combining "the democratic 
notion of accountability to the electorate with an intelligent 
method of selecting qualified candidates for judicial office", 
has many enthusiastic supporters.
A detailed empirical study carried out by Professors 
Watson and Downing of the University of Missouri, has shown, 
however, that many of the assumptions made about the state's
(1). Watson & Downing op. cit, pp. 329-30.
( 2 ) . Mayer op. cit.
Watson & Downing op. cit.
(3 ). Justice Sub-Committee, The Judiciary Stevens (1972).
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selection process by both proponents and opponents of the Plan
are erroneous. It is, they maintain, naive or misleading to
suggest, as many of the Plan's supporters do, that it has taken
the politics out of judicial selections:
"----  the Plan has not eliminated 'politics' as the
term is used in its broadest sense, that is, the 
manoeuvring of individuals and groups to influence 
who will be chosen as judges. Rather, it has 
changed the nature of that politics to include not 
only partisan forces but also those relating to the 
interests of the organised Bar, the judiciary, and 
the court's attentive publics. Nor has the Plan 
even eliminated partisan politics in judicial 
selection; vesting the final appointment power in 
the major political officer of the state is hardly 
calculated to have that result, particularly since 
state cliief executives often have been able to 
influence the choice of the three nominees as well
  The Plan has ---- taken the partisan aspects
of judicial selection out of the vortex of local 
political forces and leadership influence and 
projected them into the political world of the 
highest public official in the state." (1)
On the other hand it is agreed that the Plan has not 
meant that :
" the 'bluebeards' of the legal profession (the
large-firm lawyers representing the affluent and 
prestigious institutions in society) decide who will 
sit on the bench, as feared by many persons who 
attack the Plan. Instead the selection system, as it 
has evolved in practice, is a highly pluralistic one 
that reflects diverse interests; upper and lower 
status lawyers; a range of social and economic 
institutions; sitting members of the judiciary; and 
the factions and gubernatorial followings of state 
politics." (2)
but the consequence of the Plan on which lawyers were 
generally agreed is that it results in the appointment of 
'better' judges than are usually chosen under an elective 
system. In particular, the analysis demonstrated that the 
plan has tended to eliminate highly incompetent persons from 
the state judiciary.'^'
i). Watson & Downing op. cit. p. 332. 
2 j. ibid. p. 6.
3 ). ibid. Chap. 8.
217
Under the Plan, the continuance of each judge in office
is, in deference to the democratic ideology, dependent on the
approval of the general public; this feature of the selection
system has been strongly criticised on the grounds that the
participation of the voters is meaningless, that the elections
are in essence plebiscites similar to those that usually operate
( 1 )in authoritarian regimes.' ' Two Utah law professors have
described, "the plebiscite in which the voters are given a choice
between a definite proposal (Should X be retained as a judge?)
and an un-named alternative " as " the most familiar
( o)
window-dressing of despotism".'^' Supporters of the Plan
maintain that while it is true that most judges will automatically 
obtain an affirmative vote, the elections make it possible for 
an incompetent or corrupt judge to be removed from office by the 
voters. Since the inception of the system in Missouri, only 
one judge has ever been voted out of office and according to
Watson and Downing this took place "---- under highly unusual
circumstances posing larger issues than the case of the 
immediate individual involved. Under normal circumstances, a 
Plan judge has little to fear from the e l e c t o r a t e " . V i e w e d  
in this way, the elective component of the system appears as 
a mere gesture to democratic sentiment.
The Missouri Plan thus approaches what is apparently
emerging as the generally preferred formula for judicial 
selection, that is, executive appointment tempered by an 
influential advisory committee. This was also the method that 
Laski wanted to see applied to the English superior judiciary; 
recognising the preferability of selection by nomination over
1). Watson & Downing op. cit. p. 221.
2). Mayer op. cit. p. 503.
3). Watson & Downing op. cit. p. 345.
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election, but v/riting at a time when the powers of the
executive in making appointments were still being misused,
Laski proposed that appointments should be made by the executive
but only with the advice and consent of a standing committee
of the judiciary, selected by the judges themselves for say
three to five years. Appointments would still rest ultimately
with the Lord Chancellor or Prime Minister but "any suggested
person would be thoroughly criticised by a representative
( 1 'Icommittee of legal experts".' '
Some advocates of judicial participation have gone further 
than Laski, recommending that the judges should l_ave a decisive 
voice in the selection process. "The recruitment of judges" 
demanded one student of government, "should be entrusted to
the judiciary itself ---- There is a guarantee against
political interference and a presumption that judges may form
a competent opinion upon the candidate's scholarship and
( 2 j
character".'  ^ Such control would not, he believed, lead to 
judicial despotism; the possibility of misuse of this power 
could not in theory be excluded, but "if judges are the 
guardians of legality and good conscience then quis custodem 
custodians?"'^  The real danger in judicial control is of a 
more general and insidious nature; self-selective bodies have 
an inherent tendency towards conservatism and the particular 
ethos of the legal profession would undoubtedly accentuate this.
The present system of judicial selection in England, 
though still officially one of simple executive appointment, 
has in fact over the years evolved an informal advisory
(1). H.J. Laski, "The Technique of Judicial Appointment",
op. cit. p. 174.
(2). N. Bouropoulos, The Judicial Function in the Modern State,
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, L.S.S. (1949) p. 1C6.
(3). ibid. p. 114.
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approach. The Lord Chancellor as a member of the legal
profession must always have been influenced to a greater or
lesser extent by professional feeling on potential candidates
for the Bench, but, with the disappearance of the patronage
system, this influence appears to have become more
institutionalised. Abel-Smith and Stevens suggest that more
effective power over appointments has now passed to the Lord
Chancellor's Permanent secretary who consults the relevant judge
and perhaps a number of trusted contacts among practising
barristers; though according to one Permanent Secretary, "some
of the greatest judges seem to find it virtually impossible to
( 1 )speak ill of any candidate".' As Abel-Smith and Stevens go 
on to say, almost inevitably "some more formal advisory
committee procedure will soon be needed ----- Indeed the
customary processes of applications, references and testimonials
may all eventually have to be introduced in this field as in so
(2 )
many others".' '
A recent report by a Justice Sub-Committee recommends the
setting-up of a consultative committee to assist the Lord
Chancellor in appointing judges.
"The system would allow for interested bodies to 
make recommendations, or for interested persons to 
apply to the appointments committee. The appointments 
committee could comprise representatives of the Law 
Society, the Bar, academic lawyers and perhaps some 
lay members, e.g. highly trained and experienced 
personnel officers skilled in selection procedures.
The Committee could then make recommendations to the 
Lord Chancellor who could either accept or reject 
them. This would not prejudice the right of the 
Lord Chancellor to go outside the candidates 
recommended to him or indeed, if he so wished, to 
suggest names for consideration to the appointments 
committee, but he would be obliged to submit his 
own proposals to the Committee for their comments and 
could not, therefore, make appointments without
(1). B. Abel-Smith & R. Stevens, In Search of Justice Allen Lane
(1968) p. 372.
(2). ibid. p. 381.
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reference to them or without considering their 
views". (1)
The Sub-Committee admits, however, that the use of such 
a system would make very little difference to the sort of person 
appointed at High Court level.
It remains to consider the judicial career services of 
the Continent. Whereas in the Anglo-American legal system 
judges are chosen from the ranks of the legal profession, in 
most European countries the judges are members of a judicial 
branch of the civil service, specially trained and examined 
and quite separate from the advocates' profession. In France 
prospective judges must attend a four year course at the
( 2 )Centre Nationale d'Etudes Judiciaires' ' and initial entry into 
the service is dependent upon performance in competitive 
examinations. As a general rule promotions are made entirely 
within the service and a lawyer who chooses private practice 
usually abandons all thought of a judicial career, though it is 
not wholly impossible for an advocate to be appointed to the 
Bench and some eminent law professors do sit in the highest 
courts. The main argument in favour of such a system is that 
judges are selected and promoted on the basis of purely 
judicial abilities rather than skill in the field of advocacy.
For various reasons, however, the idea of a judicial 
career service has never been favourably received in this 
country. First, there is an increased chance of indiscipline 
in the lower courts because of the possibility that a young 
unsophisticated judge may find himself outwitted and intimidated 
by an older and more experienced advocate. This it has been
Justice Sub-Committee, The Judiciary Stevens (1972) pp. 30-31. 
Established in 1959.
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suggested, may partly account for the far greater incidence
of appeals in those countries where there is a judicial career
service. According to Professor E.J. Cohn, in Germany one-third
of all cases go on appeal and one-third of these go on further 
( 1 )appeal,'  ^ In England approximately two per cent, of the
5 0 ,0 0 0  civil oases heard each year in the High Court go on
appeal and of these only about 30 reach the House of Lords,
Secondly, although with a career system the method of initial
entry into the service limits the opportunities for political
patronage, judicial promotion within the career structure does
raise the possibility of improper influence. Lord Brougham
pointed to this danger almost a century and a half ago,
"Independence of the Bench must always be equivocal, 
if not nugatory, as long as the Grown exercises the 
power to promote judges. This looking up for 
promotion on the Bench as in the Church", he argued, 
"naturally tended to make men look up to their 
maker rather than to the public good." (2)
At one time in France the political advocates were a 
real force, capable of exerting a continuous and insidious 
pressure on the judges. This arose from the general political 
situation which, with only a very loose party system, has been 
described as "a perpetual game of squeeze played by the 
individual Deputy upon the Ministers in successive weak and 
short-lived G o v e r n m e n t s " , and from the fact that the most 
potent Deputies in Parliament are by profession usually 
advocates. Before the establishment of the Conseil Supérieur 
de la Magistrature, when judges were more dependent on the 
individual favour of the Minister of Justice, this allowed a 
possibility that their chances of promotion might depend
1). Justice Sub-Committee, The Judiciary, p. 26.
2 J. Hansard, 20th May, 1835.
3 ). R.C.K. Bnsor, Courts and Judges in Prance, Germany and
England O.U.P.TÎ933) P. 40.
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indirectly on some of the men who practised before them.
"Certain advocates", wrote Ensor in the thirties, "are widely
believed to be able to intimidate the judges whose promotion
may lie at their mercy". The belief may, he admitted, have
been exaggerated or even untrue. Nevertheless, some advocates
became fashionable, and hence prosperous, not because their
advocacy as such was outstanding but because they had a
'whip-hand* in politics and it became notorious that the judges
( 1 )dared not stand up to them.' ' The power, real or imagined,
of the political advocates has now been effectively curbed 
by the Conseil Supérieur. Yet however neutral the promoting 
body in party political terms, there remains the danger that 
a judge will through his decisions attempt to seek favour and 
appear 'safe'.
The experience of France indicates that where there is 
institutionalised promotion at all levels of the professional 
judiciary, some constitutional device may be necessary to 
ensure judicial independence. There are, however, two other 
factors to be considered; first, that the situation described 
above, derived as much from the political structure as from 
the legal institutions of the country; and second, that any 
latent weakness in the French judicial career system may be 
due not to the practice of promotion as such, but to the 
division between judges and legal practitioners. The 
fraternity of the Bar in England and the weight of professional 
opinion provide firm supports for judicial independence, though
( 2 )perhaps at the cost of breadth of social horizons.' ^
Nonetheless a hierarchical judicial career structure has never
1). Ensor op. cit. p. 41.
2). bee Chapter 11.
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commended itself to the English legal profession, having 
always been regarded as inimical to freedom from executive 
interference.
The judiciaries of the countries considered in this 
chapter, tJngland, France and America, have all over the past 
two or three decades achieved a greater degree of independence 
from the political machine. The extent of their success and 
the forms of judicial selection employed by these countries 
vary considerably; it is therefore difficult to postulate any 
simple correlation between freedom from political control and 
specific methods of appointment and advancement. Thus while 
the system of executive appointment which predominates in 
America has in comparison to its state elective systems 
achieved a relative freedom from political considerations, it 
is still some way from attaining the high degree of independence 
characteristic of the English judicial system. Nevertheless 
in general the facts suggest, and inost observers agree, that 
in a representative democracy the appointive system is 
preferable provided it is supported by security of tenure and 
that there is a genuine degree of judicial independence. Given 
the long histories of executive control over judicial selection 
in all the countries, it is not immediately clear why the 
exercise of patronage and judicial involvement in politics 
should have declined at all. In America and France advisory 
appointment committees v/hich operate as a check on executive 
powers have been established and a similar informal practice 
has developed in England; but such specific reform can only 
be a reflection of much wider changes, such as the rise of the 
professions as autonomous powers and the related decline of 
patronage in all fields. Similarly it is obvious that 
explanations for international variations must ultimately be
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sought in the general social structure, beyond the practical 
workings of the selection systems per se.
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"...,neloüra^Æ apart, the man of law lives on in our popular 
literature as a markeu conventional type, though a very 
crehitahle one. He varies little. He is learneu, if a little 
limited: dry, with a slightly comical precision: kindly and 
humane at neart, though on the surface unfeeling and disposed 
to hrowheat: more a man of affairs, than a man of tne worla.
Above all, he is a member of a caste: how should he not be, since 
he uelongs to a profession? hcnippeu and begcwned, wearing 
the habiliments of an almost forgotten age, he can still be 
proud enough of nia profession (and ^nme others respect it enough 
too) to maintain his costume as a uniform and not as a fancy 
dress. He can bandy Latin tags with his opponent or proffer 
them with submission to the judge as if they were somehow more 
pregnant with meaning than their mere English equivalent."
(Lord kadcliffe, * borne reflections on law and lawyers.*
C ampj ric!ge La\; Journa 1 Vo 1. 10. h o. 3 1350).
"Judges a m  the guardians of the gate of an ordered society: 
to them belong the sacred office of ensuring that the principles 
of right dealing according to law are pursued by private 
citinens towards each other, and towards the State, and, most 
crucial of all, by the State towards private citizens. They 
must administer justice *without fear or favour, affection org 
ill-will*. " ( H . d .  Hanbury, English Courts of Law, Û.U.P. 196c)
"The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do
not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by," .
"All their lives, forces which tney do not recognise and cannot 
name have been tugging at them - inherited instincts, traditional 
beliefs, acquired connections, and the resultant is an outlook 
Oh life, a conception of social needs, a sense in James' phrase 
of 'the total push and pressure of the cosmos'which when reasons 
are nicely balanced must determine where choice shall fall."
(B .h . G a rdo z o, The nature of the Judicial process : O.U.P. 1921)
"It is impossible to be a barrister without imagining oneself 
a judge, and Ducane's imagination had often taken this flight. 
However, and this was a/iotlier reason for Due an's ultimate 
disgust with life in the courts, tne whole situation of 'judging* 
was abhorrent to him. He had watched his judges closely, and 
had come to the conclusion that no human being is worthy to be 
a judge. In theory, the judge represents simply the majesty and 
impartiality of the law whose instrument he is. In practice, 
because of the imprecision of law and the imperfection of man, 
the judge enjoys a considerable area of quite personal power 
which he may or may not exercise wisely. Ducanés rational mind 
knew that there had to be law and courts, and that English law 
was on the whole good law and English judges good judges. But 
he detested that confrontation between the prisoner in the dock 
and the judge, dressed so like a king or a pope, seated above 
him. His irrational heart, perceptive of the pride of judges, 
sickened him and said it should not be thus; and said it the more 
passionately since there was that in Ducane which wanted to be a 
judge." (iris Murdoch, The Nice and the Good, Penguin)
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"A popular judge is a deformed tiling and 
plaudits are fitter for players than 
magistrates". - Erancis Bacon.
"All hail, great JudgeI 
To your bright rays 
,e never grudge ( 1 )Ecstatic nraise."\ ^
Chapter 10.
Judicial dtatus and Public Opinion
The anonymous wig that lends to all an air of venerable 
wisdom, the splendid isolation and imposing height of the bench 
itself, the deference of counsel and the hushed tones of those 
less accustomed to the courtly ritual make it difficult to
think of these, the 'guardians of an ordered society', the law
(2 )and the crown,' ' without some feelings of awe. The British
judiciary enjoy a dignity and prestige unknown to that of any
other Bench in the world, and with some reason. Few would
differ from Lord doodman when he said,
"I believe, and am proud to say, having travelled 
widely and seen courts in many parts of the world, 
that there are few countries, if any, which can 
find judges of the quality, of the learning and the 
integrity that we are happy to possess". (3)
The international reputation of the judiciary as the
epitome of impartiality and incorruptibility is rarely
questioned.
"In no country in the world does the judicial office 
stand in higher popular regard than in England.
Jere a malicious critic of our institutions to hint 
that the fountain of justice is impure, that an 
English judge is capable of accepting a bribe, or 
being turned aside from pursuing his rightful path 
by executive pressure or favour, he would be
(1). Chorus in Trial by Jury, Gilbert & Bullivan.
(2). The judiciary are, when the Queen's health is proposed at 
any function, permitted to remain seated.
(3). Hansard, House of Lords, 29th January, I9 6 8, Vol. 288,
col. 6i6.
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overwhelmed by public execration and riddled by the 
more effectual shafts of public ridicule. Through 
centuries of service our judges have come to be 
associated with all that is finest in our national 
life". (1)
It is not surprising that the record of actual attempts to
pervert the course of justice via the judges has remained blank
for well over a century; the last reported instance was in 1832,
when a defendant in an action before Mr. Justice Alderson of
the Common Pleas sent that judge a ten pound note together with
a statement of his case. The defendant esc^ed prosecution
on the grounds that the offence was the result ’rather of
( 2 )ignorance than of crime'.  ^ * Today, writes C.H. kolph, an acute 
and none too sympathetic commentator on judicial ways, an 
attempt to bribe a judge is the one crime about which it can 
be said with perfect certainty that a psychiatric examination 
of the accused would be endorsed.
For those who require a step by step account of the 
development of judicial incorruptibility, Henry Cecil, himself 
a judge of the County Courts, has produced a highly readable 
work, entitled 'Tipping the Scales'. It is impossible, he says, 
to determine precisely when the tradition was established. The 
last English judge to be charged with bribery was convicted 
nearly 35O years ago, but this obviously cannot be accepted as 
the last instance of the offence; and certainly other types of 
corruption, such as deciding cases in accordance with the 
Sovereign's wishes persisted for much longer, so that as late as 
1775 Dr. Johnson wrote that a judge might become corrupt and
(1). H.G-. Hanbury, English Courts of Law, O.U.P., 3rd ed. (196O),
p. 7o
2). H. Cecil, Tipping the Scales, Hutchinson (l96h), p. 17.
3). Ibid. p. 9.
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yet there be no legal evidence against him. But Cecil 
considers that it is probably safe to mark out the beginning of 
the nineteenth century as the point in time by which the pattern 
of incorruptibility was firmly set; "undoubtedly, as even 
those who are on other counts no friends of the English judges 
will be prepared to admit, the tradition of complete judicial 
immunity to the taking of bribes has certainly been established
( 4 \
for very many years'.^ '
Other countries have not been so fortunate in the 
integrity of their judiciary. In 1962 a judge of the New York 
vBtate Supreme Court was convicted of bribery and sentenced to 
two years imprisonment. The following year another New York 
judge was asked to resign after refusing to give evidence in 
a case relating to alleged corruption.'  ^ As recently as May 
1969 Associate Justice Abe Portas of the Supreme Court was 
obliged to resign his post under threat of impeachment proceeds 
ings.^^' Mr. Portas, an old friend of former President Johnson, 
who tried unsuccessfully to appoint him Chief Justice, was 
accused of receiving, though later returning, a fee of
020,000 from the family foundation of Mr. Louis Wolfson, now 
serving a prison sentence for a stock manipulation offence.
Not a whisper of such scandal disturbs the Gothic calm of 
the English courts but no Bench, however honourable, is innocent 
of fault; and perversely, it is the very esteem in which the 
judges are held and the certainty of their own uprightness 
which has been a source of judicial weakness.
1). Cecil, op. cit. p. 15.
2). Ibid., p. Id.
Impeachment proceedings have not been brought against a 
member of the United States Supreme Court since I8O5 when 
an attempt to unseat Samuel Chase for alleged partiality 
against the Jeffersonian cause was unsuccessful.
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"So high is the standard of judicial probity and 
morality that there is a danger that the nature of 
the judicial function may be misunderstood", writes 
Hanbury. "By a paraphrase of Palstaff, judges are 
moral, but they are not the reason why morals exist 
in other men. In a word their function is the /
enunciation and enforcement of law, not of morality".' ^
But the judges do often appear to see themselves as 
ruardians of the nation's moral conscience, issuing regular
pronouncements from the Bench on marital relations, sexual
morality and literary f r e e d o m . " T o  be the guardians of 
other people's morals" commented Mr. Justice McKenna, "comes
easily to men over sixty and to some even y o u n g e r " . T h e
judicial office endows these expressions of personal opinion
with an unwarranted authority and the public are inclined to
attribute to the judges a wisdom about non-legal matters which
they do not necessarily p o s s e s s . T h i s  attitude has
undoubtedly been fostered by successive governments' employment
of judges under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921
to investigate issues of all kinds, but often ones of a
scandalous nature in which politics, security and morality are
closely mingled.
"in 1936 Mr. Justice Porter probed much-publicised 
allegations into a Budget 'leak', with the result 
that an indiscreet Cabinet Minister, J.H. Thomas, 
retired from public life. In 1948 a tribunal under 
Mr. Justice Lynskey uncovered, at great trouble and 
expense, the operations of the middle man, Sidney / 
Stanley, who had wormed his way into Westminster."' ^
1). Hanbury, op. cit., p. 7.
2). In fairness, the role of moral decision-makers is sometimes 
thrust upon the judges by legislation, e.g. the Obscene 
Publications Act 196I.
(3). B. McKenna, "The Judge and the Common Man", Modern Law
Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 6 (November 19^9)> 
pi 606.
(4). The Law Lords in their legislative capacity, valuable as is 
their contribution to the Upper House, often demonstrate
a preoccupation with the moral implication of law reform, 
participating most frequently in the stormy debates on such 
issues as the abolition of the death penalty and the 
relaxation of abortion law. (g . Drewry & J. Morgan, "Law 
Lords as Legislators", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XXXII,
No. 3 (1969).)
(5 ). E.S. Turner, May It Please Your Lordship. Michael Joseph (1971)
p. 237.
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In 1963, a year after Lora Radcliffe's investigation of the 
Vassall affair, Lord. Denning headed an enquiry into the equally 
famous Profumo-Ward episode. The ensuing report was an instant 
best seller; but there were some who thought the investigation 
foolish,
"Since when," asked Jo Grimond, the leader of the 
Liberal Party, "have the people of tnis country had 
to call in a High Court judge, however eminent, in 
order to carry out a roving commission in the 
private lives of various individuals, so that we 
may be informed whether we are behaving ourselves 
or not? Can you contemplate Hr. Gladstone 
requiring advice on this subject? Disraeli would 
have laughed himself silly ----". (I)
The involvement of Her Majesty's judges in quasi-judicial
inquiries of this nature has not, it may also be said, met with
the universal approval of the judges themselves. Gome would
sooner see the judicial "charisma" preserved for purely court
purposes, and fear it may be frittered away if judges are
turned into trouble-shooters for the other uranches of
( a)
government, apart from any inroads maue on their valuable time.'^/
There is certainly evidence of a growing tendency to use 
the judges as Chairmen of Tribunals and ad hoc enquiries to
investigate matters of a politically contentious or embarrassing
(nature.' / But public respect for judicial wisdom and integrity 
is not a blank cheque to be drawn on indefinitely and there must 
be some disquiet lest this practise jeopardise the very reputation 
for judicial impartiality it seeks to employ.
There is on the other hand, evidence that the 
judicial role as Royal Commissioners is a declining one.
According to W.L. Guttsman, 5 of the 16 Royal Commissions 
set up between 1944 and I963 were presided over by High 
Court Judges; but 7 of the remining 11 were chaired by
(1). Turner, op. cit., p. 237.
(2). G. Sawer, Law in Society, Oxford, Clarendon (l9o5).
(3). e.g. Lord Wldgery's enquiry into the events of 'Bloody Sunday^;
the Wilberforce report on the 1972 miners' dispute. See further 
G. Drewry, : The Judge as Political Anodyne: DLJ 1974.
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/  1 't
academics, whose power on these oodles nas steadily increased.' ' 
It may he argued, though, that the energies of the legal 
profession, in the nineteenth century an essential component of 
all Royal Commissions, are now more specifically and more 
appropriately reserved for the work of the permanent and 
influential Law Commission and Law Reform Committee.
During the Victorian era the judiciary enjoyed a position 
of power and fame equalled by few of their successors, 
participating quite openly in the political arena and 
enthusiastically performing their creative law-making role in
(2)the courts.' ' Throughout the years of reforming legislation, 
politics and law were inextricably linked in the public mind, 
and the status and authority of the judges was equalled only by 
that of the Cabinet. But the turn of the century witnessed both 
a decline in the popularity of the judiciary and a weakening of 
their importance within the constitution.
Respect for the Bench and the law it administered was 
undermined by the violent personal attacks to which individual 
judges were subjected; particularly bitter criticism was 
aroused by some of Lord Halsbury's more unfortunate appointments.
'#hen Mr. Justice Ridley was appointed to the queen's Bench 
Division in 1897» the Law Journal commented, "The appointment 
can be defended on no ground whatsoever. It would be easy to 
name fifty members of the Bar with a better c l a i m . O f  
another of his appointments in I89O the Law Times wrote, "This
(1). J.L, Guttsman, The British Political Elite, MacGibbon & Kee 
, , (T9Ô3), p. 337.
(2). Though they still payed lip-service to the idea that their 
task was to "find" rather than "make" law.
"As long as we have to administer the law we must do so 
according to the law as it is. We are not here to make the 
law." - Lord Coleridge CJ. Reg, v. Solomons (I8 9 0) 17 Cox,
GC. 9 3.
"Our duty is simply to administer the law as we find it," - 
Grove J. dcattock v. Hartson (l873) L.R. I Com. PI. 109.
3 ). Bee Chapter 7.
4). Cited in H. Cecil, op. cit., p. 191.
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is a bad appointment. Mr. Lawrance has no reputation as a
lawyer and has rarely been seen in recent years in the Royal
Courts of Justice." According to Henry Cecil, Mr. Justice
Lawrance'8 "greatest distinction was to reserve judgment in a
difficult and important commercial case and when - after
months - it v/as hinted to him that the parties would like to
know the result, he came into court, and without giving any
( l'ïreasons at all, gave judgment for the plaintiff."' ' It is 
said that Lawrence's ineptitude prompted the creation of the 
Commercial List. Mr. Justice Grantham was yet another whose 
capacity was not equal to his appointment and whose main 
function often seemed to lie in keeping the Court of Appeal 
supplied with work. A former M.P., and still an ardent Tory, 
Grantham was at one time in serious danger of losing his seat 
on the Bench as a result of apparently biased decisions in the 
hearing of election petitions.' ' These three together with 
Mr. Justice Darling (a judge who was strikingly caricatured 
in Max Beerbohm's cartoon of him passing the black cap to the 
usher and telling him to have bells sewn on it) placed a 
severe strain on the reputation of the Bench. "The public and 
the legal profession had to endure their inadequacies and
injustices for a long period of years ---- Much money and
much time must have been wasted as a result of their defects, 
and many litigants must have suffered considerably in mind and 
estate as a result of their bad judgements.
1). Cecil, op, cit. p. 193.
2). The judiciary as a whole had never welcomed this task which 
had been thrust upon them by Parliament in 1868. The Lord 
Chief Justice, Sir Alexander Cockburn, had warned "that 
the inevitable consequences of putting judges to try 
election petitions will be to lower and degrade the 
judicial office, and to destroy or at all events materially 
impair the confidence of the public in the thoroughgoing
impartiality and inflexible integrity of the judges ----".
(e .g . Rowlands, Seventy-two Years at the Bar, Macmillan(1924).).
(3). Cecil, op. cit., p. 24.
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Confidence in the judges was impaired too by their 
apparently hostile reaction to the increasing amount of statutory 
legislation on collective issues such as housing and conditions 
of employment; because of their highly individualistic, common 
law orientation, and their lack of experience in the spheres 
to which the legislation applied, the intention of such 
statutes was often wholly distorted by judicial interpretation.
The relationship between the judiciary and organised labour had 
never been a happy one; it was not assisted by the famous Taff
( 1 JVale decision' ' of the House of Lords in 1901 which temporarily
revoked the right of peaceful persuasion precariously held by
the unions since 1859. This decision, wrote Lord Evershed,
"---- was the last episode in what had come to be
regarded by trade unions and their supporters as a 
judicial attack on the workmen's right to combine 
for their own protection and in their own economic 
interests. There is no doubt that the earlier 
legislation regulating trade unions had left scope 
for the invocation and application of the old common 
law relating to conspiracy both civil and criminal, 
and that the courts had taken full advantage of the 
opening given to them. It may perhaps also be that 
conspiracy was a field offering full scope for uhe 
exercise by a judge, consciously or unconsciously of 
individual bias." (2)
But in spite of, perhaps because of, the evasive and 
obstructive attitude of many judges, the growth of social 
legislation persisted; and this, together with the removal of 
many quasi-judicial decisions on community issues to special 
tribunals staffed with experts and the failure of the legal 
world to adapt itself to modern commercial life, led the 
judiciary to play an increasingly narrow role v/itiiin society.
The tendency for che judiciary to be divorced from political
(1). Taff Vale Railway Co. -v- Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants /1901/ AC 426.
(2). Lord Evershed, ''The Judicial Process in Twentieth Century
England", Columbia Law Review, Vol. LXI, No. ,15. 
(May 196 ) p. 773.
The establishment of the Industrial Relations Court under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 has revived much of the old 
antipathy between the Courts and organised labour.
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and emotional issues was matched by the increasingly 'apolitical*
composition of the bench; judges were no longer typically
( 1 )Westminster men.' ' Removed from many areas of competence and 
faced with a growing interest in the complexities of decision­
making, the courts reacted by withdrawing even further from 
the field of overtly creative law-making, and adopting a non- 
critical attitude in regard to administrative actions; denying 
their discretionary functions, they assumed an apparently 
passive mechanistic role.
"By 1932," writes Professor Robert Btevens, "only 
Lord Russell of Killowen was not an advocate of 
judicial restraint where social legislation was 
involved; and that brilliant trio of judges - 
Macmillan, Atkin and bright - steered the House 
away from the dangers of giving decisions in the 
field of public law which might appear to interfere 
with the policies of a democratically elected 
government." (2)
This judicial pose reached its climax during the post-war 
period, encouraged by Mr. Bevan's statement that the Labour 
government would tolerate no'judicial sabotage' of its 
legislation."Sometimes", comments J.A.G. Griffiths, "they 
seemed to be leaning over backwards almost to the point of 
falling off the Bench to avoid the appearance of hostility".
He suggests, however, that the judges might have been in some 
ways trying to show the electorate precisely what they had got, 
sometimes enforcing the letter of the law rigidly even in the 
face of the dictates of justice.'^'
That the post-war social legislation was not obstructed by 
the judges, as it had been previously, is explained by Judith
1). See Chapter ?•
2). "The Role of a Final Appeal Court in a Democracy. The House
of Lords Today", 28, Modern Law Review,(1965), 
p. 31 6.
(3). Ibid., p. 5 1 8, quoting Pari. Debs., Vol. 754, col. 1762
(May 3rd, 1946).
(4)> J.A.G. Griffith, "The Law of Property", M. Ginsberg ed. Law
and Opinion in England in the Twentieth Century
Stevens (1959), p. 120. ~
(5)0 e.g. Smith -v- East Elloe R.D.C. /J95§/ xG 736.
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Bhklar in terms of the general consensus that supported reforms
( 1 )particularly in the first years after the war.' ' Althougn Lhe 
judges are often accused of exceptional conservatism, the limits 
to judicial adaptation and adjustment are, she says, to be found 
within the wider society. Thus the number of judges who appear 
'socially oriented' has increased as society as a whole has 
become more aware of its social obligations.
The declared judicial doctrine of 'decision inevitability', 
though in practice far from realistic, succeeded at least in
heightening the respect in which the judges were held.
(o')
Criticisms were replaced by reverential eulogy.'  ^ Her Majesty's
judges, said 8ir Rupert de la here. Lord Mayor for 1953, have
a greater understanding of human nature than any other body of
men in the world.' ' Even radical critics, though quick to
point out the defects inherent in the judges' interpretative
function, rarely questioned the basic integrity or competence
of any post-war judges. They were considered more fair-minded,
more courteous and more 'judicial' than any of their predecessors.
One lawyer described them as
" mucn quieter and nicer than they were. Drunk
judges, sadistic judges, rude judges or judges it 
was sheer agony to appear before have died away; 
and the spate of recent appointments seems to have 
produced a character v/ho bears most resemblance to 
a sensible and charming headmaster at a quite 
tolerable public school." (4)
If it seemed, however, that the respected position of the 
twentieth century judge had been achieved only at a loss of 
real judicial power within modern society, this was largely
(l). J. Shklar, Legalism, Camb. Mass., Harvard Univ. Press (1964)
p. 10.
2). Though see above p. 238
3). Quoted in B. Abel-Gmith and R. Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts,
Heinemann (1967), p. 290.
(4). Sunday Times Magazine (l9th May, 1963), article by John
Mortimer,
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refuted when in the late fifties, the judges showed themselves
once again willing to recognise their creative function. The 
most outspoken of the appeal judges in demanding judicial
( a )creativity has been Lord Denning.' ^
"he do not sit nere to pull the language of Parliament 
and of Ministers to pieces and make nonsense of it.
That is an easy thing to do, and it is a thing to 
which lawyers are too often prone. ./e sit here to
find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers 
to carry it out, and we do this better by filling in 
the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by 
opening it up to destructive analysis." (2)
Lord Radcliffe had a similar approach.
"There was never a more sterile controversy than 
that upon the question whether a judge makes law.
Of course he does. How can he help it? ----
Judicial law is always a reinterpretation of 
principles in the light of new combinations of facts, 
of which very relevant ones, unprovable by evidence, 
are the current beliefs of the society in which 
those facts occur. True, judges do not reverse 
principles, once well established, but they do 
modify them, extend them, restrict them and even /
deny their application to the combination in hand.
There have been critics of this new stance, particularly 
when, as with Denning, the legalistic approach is disregarded 
in so flagrant a manner; when, it seems, he is increasingly 
indifferent to giving even the appearance of dispensing law as 
distinct from p o l i c y . H u g o  Young's recent profile of the 
judge quotes one senior lawyer's opinion of Denning's judgments,
"Of course an appeal judge has to operate policy.
We all know that. But it should be couched in 
orthodox language. Otherwise people begin to lose 
confidence in lav/ as law." (5)
But though the revival of overt judicial creativity
i), Abel-Smith & btevens, op. cit., p. 298.
2}. Magor & St. Mêlions R.D.C -v- Newport Corporation /T9507
2 All E.R. 1226, 1236-'c ;a’.------  ------- --------
(3). Viscount Radcliffe, Not in Feather Beds, Hamish Hamilton
(1968), p. 215.
4). See below p».252
Sunday Times (June 17th/24th, 1973).
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inevitably aroused some objections, there has, in general,
(i)been approval for the work of those appeal judges' ' who by 
taking social and economic conditions into consideration, have 
given to the courts a new relevance and significance.
If during the past decade there has been any doubt of the 
acknowledged superiority of 'British justice' or the quality 
of the individual judges, it has been directed at the courts' 
handling of criminal matters; criticism has centred round a 
handful of hignly publicised and sensational cases, some of them 
involving other sectors of the establishment. Feelings ran 
particularly high throughout the imbroglio of the infamous 
'Profumo affair'. In September 1963, the Observer editorial 
read,
"The public's hitherto almost unquestioning faith 
in the integrity and independence of Britain's 
judges could yet become one of the incidental 
casualties of the Profumo affair. The widespread, 
if vague feelings of disquiet at the role played 
by the courts in a number of recent cases has now 
found expression in the Labour Party's decision 
to make a political issue of the relationship 
between the Government and the judiciary." (2 )
The main criticism arose out of the secrecy which
surrounded the case of 'Lucky' Gordon before the Court of 
A p p e a l ; i t  was suggested that the judges involved were 
'persuaded' by the Establishment not to disclose certain 
information which might have damaged the Crown’s case against 
Stephen Ward. The allegation was groundless, the court had 
acted entirely within its powers; but in the moral furore 
surrounding the whole affair few of those involved, however
Most notably Lords Reid, Radcliffe, Devlin and Denning. 
Observer (September 15th, I9 6 3).
The appeal was allowed without revealing the contents of 
certain tape-recordings heard and other statements before 
the court.
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tenuous or innocent the connection, escaped the puulic pilloryq
Any concern about the standard of justice during the past
decade, though 'Profumo* and similar cases provided the fuel,
probably derived less from any particular failings of the courts,
than from a generally critical attitude towards the whole
'establishment'; an attitude characterised by a socio-journalistic
preoccupation with the 'hidden power-structure'. The criticisms
were not always consistent so that those who spoke of 'improper
influence' in one breath and 'power elites' in another sometimes
failed to realise that where there is a ruling class or power
elite, albeit a diffuse one, active influence is largely
superfluous since the prejudices and ideals of its component
groups will largely coincide. "The fact is that the judges, on
the whole free of positive political attitudes, think on the
("1 ^same wave-length as the governors".' ' Particularly when a 
Tory government is in power, any similarity in the origins and 
interests of the judiciary and the executive, will be accentuated
by the innate conservatism of the legal profession.
It is dangerous, however, to overstate the affinity between 
'legal' and 'political' conservatism. This point is taken up 
in the following, and final, chapter which considers in more 
detail the perennial question of 'class justice' and the 
significance of the judges' professional socialisation.
(l). L, Blom-Cooper, "Essays in Law Reform: the Judiciary in an
Era of Law Reform", Political Quarterly,
Vol. XXXVII, No. 4 (1966), p. 380.
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"Every profession is a conspiracy against the laity"
George Bernard Shaw.
Chapter 11.
Class Justice and Judicial Isolation
Though in the past the Bench has been less exclusive than 
other elites, the social and educational backgrounds of the 
judiciary have never to any extent reflected the social and 
educational composition of the population as a whole. The 
socially biased recruitment of all elite groups has invariably 
been regarded in a critical light, not only with regret that 
the egalitarian ideal remains unfulfilled, but also with an 
implication that the performance of the group's proper function 
is thereby vitiated. Thus defects in the judges’ interpretation 
of early social legislation have usually been seen purely in 
terms of class conflict. In 1911 Winston Churchill speaking in 
the House of Commons on the Trade Unions (no.2) Bill said:
"The Courts hold justly a high, and I think, unequalled 
prominence in the respect of the world in criminal cases, 
and in civil cases between man and man no doubt they 
deserve and command the respect and admiration of all 
classes of the community, but where class issues are 
involved, it is impossible to pretend that the courts 
command the same degree of general confidence".(l)
Similarly Laski, while he never questioned the professional 
integrity of the judges, believed that their socio-economic 
backgrounds prevented their acquiring a proper understanding 
of economic and social conditions in society as a whole. "The 
decision of the House of Lords in the Taff Vale Case" he wrote,
(1). Pari. Debs. (H.L.)
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"v/as an obvious decision from men v/ho had no experience of
(^)
the conditions under which trade unions must work '
Others have seen, and still see, the quality of justice
to be strained on a moie everyday level. The narrow social 
background of the judges creates, it is said, a ’cultural gap’, 
an obstacle to the proper understanding of those who appear 
before them, whose values, motivations and speech, will often 
be quite alien to the wellmeaning dispensers of law, A recent 
report on the judiciary states:
"With few exceptions judges have had no opportunity 
to acquire first-hand knowledge of the problems of 
poverty or of the different pressures, loyalties and 
social values that operate in a strata of society other
than their own.......A person’s conduct in the witness
box, which may not affect the issues being tried, may 
effectively discredit his value as a witness. When 
cross-examined he may feel inferior and become anxious 
and confused. Without any intention of deceiving the 
court, he may give the answer which he thinks is required 
of him and may feel that he has to deny behaviour to 
which a person with more confidence would quite happily 
admit. Some judges not only fail to understand this 
and thus make unfair critical comments, but they also 
tend to expect unrealistic standards of common sense 
and behaviour, particularly from witnesses whose social 
background differs from their own".(2)
It is suggested too that there will be a tendency for the 
judges to attach more mght to evidence given by ’their own kind’ 
than by those of other social groups. One great judge. Lord 
Justice Scrutton saw this difficulty clearly; writing of the 
need for impartiality, he stated:
"This is rather difficult to attain in any system,
I am not speaking of conscious partiality; but the 
habits you are trained in, the people with whom you mix,
(1). H.J. Laski
(2). JUSTICE Sub-Committee, The Judiciary. Stevens, (l972)p.33.
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lead to your having a certain class of ideas of such 
a nature that whan you have to deal with other ideas, 
you do not give as sound and accurate a judgement
you would wish -----  It is very difficult sometimes
to he sure that you have put yourself into a thoroughly 
impartial position between two disputants, one of your 
own class and one not of your own class".(1)
Social origins must induce some bias in judges as in other 
men;' ' but the relationship between socio-economic background
and social political outlook is never simple. Thus were the social
f 3)
base of the Bench extended by some m e a n s , it is auestionæle 
how far there would be a corresponding change in the overall
judicial orientation. It is unfortunate in this respect that the
effects of social mobility on behaviour patterns and values, 
or more particularly the phenomenon of status discrepancy, have 
not yet been the subject of comprehensive study; the only 
available material is contradictory. Investigators of America’s 
’radical right’ have, according to Seymour Lipset, suggested that 
some of the newly-rich react to the strains inherent in their
position by becoming even more conservative than the old rich and
display a tendency to adopt the values and behaviour pattern of 
the status group above t h e m . In the same way, few of the 
nineteenth century judiciary and leading members of the Bar could 
be described as ’progressive’, though many of them were of miidls 
class rather than upper class origins; they were on the contrary 
some of the staunchest of ’establishment’ supporters. On the other 
hand, similar status discrepancies have also been used to 
account for liberal tendencies.
"Thus", writes Lipset, "it has been suggested that the 
nouveaux riches have responded frequently to the experience 
of having wealth without the corresponding high status 
by giving support to leftist or egalitarian movements
1). 1 Cambridge Law Journal p.8.
2). In all men - some social observers appear to regard such bias 
as an upper-class prerogative.
3). By the appointment of solicitors, for example. See below
4). 8.M. Lipset, Revolution and Counterrevolution. Heinemann,
(1969) pp.167-69.
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that challenge the legitimacy of the traditional basis 
of social status .... this thesis has been advanced to 
account for the ....leftism of relatively well-to-do 
Jews in various countries".( 1 )
All forms of incompatibility in stratification have been 
used to explain entirely opposits socio-political reactions; and 
all seem equally valid. Lipset does indicate, however, that 
though thre may be other contrary factors, there is in general 
a tendency for individuals to take over the behaviour patterns 
of higher social classes - "a conservative bias inherent in 
stratification". 'This argument can be over-stated; the possible 
effects of a change in the social composition of the Bench cannot 
be entirely discounted. Nevertheless, the revolution might not 
be so radical as some critics of the present system prophesy.
The ascription of simple class-specific values to the judiciary 
is further confused by the importance of their professional 
orientation. The seeds of separateness may be sown by an 
upper-class family milieu and a public-school education but 
members of the legal profession are their cultivators par 
excellence. Any ’bias* or ’gap’ usually attributed to the narrow 
class background of the judges may equally well stem from their 
legal training and experiences and from the very essence of the 
law itself.
Professional Isolation.
Many lawyers believe it essential to their function to maintain 
a degree of separateness from the community at large. This
attitude has been expressed in extreme form by an eminent
(1). Lipset op.cit;
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Australian judge.
"At the very outset of his career", stated the judge, 
"during his education, a barrister is supposed to be 
trained to be apart from the whole community with 
a view to induce feelings of independence and a 
knowledge of the principles upon which that independence 
exist. A barrister is kept aloof from all classes, 
in order that he may be trained to dissociate himself 
from the every day life of the public, as constituting 
in due time a part of his education for a judge, 
because, as I take it, that quality of independence both 
in a barrister and a judge, is a matter of education, 
just as the attainment of knowledge is. He must 
absolutely ignore all the community and know no man.
That is a thing that cannot easily be done unless a 
man is trained to that particular direction".(1)
Yet it is probably this isolation, this detachment from
the contemporary world which has inspired the most criticism
of the senior branch of the legal profession as a v/hole and
of the judges in particular; and ironically active disapproval
bus if anything tended to nourish the fraternity’s introversion.
J.B, Priestley in a vitriolic hew Statesman article observed
"I have met in my time a few pleasant and lively 
wig and robe men. But even the best of them, well 
away from their courts, have never quite seemed to 
be real contemporaries, honest-to-God neighbours, and 
I have never felt tney were really with the rest of 
us. There has always been something anachronistic 
about them. I find it hard to believe they own 
cars and refrigerators and take their wives to see 
a film. Even at dinner table, doing their best to 
keep the talk going, they seem to exist in a queer 
atmosphere of their own. And I suspect that it is 
this atmosphere, as well as their whacking great fees 
and costs, that makes most of us dread any litigation.
V/e feel it would be like trying to explain ourselves to 
another time, another planet".(2)
The introversion of Bar and Bench might arouse adverse 
comment but it should occasion no surprise; the life pattern of 
the English lawyer provides a better blueprint for group
(1). Lord Wilberforce, "Educating the Judges", Journal of the 
Society of Public Teachers of Law. (Dec 19^9) Vol.X. No.4.
P. 254.
(2). J.B, Priestley,"Wigs and Robes". New Statesman (17 Aug.1962)
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( 1 )solidarity than social engineer could devise.' ' First 
the ethos they share with all professions:
"From the earliest times" observed that eminent lawyer, 
Lord MacMillan, "the practioners of a particular art 
have always shown a tendency to draw apart from the 
rest of the community and to constitute themselves a 
separate class or fraternity, with their own ceremonial 
rites and shibboleths".(2)
The foundations and extent of this professional esprit 
de corps was analysed in w.J. Goode’s article ’Community within 
a Community’."Charac t e r i s t i c  of each of the established 
professions" he wrote, "and a goal of each aspiring occupation, 
is the ’community of a profession’." Each profession is 
distinguished as a community by the following characteristics.
1. Its members are bound by a sense of identity.
2. Once in it, fev/ leave, so that it is a terminal or continuing
status for the most part.
3. Its members share values in common.
4. Its role definitions vis-a-vis both members and non-members 
are agreed upon and are the same for all members.
5. Within the areas of communal action, there is a communal 
language which is understood only partially by outsiders.
6. The community has power over its members.
7. Its limits are reasonably clear, though they are not physical
and geographical but social.
(1). In contrast, the American legal profession is far more 
heterogeneous. "In the United States the socialisation 
of lawyers shows considerable variation, and this 
heterogeneity is tied with the societal class structure
on the one hand and the internal stratification of the bar
on the other. Ethnic origin and class background are
varied and show a high correlation with length and quality
of pre-law schooling, type and quality of legal education,
the incidence of non-legal jobs as part of the work career,
and finally, the type and status of legal practise".
La.. Eueachemeyer, ’Lawyers and Doctors: A Comparison of 
Two%ofes8ioni^. Sociology of Law: ed. Vilhelm Aubert. -
(2) Lord MacMillan, Law and Other Things.Cambridge.(l9lB)D.2LH.
(3) Am. 800. Rev. Vol XXII (1957) pp.194-200
*Pengulxi (1969)p. 275.
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8. Though it does not produce the next generation biologically, 
it does so socially through its control over the selection 
of professional trainees, and through its training processes 
it sends these recruits through an adult socialisation 
process.
Of course, professions vary in the degree to whêh they
are communities, and, though most have neither a physical locus
nor extensive blood relationships between the generations, there
are exceptions. Thus, in her study of the Scottish Faculty
of Advocates, Nan Uilson points out that the advocates do actually
operate within specific geographical limits, both working and
living in an area of Edinburgh which covers only about one 
/1
square mile.'  ^ Further, since there is no heavy in-migration 
into the group, the founding fathers are often linked by blood 
with the present generation. These additional factors make the 
Faculty of Advocates far more of a closed community than most 
professions.
The same features are present, though to a lesser extent, 
in the English legal system. Though not wholly confined to 
a single geographical area, the senior branch of the profession 
finds in that area of the metropolis which contains the Inns 
of Court and the Royal Courts of Justice a distinct physical, 
and ’spiritual’, focus; most members of the profession spend
their whole working lives within this centre and all spend part of 
either their training" or practice t h e r e . O n  the other hand 
the importance of the ’provincial’ Bar and the sheer size of the
(1). Nan Wilson, The Sociology of a Profession : The Faculty of 
Advocates. Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis, Edinburgh (1965) p.137.
(2), 75% of all English barristers, including all Q.C’s have 
chambers in London.
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English Bar as a whole make it impossible for barris ters to 
interact socially on the snme scale as their Scottish 
counterparts. Yet the English Bar, still small in comparison 
with other professions, is undoubtedly highly centralised 
and socially concentrated. The members of Bar and Bench are 
also distinguished, as we have already seen, by a consistently 
high degree of self-recruitment within their numbers; family 
connections accentuate traditional professional solidarity.
The Inns of Court
The Inns of Court, like the public schools and the 
Oxbridge colleges, are noted for their tendency to foster 
’in-group’ feelings. Typical of the sentiment aroused in 
lawyers by the Inns is Lord Birkenhead’s statement that,
"A Grays Inn man is better than any other man and no damned 
nonsense about other things being equal".' ^
The origins of the Inns are not clear. It is fairly certain, 
though, that there were apprentices of the law in the days of
Edward I (1272-130?) and it is in connection with them that the
’Inns’ or ’hospicia’ are first heard of. Judges and serjeants,
like others whose work brought them to London, usually had
town houses, but the apprentices understandably found it
convenient to live in groups. According to the Pension Book
of Grays Inn,
"The earliest hospicies.... most likely originated, 
as did the halls at Oxford, in the hire of a house 
by a party of students who, at the requirement of
(1). T.H.J. Bishop, in collaboration with R. 7/ilkinson,
Winchester and the Public School Elits : A Statistical 
Analysis. Faber & Faber ( 19^71
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the landlord named one of their number as the person responsible 
for the rest, and afterwards committed to him the direction 
of their society.
About twenty inns are known to have been used in this
way by the apprentices during the fourteenth century but by
1400 they were dominated by the four principal Inns of Court.
Most of the early records of these legal societies have been
either destroyed or lost, but the Black Books of Lincoln’s Inn,
which begin in 1422, show that there was by that time a settled
academic establishment. By this time, also, the serjeants and
judges were almost invariably drawn from members of the four 
f 2^)major Inns.' '
The Inns are voluntary societies governed, in a similar 
way to the Oxbridge colleges, by the Benchers who are self- 
perpetuating bodies, new members being selected by the existing 
members. The Benchers of each Inn have disciplinary powers 
over their members and may disbar a barrister for ’unbecoming 
conduct’. In the exercise of this jurisdiction the Benchers are 
entirely independent of the courts and their action cannot be 
called in question by them. Appeal to the judges in their capacity 
as supervisory visitors to the Inns is possible but rarely 
exercised,'^' and understandably so, for the superior judiciary 
are always themselves Benchers of their respective Inns. Each 
of the Inns has its own particular character. The Inner Temple 
is reputedly the oldest and richest, and produces the largest
(1). Rev. R.J. Fletcher ed. Pension Book of Grays Inn, Vol I. p.XII.
(2). J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History,
Butterworths, (1971), p.6 9 .
(3). See though one recent case In re Shier, Time Law Report,
Feb.14th 1969.
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number of judges; both the Inner and Middle Temples have 
tended to restrict their membership to those who have been 
to th^ 'best* schools and the ancient universities. Grays 
Inn is less exclusive, admitting the greatest number of 
foreign students and paying less attention to school, while 
Lincolns Inn remains the preserve of the Chancery lawyers.
The social intimacy of the Inns has some advantages; 
inherent in such a closed community is a system of social 
control which provide strong sanctions to ensure the maintenance 
of the rules of professional etiquette. A barrister’s general 
reputation at the Bar is a paramount factor in influencing his 
appointment to the rank of Queens Counsel or ultimately to a 
judicial office; and t]^ need to stand well wibh their 
professional brethren is a powerful control on the judiciary.
Institutional factors have thus encouraged a corporate 
spirit within the legal profession and intensified any tendency 
towards social isolation arising out of the homogeneous 
origins of its members. But more than this, as I observed at 
the very beginning of this study, the nature of the legal 
profession and the law was essentially determined within the 
context of a highly individualistic society and as such has 
often been ill-adjusted to twentieth-century needs, and in 
particular to the operation of statutory legislation of a 
collectivist type. Once more it was Laski who summed up this 
point,
"The attitude of our Courts in trade union cases is, 
again, unintelligible except as the expression of a 
mental climate which has never freed itself from the 
belief that trade unions are organisations threatening
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the equilibrium of a society built upon the principle 
that the means of production must remain in private
hands''. (1)
More recently, R . I i .  Jackson has written
"The common law is on the whole highly
individualistic, upholding the liberty of men
to enter into such contacts as they see fit
and allowing property owners to do what they
like with their own, subject to certain limitations.
Modern legislation often cuts across these ideas;
statutes regulating conditions of employment
and statutes aimed at slum clearance and a better
standard of housing obviously conflict with
the policy of the common law".(2)
Yet in interpreting such statutes the judges have often 
assumed that Parliament meant to legislate in accordance with 
the existing law and not alter any rights of property or 
freedom of contract; with tlbis assumption the courts have 
sometimes wrecked a statute. But as the previous chapter 
demonstrated, this is no longer a major issue; the courts, 
though they may still retain a basically individualistic 
orientation, have since the war like the majority of the 
community come to accept enough of the theory of public action 
to avoid any fundamental criticism for their treatment of 
legislation of a collectivist nature.
Legalism
In this brief attempt to illuminate those factors which 
contribute to the social isolation of the judiciary and thus
(1). H.J. Laski - The State in Theory and Practice
Allen & Unwin (1935) p. 174.
(2). P.M. Jackson. The Machinery of Justice in jdlngdand. C.U.P.
6th ed. (1972) p.jSO
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also act as possible sources of conflict or misunderstanding 
between the courts and other sections of society, I come finally 
to a consideration of the lawyer's fundamental set of beliefs, 
embodied in the doctrine of legalism.
"Legalism" explains Judith Sklar, "is the ethical
attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter
of rule following and moral relationships to 
consist of duties and rights determined by rules".(l)
The average lawyer is irresistably instilled with a firm
respect for the virtue of certainty and a reluctance to approve
any new, and therefore possibly arbitrary powers. Even the famous
law reformer. Hale, counseled caution,
"An overbusy meddling with the alteration of lawes, 
though under the plausible name and pretence of 
reformation, doth necessarily introduce a great 
fluidness, lubricity and unsteadiness in the lawes, 
and renders it upon every little occasion subject 
to perpetual fluxes, vicissitudes and mutations".(2)
The legalistic ethos, may it is true, be tempered by 
the exercise of judicial creativity; the fiction that judges 
do not make law has long been abandoned. But judicial law-making 
is a purely interstitial activity, a pragmatic response to changing 
social conditions, carried out within an infrastructure of 
established expectations.
Judges of the nineteenth century, while in theory 
supporting the doctrine of decision inevitability, were in 
practise eften enthusiastic law-makers. There is on the other 
hand some evidence that the contemporary Law Lords, since 1966 
when they were given the power to review their own decisions,
(1). N. Shklar, Legalism, Camb. Mass., Harvard Univ. Press,(I964)p1
(2). Hale, Considerations touching the Amendment of Lawes 
(quoted in J. Baker op.cit.)
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(1)have adopted a rather more cautious stance than previously; 
the implication being that they have been inhibited by their 
new freedom, that an essential equilibrium between desired 
innovations and the certainty of precedent has been disturbed 
and that the judges to redress the balance have become more 
conservative in their decision-making. The appeal judges, 
Denning e x c e p t e d , a r e  on the whole most confortable when 
their responses to changing social and economic circumstances 
can be veiled by an apparent adherence to the dictates of 
precedent. Thus Lord Radcliffe, though a notable exponent of 
judicial creativity, has nevertheless on more than one occasion 
publicly argued the need for a mask of legalism.
"If judges prefer to adopt the formula - for that is 
what it is - that they merely declare the law and do 
not make it, they do no more than show themselves
wise men in practice. Their analysis may be weak but 
their perception of the nature of the law is sound. 
Men’s respect for it will be the greater, the more 
imperceptible its development."(3 )
(1). Exampless of this caution are given by Blom-Cooper & Drewry. 
"In Beswick and Beswick (1968) A.C.5 8 , the House was 
presented with a golden opportunity to reconsider the
longestab11shed, but much criticised judge-made doctrine 
of jus quaesitum tertio. Instead their Lordships chose 
to allow the appeal on narrower grounds, and to leave 
the issue of reform to the Law Commission and to Parliament.
In Owen and Pook (1970) A.C. 244, of the three Law Lords 
in favour of allowing the appeal, only Lord Pearce was 
prepared explicitly to grasp the nettle of overruling 
the earlier decision in question (Ricketts and 
(1926) A.C.1) Lords Ouest and Wilberforce merely distinguished 
the two decisions. (L. Blom-Cooper & 0. Drewry, Pinal Anneal 
Oxford, Clarendon (1970) p. 70 fn.2)
(2 ). See above p.2 3 7.
(3). Quoted in Hugo Young, ’Judge of Our Daily Lives’ Sunday Times
June 2 4, 1973.
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"Je cannot run the risk of finding the archetypal 
image of the judge confused in men’s minds with the very 
different image of the legislator ....Personally, I 
think that judges will serve the public interest better, 
if they keep quiet about their legislative function.
No doubt they will discreetly contribute to changes in 
the law, because, as I have said, they cannot do 
otherwise, even if they would. The judge who shows 
his hand, who advertises what he is about, may indeed 
show that his is a strong spirit, unfettered by the 
past; but I doubt very much whether he is not doing 
more harm to general confidence in the law as a constant, 
safe in the hands of judges, than he is doing good to 
the laws credit as a set of rules nicely 
attuned to the sentiment of the day." (1)
Some modem observers of the judiciary intent upon reducing 
the process of decision-making to the sum of each judge’s 
social experiences and personal foibles, too easily dismiss 
the significance of the law itself as a socialising factor.
The distinctive mode of thinking inevitably associated with the 
study and practice of the law was more obvious to their 
predecessor, Harold Laski,
"Wâèua.......so large a part of law is rooted in precedent,
it is natural for the lawyer’s mind to dwell upon 
continuity with the past rather than departure from it".(2)
and again,
"It is almost an inevitable characteristic of the legal 
mind that it should tend to conservatism. It is largely 
engaged in the study of precedent .... Lawyers, in fact, 
are more definitely the servants of tradition than any 
other class in the community".(3)
(1). Lord Radcliffe, Not in Feather Beds. Hamilton (1968)
(2). H.J. Laski, The State in Theory and Practice. Allen Æ Unwin,
,(1935) p.176.
(3). H.J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics. Allen & Unwin 2nd ed.(1930)
p.372.
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At least one occupant of tne contemporary Bench,
Mr. Justice Finer, has demonstrated an awareness of this 
tendency.
"The Lawyer, almost irrespective of his politics 
is by training and self-interest a conservative 
in the affairs of nis own profession. The 
status^quo is part of nis mental capital. Every 
legal reform robs him of an asseu he has worked 
hard to acquire."(1)
This is not, as Shklar emphasises, a matter of ’masking’ 
a specific socio-economic interest. The belief that it does 
arises out of the cultural content of the law itself which is 
still very much the child of the middle and upper classes.
It is particularly important to distinguish legalism from 
political conservatism. As J.n.d. Griffith put it,
"A lawyer is bound by certain habits of belief....
.. by which lawyers, however dissimilar otherwise, 
are more closely linked than they are separated...
.. A man who has had legal training is never cuite 
the same again...., is never able to look at 
institutions or administrative practices, or even 
social or political policies, free from all legal 
habits or beliefs".(2)
In the last resort the judges’ political associations and 
their class backgrounds may be of less importance than the 
legalistic values alllawyers inherit through their training and 
professional experiences.
(1) Morris Finer g.C., "The legal profession", in h. Zander (ed) 
What’s Wrong with the Law?
Pubïïshed^by the 3.3.0.^(1970)*
(2) JhA.G. Griffith, "The Law of Property", M. Ginsberg
ed. Law and Opinion in England in the Twentieth Century. 
Stevens,^rï959T pp.17-19^
This study has been first and foremost a factual description 
of the men who nave sat in the superior courts since 1&2 0 , an 
analysis of their social, educational, professional and political 
histories* My intention was never, as I stated at the outset, 
to relate the background cnaracteristics of tne Bench to the 
judicial decision-making process* I have though in this 
concluding chapter taken a very general look at the various 
factors which, I suggest, contribute to an overall uniformity 
in the judicial approach and tend to set them apart from the 
rest of tne community; this nas been, by its very nature, a 
highly impressionistic exercise, describing factors that are 
frequently inter-related. It is evident though, notwithstanding 
individual variations arisin^ out of differing personal experiences 
that the judges are as a whole characterised oy singularly 
homogenous life-cycles, a considerable degree of social insularity, 
and a strong professional dogma; the judges possess a communal 
identity rivalled by few other groups within our society*
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Appendix A
Sources of Biographical Data
General biographical references
Dictionary of National Biography.
Jho’s Who and Who Was Who.
Burke’s Peerage.
Burke’s Landed Gentry.
Legal Registers
Register of Admissions to the Hon. Soc. of the Middle 
Temple from the fifteenth century to the year 1944, 
ed. H.A.C. sturgess.
Vol. 2: 1782-1909
Vol. 3: 1910-1944. (1949)
Register of Admissions to Grays Inn, 1321-1889 - 
J. Foster. (1889)
Register of Admissions to Grays Inn from 1890 to
date. (unpublished)
The Records of the Hon. Boc. of the Society of 
Lincolns Inn.
Vol. 2: Admissions from 1800-93. (I896)
Masters of the Bench of the Hon. 80c. of the Inner 
Temple 1450-1883.
dupplements I883-190O (I883]
1901-1918.
Inner Temple - Admissions Records and Calls to the 
Bar. (unpublished)
University Records
Alumni Cantabrigienses - J. Venn 6 J.A. Venn.
Part II 1752-1900. (Cambridge 1940-34)
The Historical Register of the University of
Cambridge to the year 1910, ed. J.R. Tanner (C.U.P. 1917)
Supplements 1911-50.
Alumni Oxonienses 1715-1886 - J. Foster.
(Oxford and London 1888-92)
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University Records (continued)
The Historical Register of the University of
Oxford to 1900. (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1900)
Supplements I90I-3 0 (1934)
1931-50. (1951)
University of London: The Historical Record
1836-1926. (Univ. of London Press Ltd. 1926)
Supplements - to 1931, 1932-46, 1947-51.
Miscellaneous works containing biographical data, in particular:
Atlay, J.j3. , The Victorian Chancellors, Smith (1906-08).
Blom-Cooper, L.J. (ed.). The Law as Literature, Bodley 
Head (1961).
Foster, J., Men at the Bar. 2nd ed. (1
Hemston, r .F.V., Lives of the Lord Chancellors, 1863-1940, 
Oxford, Clarendon (1964).
Hutchinson, J., A Catalogue of Notable Middle Templars (1902) 
Lord Russell, The Royal Conscience.
Smith, F . E . (1st Sari of Birkenhead), Fourteen English 
Judges, Cassell (1926).
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Appendix B
Analysis of the class composition of the superior court judiciary
Though class is a concept basic to the study of society, 
yet it is not capable of precise definition; no one 
characteristic can be wholly adequate as a means of assigning 
every person in a society to an appropriate social class. None 
the less, if a single criterion must be selected, occupation 
will usually prove the most complete and useful index for the 
purpose of distributing a population along a social scale.
Though the number of classes and their precise occupational 
boundaries may vary according to the needs and limitations of 
any particular study and though individual anomalies may arise 
an analysis of social origins in terms of father’s occupation 
does throw useful light on the class structure of a group and 
on the changes occurring over periods of time.
One of the main difficulties in this class analysis was 
that of making a greater differentiation among the higher 
ranks of society than has been usual in other class studies.
Thus Guttsman, in his analysis of the British Political Elite 
uses a simple three-fold classification - aristocracy, middle- 
class and working-class.^^) Similarly, Margaret Stacey 
divides the inhabitants of Banbury into the three usual classes 
- upper, middle and working (though complemented by an 
additional refined status a n a l y s i s ) . It was soon obvious 
that such classifications were too dispersed across the whole 
social scale to be at all useful in analysing the judiciary 
who were clearly well entrenched in the upper regions of
(1). W.L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite MacGibbon and
Kee (1963)
(2). M. Stacey, Tradition and Change: A Study of Banbury O.U.P.
(i960)
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society. Little attention has been paid, hitherto to
distinctions within the upper classes - they are, after all, 
a relatively small group - but in order to avoid tediously 
homogeneous and therefore largely meaningless results, some 
differentiation within that group has had to be made for the 
purposes of this analysis.
The following classification, therefore, though obviously 
drawn up with some regard for similar analyses and for the 
"general consensus of opinion" on the social status of various 
occupations, is, ultimately, based on my own estimation of the 
social ranking of occupations, and, as such is inevitably open 
to question, both as to its overall structure and in respect of 
specific allocations, I hope, however, to minimise criticism 
by describing the main problems which arose in the construction 
of the classification and by explaining the reasoning behind 
its final structure.
It was expected that some of the judges’ fathers would 
themselves be socially mobile; the problem arose, therefore, 
as to whether the judges should be assigned to classes according 
to the position held by the father at a particular time, 
according to the father’s main occupation or to the highest 
position held by him. Most studies of social class do not, in 
fact, specify the criterion used, if any. One which does 
(i.e. C.B. Otley’s thesis on the army e l i t e ) s t a t e s  that 
the index used was father’s occupation at or as near as 
possible to the son’s date of birth. It seems reasonable to 
consider only the position held by the father in the judge’s
(l). C.B. Otley, Social Background of Senior Officers of the
British Army, 1870-1939. Ph.D. thesis. 
Hull (1962)
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early years, on the basis that this is the period when the 
general pattern of the judge’s life will be set, although 
higher positions held by fathers in later life are relevant 
in terms of the patronage and influence they might carry.
Because much of my data on fathers’ occupations were 
obtained from the Admission Records of the Inns of Court (i.e. 
when the judge was approximately twenty years old), I decided 
initially to take as my index of social class, the main 
occupation held by the father before the judge reached the age 
of majority - and in addition a ’highest position’ for 
separate analysis. However, the wide limits of the main 
analysis meant that the number of fathers who warranted two 
separate classifications was in practice negligible. In 
addition, because most of the general biographical sources 
tend to record only the highlights of the parental career and 
omit the relevant dates, there may be some cases of "hidden" 
mobility, particularly among those assigned to Class II. In 
view of these considerations, I finally concluded that it would 
be more consistent to assign the judges to classes on the basis 
of the highest position ever held by their fathers, bearing in 
mind that there may be a slight ’upward* bias in the analysis.
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Class Assignment According to Pather’s 0ccupation or Rank 
Class I.
Traditional landed upper class (a)
Peerage and baronetage.
Landed gentry, i.e. included in Burke's.
High Sheriff or Deputy Lieutenant.
Class II.
Professional, commercial and administrative upper class 
Superior or county court judge.
Bishop, dean.
Major-general and superior ranks.
Rear-admiral and superior ranks.
Director or owner of large commercial or industrial 
enterprise, (b)
Shipowner.
Major banker.
Permanent secretary or under-secretary in Civil Service.
Lord Mayor of London, ambassador.
Principal of a university college, head of major public 
school.
Editor of national newspaper.
Knightage.
Glass III.
Upper middle class
Professional occupations - barrister, solicitor, town clerk, 
doctor, (c) clergy, accountant, architect, quantity surveyor.
Army major, lieutenant-colonel or colonel.
Captain or commander in navy.
Captain in merchant service.
Merchants or other middle-range entrepreneurs, (b) minor 
banker, bank manager, member of Stock Exchange or Lloyds, 
broker or agent.
M.P., member of colonial parliament, civil servant.
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Upper middle class (Cont.)
Small landowner or estate manager.
Head of minor public school, university professor.
Editor of local newspaper, artist or composer.
Class IV.
Lower middle class
Non-conformist minister, schoolmaster, surgeon, (c) 
secretary, estate agent, journalist, minor civil servant, 
government shorthand writer, principal prison officer, 
army captain.
Minor traders and manufacturers, e.g. grocer, baker, 
bleacher, etc.
Commercial traveller.
Class V .
Working clans
Craftsman - saddler, master cabinet-maker, wig-maker, 
copper-smith.
Colliery deputy, butler, clerk.
(a) Class I, deviates from the occupational base of the other 
classes, using instead possession of land and/or a title as the 
criteria for membership; it is in a sense the very fact of the 
members of this class frequently being without occupation that 
distinguishes them from the less exalted strata.
(b) Some difficulties arose over the assignment of those 
fathers who were described as being engaged in some form of 
entrepreneurial occupation, with little information given as to 
the size or importance of the business. The majority of these, 
merchants of various kinds and manufacturers included in the 
Directory of Directors or a similar register, have been assigned 
to Class III. A few, whose dealings appeared to be on a smaller 
scale and lacking in social status were placed in Class I¥%
Only directors or owners of large, prosperous and usually well-
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known companies have been assigned to Class II, e.g. Garrards, 
Youngers, Frys.
(c) During the eighteenth century medical men were divided 
into three orders - physicians, surgeons and apothecaries; of 
these only the physician was definitely classed as a member of 
a senior profession. The physicians were a relatively
small body distinguished principally by their membership of the 
Royal Colleges and their possession of a medical degree of 
university standard; most surgeons were merely licensed. As 
G.D.H. Cole puts it, "The 'doctor' was not, as such, reckoned
( 2)a gentleman, unless he was one of the privileged few".  ^ '
Accordingly, judges of the first two appointment cohorts, whose 
fathers were 'medical men' but not fully qualified doctors, 
have been assigned to Class IV, rather than Class III.
(1). The Report of the Select Committee on Medical Education
1834 (part ii, p. 20) refers to "the 
three inferior grades of surgeons, 
apothecaries and even druggists".
(2). Studies in Class Structure Routledge & Kegan Paul (1935).
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Appendix C.
The demography of the judiciary
The judges, as a clearly defined and well-documented 
historical group, provided good subjects for demographic 
analysis; unfortunately, the relatively minor position 
occupied by this particular inquiry within the whole thesis 
has meant that the analysis is a rather crude one, based only 
on 'whole-year* figures^ , and using as the chief measure 
of nuptiality, fertility, and mortality, the simple 
arithmetic mean. I hope, however, that within these 
limitations there have emerged some useful results which 
might lead to a more detailed and proficient study.
The analysis was mainly an attempt to 'place* the 
judges demographically and possibly to reveal any peculiarly 
'judicial* characteristics; thus, it v/as expected that the 
judges, as a professional elite, with a fairly high degree 
of social mobility among the earlier members, would differ in 
various ways, - age of marriage, family size, expectation of 
life, etc., - from the general population; that their 
behaviour patterns would more closely match those of other 
leading social groups. The lack of comparable historical data 
was obviously a problem; specific comparison has, therefore, 
been confined mainly to Hollingsworth's admirable study of 
the British peerage' ', with more general comments on the 
changing life patterns of the professional and upper classes 
and the population as a whole.
(1). For individual judges this may create an error of -11 months; 
I have assumed however that for the whole population these 
errors will largely cancel each other out.
(2), T.H. Hollingsworth, "The Demography of the British Peerage." 
Population Studies. Vol.XVIII. No2, Supplement (1964-65;
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For this section only it was easier for comparative 
purposes - and also more meaningful - to classify the judges 
according to their date of birth rather than their date 
of appointment to the Bench (1)•
(1), Five judges, whose date of birth is not known, have 
been omitted from the demographic analysis.
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Marriage.
Throughout the nineteenth century the average age of 
marriage for both judges and the peerage was, as Tables 
XXXIX - XLI show, very much higher than that for the general 
population. There are, however, obvious differences between 
the former two groups; for the peers' sons in the period from 
the mid-eighteenth century, to the end of the nineteenth 
century, there is a slow but definite rise in the age of 
marriage. The fuller data included in Hollingsworth's study 
show that this is only part of a general trend towards later 
marriage within the peerage beginning about 16OO and continuing 
to the early twentieth century; this may be associated 
with a corresponding decline in mortality which made less urgent 
the need to marry off a son or daughter quickly for fear he 
or she might die. Later marriage was also a form of family 
limitation. The judicial marriage pattern is less clear.
The average age of marriage from the mid-nineteenth century, 
though more stable, compares roughly with that of the peerage; 
but this is not apparently the culmination of a gradual rise 7 
rather the figures for the preceding sixty years suggest that 
there was a large and sudden fall in the age of marriage.
There is no obvious explanation for the abnormally high age 
at which the earlier judges married, though the general tendency 
for later marriage among those destined for the Bench may be 
related to their initial educational commitments and the 
financial instability of the early years at the Bar.
A more detailed and accurate picture of the judicial 
marital pattern is obtained by an analysis of the actual 
distribution of the ages at which individual judges married.
268
Table XXXIX Mean age at first marriage of judges ever married
Cohort born
1740-99
1800-24
1825-49
1850-74
1875-99
1900-24
Mean age
33.4 years
33.4
30.4 
30.7 
30.6 
30.3
Total first marriages 
Age stated Not stated
40
48
56
53
58
72
9
1
2
6
3
Table XL
Mean age at first marriage of peers' sons ever
(1725-1924) (2 ).
Cohort horn Mean age Total first
1725-49 29.7 years 356
1750-74 29.6 II 538
1775-99 29.2 If 623
1800-24 30.8 ft 779
1825-49 30.8 II 843
1850-74 31.9 II 939
1875-9 9(3) 30.0 II 700
1900-24(3) 27.3 I 226
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(1) All HollliigswortjJs ta':,leFi refer to nis seqcndary
universe": - this conoistn cf all tne leqltirate offspring 
Tl have^oonsidered only the nale portion) of the "primary 
universe". This is CefinecL as:- All peers of any of the 
five"British national divisions (England, Bcotlanl, Ireland, 
Great Britain aa^ tae Unitea liagaoa) who liel Between IbOR
and 1939. It also includes tneir eldest sons, provided
that these wore heirs to a peerage on their fifteenth 
birthday (and even grandsons on tne sane Basis) provided 
that they likewise died botwoon iSOp and 1939. Peeresses 
in their own rights are nenhe^s cn tne grinarp universe.
Life jeers and peeresses are inelndea and the .anarchy was
treated as a peerage. (Hollingsworth op. cit. p.7.)
(2) ibid. data taken fro... Table 3 P» 13 ana Table 1't o
(3) Ih the last cohorts, says Hollingsworth, the means are 
necessarily lower than would eventually be achieved; 
many of the cohort members were still alive in 1939 
and some would undoubtedly have carried afoer that date,
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Table XLI
Mean age at marriage (all marriages) for the general male 
population of England and Wales ( 1896-1955). ^
Marriage date 1896 - 1905 1906 - 30 1931 - 55
Mean age 28y 5m 29y 2m 29y 2m
(1). ibid. data taken from Table 3 p.12. - based on the 
Registrar General's Statistical Review of England and 
Wales, Tables pt. II. 1925 p.123; and ibid. Pt.II. 
Tables, Civil 1956 p. 76 and I960 p.72.
(2). No date seems to be available before 1896.
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Table XLII shows that throughout the whole period studied,
most first marriages took place within the age group 25-34; 
the majority of judges in the two earliest cohorts were, 
however, over 30 when they married, whereas since 1825, 
(mid-nineteenth century in terms of marriage dates) the 
largest concentration of marriages has been in the 25-29 age 
group.
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Table XLII
(a) Distribution of age at first marriage of .judges ever married
Cohort Total 
born marriages 0-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-
Age n(
statec
1740-99 49 2 14 9 6 5 4 9
1800-24 49 8 11 16 6 5 2 1
1825-49 58 5 25 18 3 2 3 2
1850-74 53 3 30 8 6 5 1 -
1875-99 64 6 23 16 7 4 2 6
1900-24 75 13 31 10 10 4 4 3
Total 348 37 134 77 38 25 16 21
(b) Distribution of age at first marriage of .judges ever married 
(expressed as a percentage of all marriages where age is 
stated)
Cohort
born 0-■24 25-■29 30 -3 4 35-39 4 0 -4 4 45-
1740-99 5. 35. afo 22.5fo 15.0% 12.5% 10.0%
1800-24 16. 79G 22. 9% 33.3% 12.5^ 10.4% 4.2%
1825-49 8. 3% 44. 6% 32. 5.k% 3.6% 5 .4%
1850-74 5. 1% 5 6.7% 11.3% 9.4% 1.9%
1875-99 10. 3% 39. 1% 27.6% 12.1% 6.9% 3.4%
1900-24 18. 1% 4 3 .lfo 13.9?o 13.9% 5.6% 5.6%
Total 11. 3% 4 1 .2% 23.5% 11.6% 7.6% 4.9%
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Some of the judges married twice, hardly any three times; 
their incidence of celibacy, on the other hand, is, in comparison 
with the peerage and even the general population, relatively low.
Table XLIII
Judicial remarriage and celibacy
Cohort
horn
First
marriage
Second
marriage
Third
Marriage
Never'  ^
married Total. judges
1740-99 68.4% 17.5% - 14. 57 (100%)
1800-24 74.1% 14.8% 1.9% 9.3^ 0 54 (100%)
1825-49 86.4% 11.8% — 1.7^ 59 (100%)
1850-74 75.9% 15.5% - 8.6^ 58 (100%)
1875-99 74.0% 11.0% 2.7^ 12.5^ 73 (100%)
1900-24 78.8% 15.0% 6.39^ 80 (100%)
(1). The incidence of judicial 
over-stated owing to gaps
celibacy is if anything 
in the biographical data.
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Table XLIV
Sons of peers - proportion per 1,000 never married
(1750-1924)
Cohort born Never married per 1,000
1750-74 179
1775-99 214
1800-24 157
1825-49 134
1850-74 154
1875-99 106
1900-24 132
Table XLV
Proportions per 1,000 aged 45-49 never married, 
found in the censuses of England and Wales (1851-1951)^
Census year Birth years of group Never married per
aged 45-49 1,000 living (males)
1851 1801-06 121
1871 1821-26 99
1891 1841-46 104
1911 1861—66 127
1931 1881-86 110
1951 1901-06 98
(1). ibid. data taken from Table 11. p.20.
(2). ibid. data taken from Table 12. p.20.
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Family Size.
Historical data on fertility is considerably less reliable 
than that on nuptiality and mortality; and the analysis of 
reproductive patterns is rendered more difficult by the problem 
of deciding to what extent changes in family size reflect real 
changes in fertility and to what extent they are simply 
by-products of changes in mortality and marriage patterns.
It is clear from Table XLVI, however, that during the
second half of the nineteenth century, the judges conformed to
the general upper and middle class pattern of reproduction;
from the I860*s onwards these classes showed a distinct trend
towards smaller families. The impetus for family limitation
 ^11derived from a complex of socio-economic factors,^ ^though
principally, as J.A. Banks has shown,from the desire to achieve 
or maintain a given standard of living.'  ^ During the middle 
years of the nineteenth century social status came to depend 
increasingly on conspicuous consumption, on the need to 
demonstrate "all the paraphernalia of gentility"; the 
Great Depression threatened to undermine this way of life, but 
restricting family size was one method of reducing expenditure, 
not directly relevant to appearing affluent. "The new emphasis 
on education and specialised training as a means of preserving 
and if possible improving the social and economic position 
of one*8 children was another factor," writes Kelsall. "And 
many other influences were at work, including the decline in 
religious belief, the spread of the scientific attitude of mind, 
  and the emancipation of women. The fewer the children.
(1). Not, as some have claimed, from the development of better 
contraceptive techniques.
(2). J.A. Banks, Prosperity and Parenthood; A Study of Family 
Planning among the Victorian Middle Classes.
Rout ledge, ('l'95^ Tp . 5.
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Table XLVI
Mean family size of judges ever married
Total married^JMSes
Cohort born
Mean 
family size
Family size 
stated Not stated^
1740-99 5.7 34 15
1800-24 3.7 28 21
1825-49 4.9 47 11
1850-74 2.8 49 4
1875-99 2.4 51 13
1900-24 2.6 63 12
Table XbVII
Family size in the fgeneral population
(1861-1920)('2) -  -
Marriage cohort Ultimate family size
1861-69 6 .1 6
1881 5 .2 7
1900-09 3.3
1920 2.47
(1). It is possible that many whose family size is not 
recorded were in fact childless.
(2 ) Hollingsworth, op. cit.
the better the start in life that they could be given.
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..(1)
The process by which family limitation gradually spread
downwards through the social classes was a slow one, so that
throughout a number of decades there were large class
differentials in family size. Planned restriction increased
the percentage gap between the classes with the smallest and
largest families, the professions and miners, from 2k% in the
(2)
1850*8 to 60% in the years 1881-86. A paper produced
by T.H.C. Stevenson for the Royal Statistical Society in 1920,
based on data from the 1911 Census, showed that at that time
the lowest fertility rates were still returned for the most
(purely middle class occupations - the professions.'^'
Even allowing for late marriages, this group was very infertile. 
Barristers produced on average a family of I.6 5 , smaller 
than the national average of 2.80; even when the former figure 
is standardised to allow for later marriages, it increases 
to only 1.7 8.
Stevenson*s paper is followed by some interesting comments 
from Dr. Marie Stopes, based on a study by the nineteenth 
century geneticist Sir Francis G a l t o n . I n  this, she affirmed, 
were a good many examples, making it quite clear that many 
of the superior, successful families, such as produced judges, 
admirals and distinguished men in general, had become extinct 
through marrying with heiresses who by their very nature tended 
to be physiologically infertile. Galton had examined the
(1). R.K. Kelsall, Population. Longmans,(196 7) pp.18-19.
(2). O.R. McGregor, Divorce in England. Heinemann,(1957) p.8 3.
(3). T.H.C. Stevenson, "The fertility of various social classes in 
England and Wales from the middle of the nineteenth century 
to 1911.** Journal of the Royal Statistical Society( 1929)
laxxiii pp. 4 0 1^44.
(4). Sir Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius; an enquiry into its
laws and consequences.
Watts, 2nd. ed. ( 1892 j pp. f28^3^.
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descendants of thirty-one judges who gained peerages and 
who last sat on the Bench previous to the close of the reign 
of George IV; of these 31 peerages, at least twelve were 
extinct by the end of the nineteenth century. The reason for 
this, Galton discovered, was the "particulars of their alliances", 
a considerable proportion of the new peers and their sons 
marrying heiresses. The motives for this are obvious, he says; 
the new peer, or his son, has a title and perhaps a sufficient 
fortune to transmit to his eldest son, but needs an increase of 
possessions for the endowment of younger sons and daughters.
The heiress, on the other hand, has a fortune but wants a title. 
Unfortunately, these * ambitious* marriages are peculiarly unprolific 
for since the heiress possesses the family fortune, it follows 
that there are no sons and frequently no other daughters, 
implying a stock of low fertility; the chances are then that 
the heiress is not a good child-producer and the line tends 
to die out. Galton considered this a disastrous institution.
"The most highly gifted men are ennobled; their older 
sons are tempted to marry heiresses, and their younger sons 
not to marry at all, for these have not enough fortune to 
support both a family and an aristocratic position. So the 
side-shoots of the genealogical tree are hacked off and the leading 
shoot is blighted, and the breed is lost for ever".^^) These 
heiress marriages, wrote Galton, had been responsible for 
bringing to an end within a hundred years the lines of four 
Prime Ministers - Walpole, Grenville, Rockingham and Canning.
(1). ibid. p.132.
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Galton also reports on another "peculiarity in their 
domestic relations" that interferes with a large average of 
legitimate families for the judiciary. In a footnote to his 
life of Lord Chancellor Thurlow, Lord Campbell writes that 
when he was first acquainted with the English Bar, one half 
of the judges had married their mistresses; it was the 
understanding, he says, that when a barrister was elevated to 
the Bench, he should either marry his mistress or put her away. 
According to this extraordinary statement, comments Galton, 
it would appear that much more than one half of the judges that 
sat on the Bench in the beginning of this century (the nineteenth) 
had no legitimate offspring before the advanced period of 
their lives at which they were appointed judges. This was 
obviously one of the many occasions when Lord Campbell's lively 
imagination outran his regard for truth; the number of judges 
entering into marriage for either the first or second time after 
their appointment to the Bench was negligible; only 8 of those 
appointed between 1820-75 married after their appointment, 
three for the first time, the remainder for the second.
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Birth order.
H  'jIn a note to Bishop and Wilkinson's study of Winchester,' ' 
the authors suggest that future studies of career success
should wherever possible include data on such family factors
as number of brothers and sisters and birth order; the
difficulty lies in obtaining adequate and accurate information
on such points. In his examination of the judges of England
between 1660-1865> Galton recorded the birth order of 120
of the 286 judges(^);-
Only son. Elder 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Later
11 17 38 42 9 1 2
His results led him to suggest that social influences were 
probably against the first son entering the law. "It is clear", 
he wrote, "that the eldest sons do not succeed as judges half as 
well as their cadets." If this is true of the earlier period,
- and the paucity of Gallon's data invites some scepticism, - 
the trend over the past 150 years has been in the opposite 
direction. The majority of those recently appointed to the bench 
have been only or elder sons; the explanation for this must lie
partly in the overall decline in family size.
(1). T.H. Bishop, In collaboration with R. Wilkinson,
Winchester and the Public School Elite : A Statistical 
Analysis. Faber & Faber,(1967) p.190
(2). Galton op. cit. p.78.
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Table XLVII 
a) Birth order of the .judiciary
Cohort
born
Only
son
Elder Younger 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Later Not
Stated
1740-99 3 22 3 11 12 3 - 1 2
1800-24 1 19 1 21 5 7 — — -
1825-49 8 20 — 21 6 2 — 1 1
1850-74 8 16 - 19 6 3 3 1 2
1875-99 13 19 5 12 9 3 — 3 9
1900-24 18 28 7 8 8 1 2 1 7
Total 51 124 16 92 46 19 5 7 21
b)
Cohort born
1740-99
1800-24
1825-49
1850-74
1875-99
1900-24
Only and elder sons
25
20
28
24
32
46
Younger sons
30
34
30
32
32
27
Total 175 185
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Mortality.
It is a common saying of English and American lawyers
( 1 )that "great judges never retire ---- and seldom die".' '
A special preservative perhaps hut more likely a simple 
case of demographic bias; the judiciary have a tendency 
to longevity mainly because entry into the cohort is unusual 
before the age of fifty. Beyond this age the expectation of 
life has for the whole population changed little over the past 
century and a half and class differentials have been minimal. 
The major gains in mortality have been at the younger ages.
Thus between 1840/1 and 1910/1 the expectation at birth for 
males in the general population rose by 15 years from 40 to 55^ 
while at age 65> in over a century from 1785/6 to 1890/1 the 
expectation increased by only one year. Similarly a comparison 
of the general population (males) and peers' sons born in the 
1840's shows that the expectation at birth for the latter was 
some twelve years longer than for the former; but by age 55 
there was only about 2 years difference between the two groups.
(l). H. Levy-Uliman English Legal Tradition. 
Macmillan (19357p.75 fn.1
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Table XLIX
Judicial mortality 
a) Mean age at death
(1)
Cohort born
1740-99
1800-24
1825-49
1850-74
1875-99(2)
M a
7 4 .6 years
7 1 . 1  "
75.2 "
77.2 "
73.2 "
h ) Distrihution of age at death
Cohort b o m 45-54. 55.%64 6 5 -7 4 74-84 85-
1740-99 1 5 24 18 9
1800-24 2 13 18 17 4
1825-49 2 6 19 21 11
1850-74 - 5 13 27 11
1875-99 — 3 19 12 2
(1). An examination of those judges who died whilst still in 
office is contained in the analysis of 'Judicial Retirement', 
Table XXVl(b).
(2). In this cohort the mean is lower than will eventually be 
achieved; 37 of the judges were still alive at the end of 
1968, All but two of the judges in the birth cohort 
1900-24 were also alive.
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Table L
Life expectation of all males In England and Wales (1785-1911) ^ ^
Cohort born 0 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 80
1785/6 - - — - - 16.5 10.8 6.36 4.69
1810/1 — - - 29.0 22.4 16.0 10.6 6.33 4.73
1840/1 39. 9 49.4 42.8 35.8 29.0 22.4 16.2 10.7 6.32 4.82
1860/1 42. 3 53.6 46.6 38.9 31.5 24.3 17.6 11.4 6.57 5.11
1875/6 46. 1 57.0 49.3 41.3 33.4 25.8 18.3 12.0 6.82 5.03
1890/1 48. 8 59.2 50.9 42.5 34.6 26.3 18.6 11.9 - -
1910/1 55. 2 61.8 53.4 44.8 36.1 27.0
Table LI
Life expectation of peers' sons Cl221::19.24)^
:2)
Cohort
born 0 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 80
1725-49 38.6 47.5 40.6 34.2 28.0 21.4 15.6 10.5 6.7 5.47
1750-74 44.5 49.7 42.3 35.6 29.8 23.0 17.1 10.8 5.8 3.98
1775-99 46.8 49.7 42.6 37.1 30.9 24.0 16.9 10.7 6.0 4.60
1800-24 49.2 52.1 43.9 37.2 31.1 24.7 18.2 11.8 7.0 4.67
1825-49 52.1 53.4 45.4 38.6 31.7 25.1 18.4 11.8 7.0 4.67
1850-74 54.7 55.8 47.1 39.1 32.1 25.3 18.3 12.7 7.1 5.40
1875-99 53.8 51.8 42.8 37.4 32.8 26.7 19.7 13.4 7.4 5.64
1900-24 60.2 58.5 49.3 42.1 35.5 28.3
(1). Hollingsworth op. cit. data talcen from Table 45. p.59.
(2). Hollingsworth op. cit. data taken from Table 42. p.56.
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In Biumary5 it is clear that as expected the 
judges, appointed between 1820 and 1968 and born 
in the eeriod 1740-19^4, have, in respect of the 
general peculation, been dsuorrajhicall
nitrerns or narr anu reiroduction
I e T* c.rerrcsenuauive or une proiessional anu 
The inherent bias derived frou their age of appointment; 
unfortunately prevents a proper comparative assessment 
of what superficially appears to be a favourable 
Gxnectation of lifeo
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Appendix D.
Correspondence between Lord Birkenhead and Lloyd George on 
the appointment of the Lord Chief Justice in 1921
(taken from F.E., The Life of P.E. Smith. First Earl of
Birkenhead, by his son. The Second Earl of Birkenhead.
Eyre & Spottiswoode, (1939) pp.402 - 7.)
(Secret) House of Lords,
8.W»
9th February 1921.
My dear Prime Minister,
With further reference to our conversation yesterday on the 
subject of the appointment to be made upon the retirement of the 
present Lord Chief Justice, I think that I ought to recapitulate 
the effect of what I then said. The matter is, in my opinion, 
of the gravest importance both in relation to the future of 
our judicial system and to the credit and indeed the existence 
of the present Government, You knov/ that it has been my constant
object to give you every assistance possible to bear the heavy
burden of responsibility which rests upon you. If I now press 
upon you a view which is contrary to your own, I do so because 
of the gravity of the issue and the very serious consequences which,
in my opinion, would result from the adoption of the course which
you had contemplated.
The proposal is, as I understand it, that the person 
appointed to the vacant office should be so appointed upon the 
understanding express or implied that he will retire when called 
upon, and that the Attorney General should withdraw his claim 
to appointment upon this occasion upon the understanding that 
the pledge to retire will be exacted from the new Lord Chief
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Justice before any change of Government, so that he, the 
Attorney General, may then be appointed.
For the reasons which I am about to give, I do not think 
that such an arrangement as this is practicable.
In the first place, I would draw attention to Section 9 
of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, which provides 
that 'all the judges of the High Court of Justice ... shall 
hold office for life subject to a power of removal by Her Majesty 
on an address presented ... by both Houses of Parliament.'
In my opinion, an appointment to the office of a Judge, 
upon the understanding express or implied, that the person 
appointed will retire when called upon to do so, is a clear 
infringement of this statutory provision. Not only does it violate 
the letter of the Statute, but it is in defiance of its spirit, 
and defeats the object for which the enactment was passed.
That object was to secure that the Judges should hold office 
independently of any political or other influence, and should 
be removeable only for the most serious judicial misbehaviour and 
then in the most public and open manner.
The proposal under contemplation, however, would make the 
Lord Chief Justice a transient figure, subject to removal at the 
will of the Government of the day, and the creature of political 
exigency. I do not think that if such an arrangement were 
publicly discussed, it would be found capable of reasoned defence.
To test the question, I would ask you to consider what 
would happen if the question were put in Parliament, whether the
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new Lord Chief Justice had accepted office upon any pledge or 
understanding that he would resign when called upon, or on the 
happening of any political event. Euch a question must he 
answered truthfully or untruthfully. I put aside the alternative 
of an untruthful answer. If it is answered truthfully in the 
affirmative, the consequences to the Government, to the Lord 
Chief Justice and to the Attorney General would be disastrous.
It can only be answered truthfully in the negative if no such 
understanding has been entered into or pledge given, and in that 
event, the security, in exchange for which the Attorney General 
has surrendered his claims, disappears.
It is necessary further to consider what the situation would 
be if such an arrangement were entered into in spite of both of 
the arguments which I have adduced and the public criticism which 
would be aroused. The Lord Chief Justice ... the highest 
judicial officer of the Kingdom ... would sit in his Court with 
the Attorney General constantly appearing to argue before him 
and with the knowledge in the minds both of the Judge and of the 
advocate that the latter could at any time displace the former 
from his seat and occupy it himself. I do not think that such a 
situation could be contemplated v/ithout dismay.
Gossip has already dealt freely with the situation and 
rumour has been busy with various suggestions - some fantastic - 
as to the means which the Government intended to adopt for meeting 
it. Public opinion, therefore, is already awake to the possibility 
of some such transaction as that which is now contemplated.
There can be no doubt that every means will be taken by those
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hostile to the Government to probe every detail of the 
negotiation. It is, therefore, impossible that it should 
remain undiscovered. Further, on the -“^ench, at the Bar and 
among the solicitors, public opinion on the subject is already 
articulate, and I have no hesitation in saying that were such 
an arrangement made it would be regarded in all quarters with 
consternation as a public scandal of the greatest magnitude, and 
would inflect incalculable harm upon the credit and reputation 
of the Government.
The exercise of judicial patronage, whether by the Prime
Minister or the Lord Chancellor, is always a matter of great 
anxiety, and I know the attention which you have given to the 
question of your own judicial patronage whenever it has arisen 
during my tenure of office. You know also how deadly is criticism 
on such matters when it is both just and well informed.
The public opinion of the profession has in the past on more
than one occasion been a formidable weapon in the hands of the 
opponents of the Government of the day. I would instance the 
appoint of Sir Robert Collier to the Judicial Committee by 
Mr. Gladstone, when a motion to the effect that the circumstances 
were at variance with the spirit and intention of the Statute and 
of evil example in the exercise of judicial patronage was only 
lost in the House of Lords by two votes. Had such a motion been 
carried, it would have involved the resignation of the then 
Lord Chancellor (Lord Hatherley). The motion might easily
form a model for a similar motion upon the present occasion, and
I regard it as certain that such a motion would be carried in 
the House of Lords. I need hardly point out the iiwitable
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consequences to my own position which would follow if it was 
supported (as it would he) by my legal colleagues in this House.
I turn to consider by whom it would be possible that the 
office of Lord Chief Justice could be filled upon such terms 
as have been suggested. Lord Finley is approaching 79 years 
of age. He has in the past rendered the most eminent services 
as Attorney General and has enjoyed the highest reputation as 
an advocate. You yourself thought that age unfitted him to hold 
the position of Lord Chancellor towards the end of 1918. Since 
then he has sat frequently in the House of Lords for the purpose 
of hearing appeals, and it is apparent to everyone that the 
great powers which he once possessed are now gradually leaving 
him under the burden of his advancing years.
I have no doubt that even if he were willing to accept 
office on such conditions, professional opinion would condemn 
the appointment, and lay opinion would inquire how it was that 
he who was too old to be Lord Chancellor in 1919 was not too old 
to enter upon the arduous office of Lord Chief Justice in 1921.
But in addition, it would become apparent to the whole world 
immediately upon his assumption of his duties that he had reached 
an age at which he was unfitted to perform them.
I pass by Lord Sterndale because I am convinced, not only that 
he would not accept office on any such understanding, but that no 
one would be found hardy enough to make such a proposal to him. 
There remain Mr. Justice Darling and Mr. Justice A.T. Lawrence. 
Whatever may be the excellencies of Mr. Justice Darling, the 
opinion of his colleagues and of the two professions would be
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unanimous in condemnation of such an appointment, and 
Mr. Justice A.T. Lawrence - sound lawyer as he is - has 
not shown such qualities as would atone for the circumstances 
of the appointment, and he is moreover in the 75th year of 
his age.
In conclusion, I would say that I realise very fully the
difficulties that must arise from the appointment of the Attorney 
General to the Lord Chief Justiceship. No one will lose more 
than myself by his departure from the House of Commons, or is 
in a better position to estimate his loss as an advocate for 
the Grown. The consequential Parliamentary difficulties which 
arise are also considerable, and any help which I can give 
to obviate them is at your disposal, I feel, however,most 
strongly that such difficulties as these must give way before 
the necessities of the case, and to attempt - in order to deal 
with them - to patch up the situation in the manner proposed 
would, for the sake of a temporary emergency, inflict lasting 
harm upon both the Courts and the Government.
Yours very sincerely,
BIRKENHEAD.
Lloyd George replied:
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall, S .W .1.
Feb.11th 1921.
My dear Lord Chancellor,
I fail to see the point of your lengthy typewritten document 
with its quotation from the Judicature Act. I never suggested 
to you the subjects of your elaborate protest. My only proposal
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to you was that I should appoint a distinguished lawyers on 
the express understanding that he should retire at 80. If it 
is contrary to the Judicature Acts to stipulate that high legal 
functionaries should not cling to their posts into years of 
decrepitude tuen it is high time these Acts were amended.
To take the Attorney General from his present position 
under existing conditions would he a national disservice.
He very nobly responded to the appeal made to him by B.L. and 
myself in the interests of the nation to forego his claims.
He is much too honourable and loyal a man to allow anyone 
to persuade him to break faith.
As to Finlay’s capacity Carson whom you will admit is the 
most eminent advicate of his day told me the profession would 
regard his appointment with great satisfaction.
Yours ever,
D. Lloyd George.
House of Lords. 
Feb. 11th 1921
My dear Prime Minister,
1. The question has never arisen whether a judge cd 
properly be put under a condition to retire at the age of 80 
because so far as I know no-one has ever been made a judge at 
an age which suggested such a stipulation. Campbell was 70 
when he became L.C.J. but his vitality was amazing: he was,
I think, a record. Carson has not practised before Finlay 
since the latter became Ld Chancellor. I have sat with him 
continuously. I by no means say that he is unfit for judicial
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work but he is not the man he was and. I do not think that he 
cd undertake the office of L.C.J. The Appointment is yours and 
if you appoint him I shall loyally co-operate with him but I 
most earnestly hope that if you do you will make him L.C.J. 
without any condition, relying upon his age to terminate his 
tenure of office within a reasonable time. If any condition 
is imposed I am sure that we shall find ourselves exposed to 
the risks and difficulties suggested in my letter the 
suggestion of which was the object of that letter.
2. I have no conceivable object in the matter (except)
to help the Government. I have no conceivable personal motive in 
desiring to see the A.G. become L.C.J. at this moment. '«Vhat 
does it matter to me ? So far from advising the A.G. to do 
anything which is not honourable I have most carefully limited 
the opinion I gave him to the point already indicated to 
yourself that a judge cannot be appointed sub condioione be 
that condition written or verbal. Nor did I volunteer this 
opinion. He came to me and invited it on the night of my return.
3. The appointment is of coure yours but as Mr. Gladstone 
pointed out in the Collier crisis: ’In such cases the public 
will suppose and will rightly and necessarily suppose that 
the Lord Chancellor is privy and assentient to the policy 
adopted, and my noble and learned friend was so privy and 
assentient.'
It is surely better that possible objections should be 
stated by me who in effect must share the responsibility than 
from less friendly lips.
Yours sincerely,
BIRKENHEAD.
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Appendix E
The Judges of the Superior Courts 1820 - 1968.
Where a judge held more than one office within the superior 
courts, this is indicated by a simple cross-reference system 
using an alphabetical coding: - a. Vice-Chancellors.
b. Chancery Division......................s. Lords of Appeal
in Ordinary.
a.
Chancery
Vice--Chancellors
1818 — 2 7 John Leach r.
1827 — 30 Anthony Hart
1827 - 50 Lancelot Shadwell
1841 - 51 James Lewis Knight Bruce c.
1841 - 50 James Wigram
1850 - 51 Robert Monsey Rolfe,later Lord Cranworth c.d
1851 - 53 George James Turner c.
1851 — 66 Richard Torin Kindersley
1851 — 52 James Parker
1852 — John Stuart
1853 — 68 William Page Wood, later Lord Hatherley c.
1866 - 81 Richard Malins
1868 — 69 George Markham Giffard c.
1869 — 70 William Milbourne James c.
1870 - 86 James Bacon
1871 - 73 John Wickens
1873 mm 82 Charles Hall
295
b. Chancery Division
1877 - 83 Edward Fry q.
1881 — 90 Edward Ebenezer Kay q.
1881 — 97 Joseph William Chitty q.
1882 - 86 John Pearson
1883 - 1900 Ford North K
1886 — 1907 Arthur Kekewick
1886 - 1900 James Stirling q.
1890 - 99 Robert Romer q.
1893 - 1904 Robert S. Wright k.
1897 - 1904 Edmund Widdrington Byrne
1899 - 1901 Herbert Cozens-Hardy, later Lord q. r.
1899 — 1906 George Farwell q.
1900 — 15 Matthew Ingle Joyce
1900 - 06 Henry Burton Buckley, later Lord Wrenbury q.
1901 - 13 Charles Swinfen Eady, later Lord Swinfen q.r.
1904 - 15 Thomas Rolls Warrington, later Lord q.
1906 - 18 Ralph Neville
1906 - 13 Robert John Parker, later Lord s.
1907 — 37 Harry Trelawney Eve
1913 — 23 Charles Henry Sargent q.
1913 — 29 John Meir Astbury
1915 - 19 Robert Younger, later Lord Blanesburgh q. 8.
1915 - 22 Arthur Frederick Peterson
1918 - 26 Paul Ogden Lawrence q.
1919 — 28 Frank Xavier Joseph Russell, later Lord q. s.
1922 - 29 Mark Lemon Romer, later Lord q.8.
1923 - 29 Thomas James Gi^eshyre Tomlin, later Lord 8.
1926 — 38 Albert Gparles Clauson, later Lord q.
1928 - 34 Frederick Herbert Maugham, later Viscount q. s.
1929 - 38 (Arthur) Fairfax C. Luxmoore q*
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1929 — 43 Christopher J.W. Farwell
1929 — 43 Charles Alan Bennett
1934 - 41 Charles Stafford Grossman
1937 - 44 Gavin Turnbull Simonds, later Viscount s.
1938 — 44 .Fergus Dunlop Morton, later Lord q. 8.
1941 - 46 Augustus Andrewes Uthwatt, later Lord s.
1943 - 46 Lionel Leonard Cohen, later Lord q. S.
1944 - 60 Harry Bevir Vaisey
1944 — 47 Francis Raymond Svershed, later Lord q.r.S.
1944 - 51 Charles Robert Ritchie Romer q.
1946 - 60 Ronald Francis Roxborough
1946 — 60 Henry Wynn-Parry
1947 — 49 David Llewelyn Jenkins, later Cord q. s.
1947 — 59 Charles Enstace Harman q.
1949 — 61 Harold Otto Danckwerts q.
1949 - 69 George Harold Lloyd-Jacob
1951 - 60 Gerald Ritchie Upjohn, later Lord q.s.
I960 — 62 Charles Ritchie Russell q.
I960 — 69 (Arthur) Geoffrey (Neale) Cross, later Lord.
I960 — 70 Denys Burton Buckley
I960 - John Pennycuick
1961 — 64 Richard Orme Wilberforce, later Lord 8 .
1961 - (John) Anthony Plowman
1962 - (Arwyn) Lynn Ungoed-^homas
1964 — 71 (Edward) Blanchard Stamp
1965 - Reginald ''•'illiam Goff
1967 - Robert Edgar Megarry
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C. Lords Justices in Chancery
d.
1851 - 66 ^ames Lewis Knight Bruce a.
1851 - 52 Robert Monsey Rolfe, Lord Cranworth d. a.
1853 - 67 George James Turner a.
1866 - 68 Hugh McCalmont Cairns, Lord, later Viscount
1867 — 68 John Rolt
1868 - William Page Wood, Lord Hatherley a.
1868 - 69 Charles Jasper Selwyn
1869 - 70 George Markham Gifford a.
1870 - 76 William Milbourne James a.
1870 - 76 George Mellish
Exchequer
Court of Exchequer
1799 - 1827 Robert Graham
1806 - 25 George Wood
1817 - 32 William Garrow
1825 - 29 John Hullock
1827 - 34 John Vaughan g.
1829 - 39 William Holland
1850 - 34 John Bayley 3.
1852 - 45 John Gurney
1854 John Williams 3.
1854 - 57 Edward Hall Alderson g.
1854 - 55 James Parke, later Lord Wensleydale 3.
1859 William Henry Maule g.
1859 - 50 Robert Monsey Rolfe, later Lord Cranworth a, c.
1845 — 56 Thomas Joshua Platt
1850 - 74 Samuel Martin
1856 - 76 George W. Wilshere Bramwell, later Lord q.
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Court of Exchequer (Cont.)
1856 - 60 William Henry Watson
1857 - 73 William Pry Channell
1859 - 65 James Plaisted Wilde, later Lord Penzance n.
1863 - 73 Cillery Pigott
1868 - 97 Anthony Cleashy
1873 - 81 Charles Edward Pollock k.
1874 - 76 Richard Paul Amphlett q.
e. Exchequer Division
1873 - 81 John Walter Huddleston h.k.
1876 - 81 Henry Hawkins, later Lord Brampton k.
1879 - 81 James Pitzjames Stephen k.
f. Chief Barons of the Exchequer
1817 - 24 Richard Richards
1824 - 31 William Alexander
1831 - 34 John Singleton Copley, Lord Lyndhurst
1834 - 44 James Scarlett, Lord Ahinger
1844 - 66 Jonathan Frederick Pollock
1866 - 80 Fitzroy Kelly
Common Pleas
Court of Common Pleas
1816 - 38 James Allan Park
1816 - 29 James Burrough
1818 — 24 John Richardson
1824 - 37 Stephen Gaselee
1830 - 42 John Bernard Bosanquet
1830 - 34 Edward Hall Alderson d.
1834 - 39 John Vaughan d.
1837 Thomas Coltman
1839 - 44 Thomas Erskine
1839 - 33 William Henry Maule d.
2-99
Court of Common Pleas (Cont.)
1842 - 58 Cresswell Cresswell n.
1845 - 46 William EBle j.
1847 - 65 Edward Vaughan Williams
1850 - 54 Thomas Noon Talfourd
1854 - 59 Richard Budden Crowder
1855 - 72 James Shaw Willes
1858 - 73 John Barnard Byles
1859 - 75 Henry Singer Keating
1865 - 71 Montague Edward Smith
1868 - 76 William Baliol Brett, later Viscount Esher q.r.
1871 Robert Porret Collier, later Lord
1871 - 81 William Robert Grove k,
1872 - 81 George Denman k.
1873 - 75 George Essex Honyman
h. Common Pleas Division
1875 - 76 Thomas Dickson Archibald j.
1875 - John Walter Huddlestone e.k.
1875 - 81 Nathaniel Lindley, later Lord q.r.s.
1876 - 81 Henry Charles Lopes k.
i. Chief Justices of the Common Pleas 
1818 - 23 Robert Dallas
1824 Robert Gifford, Lord
1824 - 29 William Draper Best, later Lord j.
1829 - 46 Nicholas Conyngham Tindal
1846 - 50 Thomas Wilde, later Lord Truro
1850 - 56 John Jervis
1856 - 59 Alexander J. Edmund Cockburn
1859 - 66 William Erie g.j.
1866 - 73 William Bovill
1873 - 80 John Duke Coleridge, Lord
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Queen* s Bench
j. Court of Queen’s Bench
1808 - 30 John Bayley d.
1816 - 28 George Sowley Holroyd
1818 - 2k William Draper Best, later Lord i.
1824 - 41 Joseph Littledale
1828 - 34 James Parke, later Lord Wensleydale d.
1830 - 52 John Patteson
1830 - 35 William Elias Taunton
1834 - 46 John Williams d.
1835 - 76 John Taylor Coleridge
1841 - 63 William Wightman
1846 - 59 William Erie g.i.
1852 - 65 Charles (John) Crompton
1858 - 61 Hugh Hill
1859 - 76 Colin Blackburn, later Lord s.
1861 - 79 John Mellor
1864 - 68 William Shee
1865 - 80 Robert Lush q.
1868 - 72 James Hannen, later Lord n.p.s,
1868 - 69 George Hayes
1872 - 76 John Richard Quain
1872 - 75 Thomas Dickson Archibald g.
k , Queen* s Bench Division
1875 - 90 William Ventris Field
1876 - 90 Henry Manisty
1879 - 88 Charles Synge Christopher Bowen, later q.s.
Lord
1880 - 84 Charles J. Watkin Williams
1881 - 97 Lewis William Cave
1881 - 92 George Denman g.
1881 - 87 William Robert Grove g.
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Queen* s Bench Division (Cont.)
1881 — 98 Henry Hawkins, later Lord Brampton e.
1881 — 90 John Walter Huddlestone e.h.
1881 — 85 Henry Charles Lopes, later Lord h.
1881 - 1901 James Charles Mathew q.
1881 - 83 Ford North b.
1881 — 97 Charles Edward Pollock d.
1881 - 91 James Fitzjames Stephen e.
1882 — 1901 John Charles Frederic 8. Day
1883 - 92 Archibald Lewin Smith q.r.
1884 - 1905 Alfred Wills
1886 — 1911 William Grantham
1887 — 97 Arthur Charles
1890 — 97 Roland (Bowdler) Vaughan Williams q.
1890 - 1912 John Compton Laurance
1891 — 93 Robert 8. Wright b.
1891 — 97 Richard Henn Collins, later Lord q. r. s.
1892 - 1907 William Rann Kennedy q.
1892 - 1904 Gainsford Bruce
1897 — 1917 Edward Ridley
1897 - 1909 John Charles Bigham, later 
Viscount
p.
1897 — 1923 Charles John Darling, later Lord
1897 — 1914 Arthur Moseley Channell
1897 - 1913 Walter G. Frank Phillimore, later 
Lord
q.
1899 - 1915 Thomas Townsend Bucknill
1901 - 10 Joseph Walton
1901 — 10 Arthur Richard Jelf
1904 - 23 Reginald More Bray
1904 - 21 Alfred Tristram Lawrence, later Lord 
Trevethin
m.
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Queen* s Bench Division (G ont.)
1905 - 10 Henry Sutton
1907 - 14 William Pickford, later Lord Sterndale p.q.r.
1907 - 23 Bernard John Seymour Coleridge,
Lord
1909 - 12 John Andrew Hamilton, later Viscount q.s,
Sumner
1910 - 16 Thomas Edward Scrutton q.
1910 - 15 John Eldon Bankes q.
1 9 1 0 - 3 5  Horace Edmund Avory
1910 - 37 Thomas Gardner Horridge
1910 - 25 Charles Montagu Lush
1912 - 32 Sidney Arthur Taylor Rowlatt
1912 - 24 Clement Meacher Bailhache
1913 - 19 James Richard Atkin, later Lord q.s.
1914 - 29 Montague Shearman
1915 - 28 John Sankey, later Viscount q.
1915 - 18 Frederick Low
1916 - 33 Henry Alfred McCardie
1917 - 34 Alexander Adair Roche, later Lord q.s.
1917 - 28 Arthur Clavell Salter
1919 - 27 (Frederick) Arthur Greer, later Lord q.
Fairfield
1920 - 37 Rigby Phillip Watson Swift
1920 - 34 Edward Acton
1921 - 39 George A. Harwin Branson
1923 - 37 George John Talbot
1924 - 46 Frank Douglas MacKinnon
1924 - 27 Hugh Fraser
1924 - 38 William Finlay, Viscount q.
1925 - 32 Robert Alderson Wright, later r.s.
Lord
1928 - 41 (John) Anthony Hawke
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Queen* s Bench Division (Cont.)
1928 - 47 Ernest Bruce Charles
1928 - 51 Travers Humphreys
1928 - 47 Malcolm M. Macnaghten
1932 - 38 Herbert du Parcq, later Lord q.s.
1932 - 38 Rayner Goddard, later Lord m.q.s,
1932 - 44 Geoffrey Lawrence, later Lord q.s.
Trevethin and Oaksey
1933 - 48 Cyril Atkinson
1934 - 48 John Edward Singleton q.
1934 - 38 Samuel Lowry Porter, later Lord s.
1935 - 40 Walter Greaves-Lord
1935 - 62 Malcolm Hilbery
1935 - 50 Wilfred Hubert Poyer Lewis
1937 - 47 Frederick John Wrattesley q.
1937 - 45 Frederick James Tucker, later q.s.
Lord
1938 - 46 Cyril Asquith, later Lord q.s.
1938 - 57 Roland Giffard Oliver
1938 - 54 Reginald Powell Croom-Johnson
1938 - 68 Wintringham Norton Stable
1939 - 61 James Dale Cassels
1939 - 57 Hugh Imbert Periam Hallet
1941 - 50 (william) Norman Birkett, later q.
Lord
1944 - 57 George Justin Lynskey
1945 _ 51 John William Morris, Lord q.s.
1945 - 58 Stephen Ogle Henn-Gollins o.
1946 - 57 Frederic Aked Sellers q.
1947 - 53 Fred Ellis Pritchard
1947 - 66 Geoffrey Hugh Beslow Streatfeild
1947 - 60 Lawrence Austin Byrne o.
1948 - 62 Gerald Osborne Slade
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Queen*s Bench Division (Cont.)
1948 - 6l Austin Bills Lloyd Jones o.
1948 - 60 Patrick Arthur Devlin, later Lord q.s.
1948 - 64 Donald Leslie Pinnemore o.
1950 - 34 Hubert Lister Parker, later Lord m.q.
1950 - 64 William Gorman
1950 - 66 Patrick Redmond Joseph Barry
1930 - 66 Terence Norbert Donovan, later Lord q.s.
1930 - 37 Benjamin Ormerod o.q.
1930 - 66 William Lennox McNair
1931 - 61 Gonne St. Clair Pilcher o.
1931 - 61 Colin Hargreaves Pearson, later Lord q.s.
1932 - 67 Cecil Robert Havers o.
1933 - 68 Hildreth Glyn-Jones
1933 - 36 (Albert) Denis Gerrard
1934 - John Percy Ashworth
1934 - 37 Edward Holroyd Pearce, later Lord o.q.s.
1936 - 61 (William John) Kenneth Diplock, later q.s.
Lord
1937 - George Raymond Hinchcliffe
1937 - Gilbert James Pauli
1937 - 64 Cyril Barnet Salmon q.
1938 - 66 (Herbert) Edmund Davies q.
1938 - 66 Richard (Everard Augustine) Elwes
1938 - Gerald Alfred Thesiger
1959 - 63 (Charles) Rodger (Noel) Winn q.
1939 - 61 (william) Arthian Davies o.q,
1960 - 68 Penton Atkinson q.
i960 - 66 Eric Sachs o.q.
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Queen'£3 Bench Division (Cont.)
i960 - Basil Edward Nield
1961 — 71 (Stephen) Gerald Howard
1961 — (Aubrey) Melford (steed) Stevenson
1961 - Geoffrey de Paiva Veale
1961 - 69 John Megaw
1961 — 72 Frederick Horace Lawton
1961 — 68 John Passmore Widgery
1961 - Bernard Joseph Maxwell MacKenna
1961 - Alan Abraham Mocatta
1961 - John Thompson
1961 — 66 Archie Pellow Marshall
1962 - Daniel James Brabin
1962 - 71 Eustace Wentworth Roskill
1962 - 71 Maurice Légat Lyall
1962 — 71 John Frederick Eustace Stephenson
1962 - 68 Henry Josceline Phillimore
1964 - Helenus Patrick Joseph Milmo
1965 - Joseph Donaldson Cantley
1965 — Patrick Reginald Evelyn Browne
1965 - George Stanley Waller
1965 - 67 (Frederick) Geoffrey Laurence
1965 - Arthur Evan James
1965 — Eric Herbert Blain
1966 - Ralph Vincent Cusack
1966 - Stephen Chapman
1966 - John Ramsay Willis
1966 — Graham Russell Swanwick
1966 - Patrick McCarthy 0*Connor
1966 - John Francis Donaldson
1966 - Geoffrey Dawson Lane
1967 — Samuel Burgess Ridgway Cooke
O.
q,
o.
O.n.
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Queen*S Bench Division (Cont.)
1967 - (John) Robertson (Dunn) Crichton
1968 - Bernard Caulfield
1968 - 70 Henry Arthur Pears Fisher
1968 - Sebag Shaw
1968 - Hilary Gwynne Talbot
1968 - Edward Walter Eveleigh
1968 - Nigel Cyprian Bridge
1 • Shlef Justices .of the._Quecn' s Bench
1818 - 32 Charles Abbott, Lord Tenterden
1832 - 50 Thomas Denman, Lord
1850 - 59 John Campbell
1859 - 80 Alexander J. Edmund Cockburn
m. Lords Chief Justice
1880 - 94 John Duke Coleridge, Lord
1894 - 1900 Charles Russell, Lord Killowen
1900 - 13 Richard Everard Webster, Lord Alverstone
1913 - 21 Rufus Daniel Isaacs, Lord Reading, later
the Marquess of
1921 - 22 Alfred Tristram Lawrence, Lord Trevethin k.
1922 - 40 Gordon Hewart, Lord, later Viscount
1940 - 46 Thomas Walker Hobart Inskip, Lord
Caldecotè"
1946 - 58 Rgyner Goddard, Lord k.q.s
1958 - 71 Hubert Lister Parker, Lord k.q.
Probate. Divorce and Admiralty
n. Court of Probate
1858 - 63 Cresswell Cresswell g.
1863 - 72 James Pfeisted Wilde, Lord Penzance d.
1872 - 75 James Hannen, later Lord j.p.s,
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O. Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
1875 — 83 Robert Phillimore
1883 - 91 Charles Parker Butt P«
1891 — 92 Francis Henry Jeune, later Lord St. Helier p.
1892 — 1903 John Gorell Barnes, later Lord Gorell p.
1905 - 17 Henry Bargrave Deane
1917 — 30 Maurice Hill
1925 — 33 Alexander Dingwall Bateson
1930 - 42 George Phillip Langton
1935 — 43 Alfred Townsend Bucknill q.
1937 — 43 Stephen Ogle Henn-Collins k.
1937 - 31 Francis Lord Charlton Hodson, later Lord q.s.
1942 - 31 Gonne St. Clair Pilcher k.
1944 - 60 Hubert Joseph Wellington
1944 - 48 Alfred Thompson Denning, later Lord q. r. s.
1944 - 39 Henry William Barnard
1945 - 48 Austin Ellis Lloyd Jones k.
1945 — 47 Lawrence Austin Byrne k.
1945 - 38 (Henry) Gordon Willmer q.
1947 — 48 Donald Leslie Finnemore k.
1948 — 30 Benjamin Ormerod k. q.
1948 - 34 Edward Holroyd Pearce, later Lord k. q. 8.
1950 - 62 Charles Arthur Collingwood
1951 - 68 Seymour Edward Karminski q.
1951 - 32 Cecil Robert Havers k.
1952 - 39 (william) Arthian Davies k.q.
1954 — 60 Eric Sachs k.q.
1957 - 61 (Aubrey) Melford (Steed) Stevenson k.
1958 - Geoffrey Walter Wrangham
1958 — 66 (Joseph) Bushby Hewson
1959 — 61 Archie Pellow Marshall k.
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Probate . Divorce and Admiralty Division (C ont,)
1959 - 62 Henry Josceline Phillimore k.q.
I960 - 72 (Harry) Vincent Lloyd-Jones
I960 - 70 David Arnold Scott Cairns
1961 — 71 George Gillespie Baker
1961 - Leslie (George) Scarman
1961 - Roger (Pray Greenwood) Ormrod
1962 - Charles William Stanley Rees
1962 - Reginald Withers Payne
1963 - Neville Major Ginner Faulks
1964 — (Robert) James (Lindsay) Stirling
1964 — (James) Roualeyn Summing-Bruce
1965 - John (Brinsmead) Latey
1965 - Hugh Fames Pack
1965 - Elizabeth Kathleen Lane
1965 - 71 Alan Stewart Orr
1966 - Henry (Vivian) Brandon
Presidents of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
1875 - 91 James Hannen, later Lord j.n.s.
1891 - 92 Charles Parker Butt 0 .
1892 - 1905 Francis Henry Jeune, Lord St. Helier 0 .
1905 - 09 John Gorell Barnes, Lord Gorell 0 .
1909 - 10 John Charles Bigham, Lord, later 
Viscount
k.
1910 - 18 Samuel Thomas Evans
1918 - 19 William Pickford, Lord Sterndale k.q.r.
1919 - 33 Henry E. Duke, Lord Merrivale q.
1933 - 62 Frank Boyd Merriman, Lord
1962 - 71 Jocelyn Edward Salis Simon
The Court of Appeal
Lords Justices of Appeal
1876 - 81 William Milbourne James
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Lords Justices of Appeal (Cont.) 
George Hellish 
Richard Baggalay
1876 - 77
1875 - 85
1876 - 81
1876 - 83
1876 - 77
1877 - 90
1877 - 80
1880 - 81
1881 - 97
1882
1883 - 92
1885 - 97
1888 - 93
1890 — 97
1892 — 1900
1893 - 94
1894 — 1901
1897 - 99
1897 — 1901
1897 - 1914
1899 — 1906
1900 — 06
1901 — 05
1901 — 07
1906 - 12
1906 - 13
1906 - 15
1907 - 15
1912 — 13
George W. VVilshere Bramwell, later d.
Lord
William Baliol Brett, later Viscount Esher g.r. 
Richard Paul Amphlett d.
Henry Cotton 
Alfred Henry Thesiger
Robert Lush j.
Nathaniel Lindley, later Lord h.r.s.
John HoIker
Edward Fry b.
Henry Charles Lopes, Lord
Charles Synge Christopher Bonwen, k. s.
Lord
Edward Ebenezer Kay b.
Archibald Lewin Smith k.r.
Horace Davey, later Lord 
John Rigby
Joseph William Chitty b. .
Richard Henn Collins, later Lord k.r.s.
Roland (Bowdler) Vaughan Williams k.
Robert Romer b.
James Stirling b.
James Charles Mathew k.
Herbert Hardy Cozens-Hardy, later b.r.
Lord
John Fletcher Moulton, later - s.
Lord
George Farwell b.
Henry Buhton Buckley, later Lord Wrenbury b.
William Rann Kennedy k,
John Andrew Hamilton, later Viscount k.s.
Sumner
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1913 — 18 Charles Swinfen Eady, later Lord Swinfen b.r.
1913 — 16 Walter G. Frank Phillimore, later Lord k.
1914 — 18 William Pickford, later Lord Sterndale k.p.r.
1915 - 27 John Eldon Bankes k.
1915 — 26 Thomas Rolls Warrington, later Lord b.
1916 - 34 Thomas Edward Scrutton k.
1918 - 19 Henry E. Duke, later Lord Merrivale p.
1919 — 28 James Richard Atkin, later Lord k. 8.
1919 — 23 Robert Younger, later Lord Blanesburgh b. s.
1923 - 28 Charles Henry Sargant b.
1926 — 34 Paul Ogden Lawrence b.
1927 - 38 (Frederick) Arthur Greer k.
1928 - 29 John Sankey, later Viscount k.
1928 - 29 Frank Xavier Joseph Russell, later Lord b. 8.
1929 - 40 Henry Slesser
1929 — 38 Mark Lemon Romer, later Lord b. s.
1934 - 35 Frederick Herbert Maugham, later Lord b. 8.
1934 — 35 Alexander Adair Roche, later Lord k. s.
1935 - 37 Wilfred Arthur Greene, later Lord
1935 - 48 Leslie Frederic Scott
1937 — 46 Frank Douglas MacKinnon
1938 — 42 Albert Charles Clauson, later i<ord b.
1938 - 45 William Finlay, Viscount k.
1938 — 44 (Arthur) Fairfax C.C. Luxmoore b.
1938 - Zi4 Rayner Goddard, later Lord k.m. 8.
1938 — 46 Herbert du Parcq, later Lord k. 8.
1944 - 47 Geoffrey Lawrence, Lord Trevethin and 
Oaksey
k. s.
1944 — 47 Fergus Dunlop Morton, later Lord b. s.
1945 - 50 Frederick James Tucker, later Lord k. s.
1945 — 51 Alfred Townsend Bucknill q. o.
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1946 — 54 Donald Bradley Somerwell, later Lord
1946 — 51 Cyril Asquith, later lord k. s.
1946 — 51 Lionel Leonard Cohen, later Lord b, s .
1947 - 48 Frederic John Wrottesley k.
1947 - 49 Francis Raymond Evershed, later Lord b.r. 8.
1948 - 57 John Edward Singleton k.
1948 — 57 Alfred Thompson Denning, later Lord o. r. s.
1949 - 59 David Llewelyn Jenkins, later Lord k. 8.
1950 - 57 (william) Norman Birkett, later Lord k.
1951 - 60 Francis Lord Charlton Hodson, later Lord o. s.
1951 - 60 John William Morris, later Lord k. 8.
1951 - 60 Charles Robert Ritchie Romer b.
1954 - 58 Hubert Lister Parker, later Lord k.m.
1957 - 68 Frederic Aked Sellers ko
1957 - 63 Benjamin Ormerod k. 0.
1957 — 62 Edward Holroyd Pearce, later Lord k.o.s.
1958 - 69 (Henry) Gordon Willmer o.
1959 - 70 Charles Eustace Harman b.
I960 — 63 Terence Norbert Donovan, later Lord k. 8.
I960 - 61 Patrick Arthur Devlin, later Lord k. s.
I960 _ 63 Gerald Ritchie Upjohn, later Lord b. 8.
1961 - 69 Harold Otto Danckwerts b.
1961 — 65 Colin Hargreaves Pearson, later Lord k. s.
1961 - (William) Arthian Davies k. o.
1961 - 68 (William John) Kenneth Diplock, later 
Lord
k. s.
1962 — Charles Ritchie Russell b.
1964 — 72 Cyril Barnet Salmon k.
1965 - (Charles) Rodger (Noel) Winn k.
1966 - Eric Sachs k. o.
1966 — (Herbert) Edmund Davies k.
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Lords J u stices of Appeal (C o n t .)
1968 - 71 Fenton Atkinson k.
1968 - Henry Josceline Phillimore k.o.
1968 “ 71 John Passmore Widgery k.
1968 - Seymour Edward Karminski o.
r. Masters of the Rolls
1818 “ 24 Thomas Plumer
1824 - 26 Robert Gifford, Lord
1826 - 27 John Singleton Copley, later Lord
Lyndhurst
1827 - 34 John Leach a.
1834 - 36 Charles Christopher Pepys, Lord Cottenham,
later Viscount
1836 - 51 Henry Bickersteth,' Lord Langdale
1851 - 73 John Romilly, Lord
1873 - 83 George Jessel
1883 - 97 William Baliol Brett, Lord Esher, later g.q.
Viscount
1897 - 1900 Nathaniel Lindley, later Lord h.q.s.
1900 Richard Everard Webster, Lord Alverstone,
later Viscount
1900 - 01 Archibald Levin Smith k.q.
1901 “ 07 Richard Henn Collins, later Lord k.q.s.
1907 - 18 Herbert Hardy Cozens-Hardy, Lord b.q.
1918 - 19 Charles Swinfen Eady, Lord Swin f e n  b.q.
1919 - 23 William Pickford, Lord Sterndale k.p.q.
1923 - 35 Ernest Murray Pollock, Lord, later
Viscount
1 9 3 5  _ 3 7 Robert Alderson Wright, Lord k. s.
1937 - 49 Wilfred Arthur Greene, Lord
1949 - 62 Francis Raymond Evershed, Lord b.q. s.
1962 - Alfred Thompson Denning, Lord . o.q.s.
A p p ellate Committee of the House of L o rds
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1876 — 86 Colin Blackburn, Lord j.
1876 - 79 Edward Strathearn Gordon, Lord
1880 - 99 William Watson, Lord
1882 — 89 John David Fitzgerald, Lord
1887 — 1913 Edward Macnaghten, Lord
1889 - 1900 Michael Morris, Lord
1891 - 94 James Hannen, Lord j.n.p.
1893 — 94 Charles Synge Christopher Bowen, Lord k. q.
1894 - 1907 Horace Davey, Lord
1894 Charles Russell, Lord Killowen
1899 - 1909 James Patrick Bannerman Robertson, Lord
1900 - 05 Nathaniel Lindley, Lord h. q. r.
1905 - 28 John Atkinson, Lord
1907 — 10 Richard Henn Collins, Lord k. q. r.
1909 — 29 Thomas Shaw, Lord
1910 - 12 William Snowdon Robson, Lord
1912 - 21 John Fletcher Moulton, Lord
1913 - 18 Robert John Parker, Lord b.
1913 - 32 Andrew Graham Murray, Viscount Dunedin
1913 - 30 John Andrews Hamilton, Viscount Sumner k« q#
1918 - 22 George Cave, Viscount
1921 - 29 Edward Henry Carson, Lord
1923 - 37 Robert Younger, Lord Blanesburgh b.q.
1928 — 44 James Richard Atkin, Lord k.q.
1929 - 35 Thomas James Cheshyre Tomlin, Lord b.
1929 - 48 William Watson, Lord Thankerton
1929 — 46 Francis Xavier Joseph Russell, Lord b. q.
1930 — 39 Hugh Pattison MacMillan, Lord
1941 — 47 II II II II
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Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (Cont.)
1932 — 35 Robert Alderson W r i g h t , Lord k. r.
1937 - 47 It II II I
1935 - 38 Frederick Herbert Maugham, Viscount b.q.
1939 — 41 II II II II
1935 — 38 Alexander Adair Roche, Lord k. q.
1938 — 44 Mark Lemon Romer, Lord b. q.
1938 — 54 Samuel Lowry Porter, Lord k.
1944 — 51 Gavin Turnbull Simonds, Viscount b.
1954 - 62 II 11 II I
1944 — 46 Rayner Goddard, Lord k.m.q.
1946 — 49 Augustus Andrewes Uthwatt, Lord b.
1946 - 49 Herbert du Parcq, Lord k. q.
1947 - 53 Wilfred Guild Normand, Lord
1947 — 57 Geoffrey Lawrence, Lord Trevethin and 
Oaksey
k.q.
1947 - 59 Fergus Dunlop Morton, Lord b.q.
1947 — 51 John Clarke MacDermott, Lord^
1948 - James Scott Cumberland Reid, Lord
1949 - 64 Cyril John Radcliffe, Viscount
1949 - 50 Wilfred Arthur Greene, Lord
1950 — 61 Frederick James Tucker, Lord k.q.
1951 — 54 Cyril Asquith, Lord k.q.
1951 - 60 Lionel Leonard Cohen, Lord b. q.
1953 — 61 James Keith, Lord
1954 — 60 Donald Bradley Somerwell, Lord
1957 - 62 Alfred Thompson Denning, Lord 0 . q. r.
1959 — 63 David Llewelyn Jenkins, Lord b.q.
I960 — John William Morris, Lord k.q.
I960 — 71 Francis Lord Charlton Hodson, Lord o.q.
1961 — 71 Christopher William Graham Guest, Lord
1961 - 64 Patrick Arthur Devlin, Lord k.q.
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Lords of Appeal In Ordinary (Cont.)
1962 - 69 Edward Holroyd Pearce, Lord k.o.q
1962 - 65 Francis Raymond Evershed, Lord b. r. 8
1963 - Gerald Ritchie Upjohn, Lord b. q.
1963 - Terence Norbert Donovan, Lord k.q.
1964 - Richard Orme Wilberforce, Lord b.
1965 - Colin Hargreaves Pearson, Lord k. q.
1968 - (william John) Kenneth Diplock, Lord k. q.
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